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
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ANTHONY WAYNE.

Anthony Wayne

SOMETIMES CALLED "MAD ANTHONY"

BY

JOHN R. SPEARS



NEW YORK

D. Appleton and Company

1903

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ANTHONY WAYNE

CHAPTER I

YOUTHFUL EXPERIENCES

It was in the midst of the most stirring period of the history of the colony of Pennsylvania that Anthony Wayne grew from infancy to manhood, for he "was born in the township of Easttown, Chester County, Pennsylvania, on the first day of January, 1745." The Indian traders from Pennsylvania during that year penetrated the unbroken wilderness as far as Sandusky Bay, on Lake Erie, where they established a post, and thus greatly alarmed the French of Canada, who claimed the whole Mississippi watershed as their territory. In 1749 the French sent an expedition under Bienville de Celeron to the Ohio Valley to "restore tranquillity" among the Indian villages, and to plant certain lead plates in the earth, each of which was to be a "monument of the renewal of possession by the French." But this did not re-

Anthony Wayne

strain the British colonial enterprise, and in 1752, when Wayne was seven years old, and well able to comprehend the stories from the frontier, a dozen British frontiersmen were building cabins in the valley of the Monongahela. At the same time, however, a French force under Charles Langlade attacked the British trading-post called Picawillany, in the Ohio country, and that attack begun the bloody war that was to end only when the French had been driven from the valley.

Before snow flew that year the French had built forts at Presq'isle (now Erie), Pa., and where Waterford, Pa., now stands, at what was then the head of canoe navigation in French Creek, a branch of the Alleghany River.

A year later (November 16, 1753), Washington crossed the Alleghany Mountain divide on his celebrated mission to the French at Le Bœuf, and in February following the Virginians were building a fort at the forks of the Ohio. Then came the French under Contrecoeur, to compel the surrender of the new stockade on April 17, 1754, and in 1755, when Wayne was ten years old, Braddock came, intending to drive the French not only from the forks of the Ohio, but from Niagara,

Youthful Experiences

and from Crown Point, on Lake Champlain, as well. The story of the frightful slaughter that followed on the banks of the Monongahela was thoroughly well known to the youthful Wayne, and it is not improbable that he saw the miserable troops under Dunbar, who, in their retreat, crossed Chester County and reached Philadelphia.

Then came "the two dismal years" of 1756 and 1757, wherein the Indians, led by French officers, crossed the Alleghanies, and with torch and tomahawk raided the settlers within 60 miles of Philadelphia. Worse raiding was never known than that. "The Indians do not make any prisoners," wrote Father Claude Godfroy Cocquard, S. J., in a letter to his brother in 1757. "They kill all they meet—men, women, and children. Every day they have some in their kettle, and after having abused the women and maidens, they slaughter and burn them."

Wayne's father had been a militia officer who was locally distinguished as an Indian fighter. The boy lived where he saw the frightened fugitives from the interior fleeing to Philadelphia for protection. He heard their pitiful stories. He knew all about the raising of the force that, under Col. John

Anthony Wayne

Armstrong, went to Kittanning and inflicted some injury on the Indians, but failed to bring peace. Whether he knew much about, or comprehended, the negotiations with the Indians conducted thereafter, is a question; but when General Forbes organized an army at Philadelphia, in 1758, to retrieve the losses of the preceding years, we may be confident that Wayne knew all about that work. And how all these stirring events affected the mind of the lad is a matter of record.

For during the conflict Wayne was attending a school taught by his uncle Gilbert (or Gabriel) Wayne, and this uncle, exasperated at the boy's conduct, wrote the following letter to Anthony's father, Isaac Wayne:

"I really expect that parental affection blinds you, and that you have mistaken your son's capacity. What he may be best qualified for, I know not—one thing I am certain of, he will never make a scholar; he may perhaps make a soldier; he has already distracted the brains of two-thirds of the boys under my charge, by rehearsals of battles, sieges, etc. They exhibit more the appearance of Indians and Harlequins than students. This one decorated with a cap of many colors, others habited in coats as variegated, like Jo-

Youthful Experiences

seph's of old—*some laid up with broken heads and black eyes.* During noon, in place of the usual games of amusement, he has the boys employed in throwing up redoubts, skirmishing, etc. I must be candid with you, brother Isaac—unless Anthony pays more attention to his books, I shall be under the painful necessity of dismissing him from the school.”

It was in the summer of 1759 that this letter was written. The boy's natural talent for deeds of war had been cultivated by the stirring tales of Braddock's defeat, and the French raids, and the colonial acts of resistance, until he made himself the leader of the boys at the school, and tried to make soldiers of them.

After the letter was read at home young Wayne showed one other mark of the good soldier—a ready subordination to authority. His father ordered him to return to school and devote himself to his studies, instead of to mimic war, and he did it. “He persevered so effectually that at the end of eighteen months, his uncle acknowledged that he could instruct him no further.”

Accordingly, on the recommendations of his uncle, Anthony was sent to the academy in Philadelphia, where he remained two years.

Anthony Wayne

“His attachment to mathematical science was so ardent, and his zeal to reach its summit so great, that the united solicitations of his friends and tutors could not prevail on him to devote more time to the dead languages than what was merely sufficient for the acquirement of their rudiments.” But when, at the age of eighteen, he left school, he had thoroughly fitted himself for the career of a surveyor.

The school experiences of Wayne afford a notable parallel to those of Washington. England was at war with Spain while Washington was attending Hobby's school, and the tales which the lad heard about the deeds of Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth in the West Indies (with whom Laurence Washington, the half-brother of George, was serving) led him to “make soldiers of his schoolmates.” “All his amusements took a military turn,” and “they had mimic parades, reviews, and sham fights,” according to Irving, though it does not appear that there were any black eyes or broken heads in young Washington's battles.

Then, when Washington left Hobby's care for that of Williams, “he never attempted to learn the languages, but in land surveying”

Youthful Experiences

he "schooled himself thoroughly." So says Irving.

The parallel in the lives of these men, who were to be so usefully connected in later years, extends somewhat beyond their school-days. Washington became acquainted with Lord Fairfax, who was then the great man of Virginia. Fairfax saw the inherent worth of the youth, and employed him in surveying the wide Fairfax domain in the beautiful Shenandoah Valley. Wayne, in some way not recorded, became acquainted with Franklin, who was then the great man of Pennsylvania, and was employed by him in a still more important trust than that which Fairfax confided to Washington.

On leaving school, Wayne used his compass and chain in the wilds of Pennsylvania, giving his spare time meanwhile to the study of civil engineering and astronomy. It was a life well suited to the taste of the youth, for the work took him into the wilderness, where the days were passed in running lines over mountains and across valleys and gorges, while at night he slept by an open fire. There were dangers enough to excite his love of adventure, including, indeed, the danger of an encounter with stray Indians looking for pri-

Anthony Wayne

vate revenge for old injuries. It was while thus employed that he attracted the attention of Franklin.

Franklin, after the French power was destroyed in Canada, organized an association (1764) "for the purpose of purchasing and settling a large body of land in the Province of Nova Scotia." His company included "many wealthy and distinguished characters," all of whom, however, were speculators, as Franklin was, and not desirous of going to Nova Scotia on any account. A man was needed to take entire charge of the emigrants who were to be sent there—help them select their lands, survey out plots for them, make and enforce contracts, and in every way promote the interests of the settlers and the company. It is certain that no boy twenty years old would be selected for such a task in the twentieth century, but in 1765 Franklin selected Anthony Wayne for it.

Wayne left Philadelphia in the month of March, with a company of settlers, and on reaching Nova Scotia, he selected a tract of 100,000 acres on the St. John's River, and another of equal extent on the Piticoodzack. The records of the Crown Land Office at Quebec show that warrants for the tracts were

Youthful Experiences

issued to Wayne, in the name of the company, on October 31, 1765 (Stille). It is apparent that Wayne must have surveyed these tracts during the warm season, besides attending to his other duties. What these other duties were appears in part from the instructions given him. He was to ascertain (says Stille) whether "the land proposed to be bought and settled upon was, 1. Good & supplied with navigable waters. 2. To observe where were the heads of navigation in the Rivers, that is, the tide. 3. Convenient places for ferries. 4. Passes through the mountains. 5. Iron ore & cole mines. 6. Mill seats & other waterworks. 7. Places where the roads meet. 8. Beaches or islands with black sand washed up. 9. Mast lands or pure swamps. 10. Lime stone or other stones. 11. Meadow lands and marsh. 12. Large springs or any mineral springs."

Wayne did these things while managing his company of settlers (some of whom were doubtless homesick and discontented) and surveying the lands in an absolute wilderness. In December he returned to Philadelphia with his report, and the report was to the entire satisfaction of the company. He was continued in the post of resident manager and re-

Anthony Wayne

turned to Nova Scotia in the following season, where he continued his work with entire success. But when the second year's work had been completed "the menacing character of the controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies put an end to the enterprise" (Sparks).

Before telling what Wayne did after the impending political troubles put an end to the Nova Scotia enterprise, it is worth while to consider, for a moment, the facts, so far as known, of Wayne's ancestry.

The story of Anthony Wayne's ancestors begins with his grandfather, who was a native of Yorkshire, England, and also bore the name of Anthony. When still a young man this grandfather moved to the County Wicklow, Ireland, where he was engaged in farming. But being a man of means and influence, "he occasionally executed some civil as well as military offices." As a Protestant he joined the forces of William of Orange, under whom he commanded a troop of dragoons at the battle of the Boyne, "and he greatly distinguished himself by gallantry in that decisive battle" (Stille). One likes to note that the Wayne of Stony Point came of good fighting stock.

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In 1722 the grandfather came to Philadelphia, and after two years spent, presumably, in examining the country, he purchased 1,600 acres of land in Chester County, Pennsylvania. His family, at this time, consisted of his wife and four sons, the youngest of whom was named Isaac. These sons were established on the estate as farmers.

At the death of the grandfather Isaac inherited a plot of 500 acres, within two miles of the village of Paoli, and it was on this farm that Anthony Wayne, the subject of this memoir, was born. It is recorded that Isaac Wayne was a man of "great industry and enterprise," and that his wife was a woman of great "force of character."

Isaac "frequently represented the county of Chester in the provincial legislature," and as a militia officer "repeatedly distinguished himself in expeditions against the Indians." He was celebrated as a patriotic Pennsylvanian. He died in 1774, leaving one son—Anthony—and two daughters.

When, in 1767, young Anthony's work in Nova Scotia came to an end because of the ominous character of the political outlook, he married Mary, the daughter of Bartholomew Penrose, a prominent Philadelphia merchant,

Anthony Wayne

and took her to his father's estate at Waynesborough, in Chester County. Here he established a tannery and devoted himself to the management of it and the family estate.

Wayne's work in Nova Scotia had enlarged his capacities and cultivated his abilities. It had been an experience in leadership that was especially valuable, and it had broadened his views of the world.

Naturally in his new home life, wherein he was a manager of business operations and a leader of workmen, he still further cultivated the abilities that had given him success in Nova Scotia. Moreover, he was elected by the people of the county to various local offices, and this not only strengthened his faculties as a leader of men, but it gave him opportunity to learn something—perhaps much—of the character of the American system of government that was then developing. It also gave him opportunity to strengthen that good-will among the people of his county (and of Philadelphia as well), which his previous work had created.

In short, from the days when the stories of the war with the French and Indians incited him to organize his schoolmates for sham battles, wherein some got black eyes and

Youthful Experiences

broken heads, down to the year 1774, when the death of his father threw him wholly upon his own resources, the life of Anthony Wayne was admirably adapted to fit him for leadership among men of affairs.

The "controversy between Great Britain and her Colonies," in compelling him to abandon the work of promoting the settlement of the Nova Scotia wilderness, had seemed to cut him off from a great opportunity for useful labor, but now that "controversy" was to open for him a career wherein he was to use with all his might, not only every natural capacity and faculty he possessed, but all that he had been able to acquire through his unusual experiences. At the death of his father, in 1774, the work of Anthony Wayne in the American Revolution was already begun.

CHAPTER II

AS A CITIZEN OF THE COLONY OF PENNSYLVANIA

OF the life of Anthony Wayne during the stirring times immediately preceding the War of the Revolution we have many glimpses in the public documents that remain, if no complete account. Thus we find that when the Pennsylvania Assembly met in Philadelphia on October 14, 1774, Wayne was one of the "Representatives of the freemen" of Chester County. The first thing done in this Assembly, after the usual formalities of organization, was to add John Dickinson "to the committee of deputies appointed . . . to attend the General Congress now sitting in the City of Philadelphia on American Grievances." The next thing done was to resolve "That this House will provide an Entertainment to be given on Thursday next," to the members of this Congress, and it was ordered that eight members, of whom Wayne was one, "be a committee to provide and superintend the said Entertainment."

As a Citizen of Pennsylvania

Wayne and his neighbors, including the Quakers, who, from principle, would not fight, were firm in their opposition to the aggressions of the British ministry, and it was natural to expect the pugnacious schoolboy whose sham battles had given the combatants black eyes and broken heads would develop into a man who would be earnest in defending the natural rights of himself and his countrymen.

When the British ministry had determined to send the tea to the American colonies in spite of the resolutions which the colonists had taken in refusing to buy it, several of the tea fleet, including the ship *Polly*, Captain Ayres, were headed for Philadelphia. On learning this the Philadelphians held a public meeting at the State-House on October 17, 1773. At this meeting a committee was appointed to "request" the agents of the tea company to resign. This committee duly represented to the agents "the detestation and abhorrence" which any attempt to sell tea would cause, and also "the *danger* and difficulties which must attend so odious a trust," with the result that the agents resigned their commissions.

On December 25th the *Polly* reached Ches-

Anthony Wayne

ter and was promptly reported to the people of Philadelphia. A committee of citizens rode down the river-bank, and at two o'clock next day hailed the Polly, when off Gloucester Point, and requested Captain Ayres to anchor and come ashore, which, on seeing the great throng gathered and the manifest earnestness of the people, he did.

The committee represented to him "the *danger* and difficulties " that would attend any attempt to land the tea, and then took him to town to attend a public meeting wherein the number of people gathered was so great that the State-House could not hold them, and they "adjourned into the square." Here the following resolutions were not only agreed to, but the public approbation was testified in the warmest manner. (Principles and Acts of Revolution, p. 171.)

That the tea on board the ship Polly *shall not be landed.*

That the captain shall be allowed to stay in town till to-morrow to provide necessaries for his voyage.

That he *shall then be obliged to leave* the town and proceed to his vessel, and make the best of his way out of our river and bay.

The attitude and enthusiasm of the people

As a Citizen of Pennsylvania

at the mass meeting, together with the vigilance and determination of the "committee of four gentlemen," awed Captain Ayres into leaving Delaware Bay and carrying the tea back to England. Destroying the tea was not necessary at Philadelphia, but that it would have been destroyed had an effort been made to land it is evident from the following extract from the report of the public meeting where Captain Ayres was present:

The assembly were then informed of the spirit and resolution of New York, Charleston, South Carolina, and the conduct of the people of Boston, whereupon it was unanimously resolved—

That this assembly highly approve of the conduct and spirit of the people of New York, Charleston and Boston, and return their hearty thanks to the people of Boston for their resolution in destroying the tea, rather than suffering it to be landed.

There is no record that Wayne was present at any of these proceedings, but it is likely enough that he had part in that eventful public meeting, and it is certain that he approved all that was done there. For not only was he forward in doing public honor to the first Continental Congress that assembled at Philadelphia (September 5, 1774), but when

Anthony Wayne

a meeting of the people of Chester County was held "at the Court House in the Borough of Chester" (December 20, 1774), to choose a committee "to carry into execution the Association of the late Continental Congress," Anthony Wayne was the first man selected for that committee, and his associates elected him chairman.

Of the work of Anthony Wayne as a member of the Colonial Assembly at this time I have found one more fact memorable here. When it was moved (March 4, 1775) that "the Doors be opened and the reputable inhabitants admitted to hear the debates," the motion was lost, but Wayne was one of the fearless minority who were willing to express their opinions freely in public.

After the assault of the British troops upon the minutemen at Lexington, Mass. (April 19, 1775), the Chester County Committee of Safety held a meeting (May 15), at which it was unanimously resolved that it was the "indispensable duty of all the freemen of" Chester County "immediately to form and enter into associations *for the purpose of learning the military art.*" "And we solemnly engage to promote such associations to the utmost of our power."

As a Citizen of Pennsylvania

Wayne had very clear ideas of his duties as a patriot at this time, and others equally clear on the practical work to be done; for the committee resolved that "no powder be expended in this county," except as directed by the committee. And it was further resolved that the committee meet "to consult, the Justices, Grand Jury, and Board of Commissioners and Assessors on ways and means to procure a proper quantity of Arms and Ammunition for use of this county."

Wayne was fully convinced that the colonies would all be involved in war, and he began to study every book on military tactics and the art of war that he could obtain. Every history that gave a description of battles was as eagerly read as text-books for a military academy would have been, if within his reach. Marshal Saxe's Campaigns was his favorite work, as his letters show.

Further than that, Wayne put in practise as well as he could all that he learned about the manual of arms and the maneuvering of troops. "Every day which he could spare from other public duties, he devoted to performing the service of drill officer, and infusing into the minds of his fellow citizens a knowledge of military science." He was a

Anthony Wayne

man of whom Carlyle might have said that he fully understood that "the All of Things is an infinite conjugation of the verb *To Do*." "His growing popularity brought to his standard large assemblages of the youths of Chester County wherever he appointed a drill, and the confidence which they reposed in his skill and intrepidity was an earnest of the most prompt and strict attention to his orders should the occasion come" for giving orders in time of battle.

In those days—the summer of 1775—the activity of the patriotic Pennsylvanians was so great that John Adams, on observing it, wrote from Philadelphia that one "would burst to see whole companies of armed Quakers in that city, in uniforms, going through the manual."

And yet these men sincerely deprecated the idea (which their enemies advanced) that they were seeking the independence of the colonies. On September 25, 1775, the Chester County Committee declared by unanimous vote "their abhorrence even of an idea so pernicious in its nature, as they ardently wish for nothing more than a happy and speedy reconciliation on constitutional principles."

From the head of the Chester County

As a Citizen of Pennsylvania

Committee Wayne was promoted to a place on the Colonial Committee of Safety, by the resolution of the Provincial Assembly on June 30, 1775. There were 25 men in this Colonial Committee, and among them were Benjamin Franklin, John Dickinson, and Robert Morris. One notes (see Force's Archives) that the resolution places the word "Gentlemen" at the end of the list of names.

On this day the Assembly also urged each county to provide "good new Firelocks, with Bayonets fitted to them"—in all 4,500 for the province—and the fact that bayonets were mentioned is presumptive evidence that Wayne had a hand in wording the resolution. Moreover, the Assembly urged that enough minutemen be enlisted to use the firelocks, and that ammunition be provided for them. The Assembly also voted to pay £20 for every hundredweight of saltpeter that any one would manufacture in the province, and authorized the issue of bills of credit to the value of £25,000.

Of the work of the Provincial Committee of Safety, it is worth noting that at the first meeting it resolved that the barrels of the muskets to be carried by the Pennsylvania soldiers should "be three feet eight inches in

Anthony Wayne

length, well fortified, the bore of sufficient size to carry seventeen balls to the pound."

Thereafter committees were appointed to look after the collection of military supplies. Doctor Franklin was "requested to procure the model of a Pike." The construction of a provincial navy to defend the river received careful attention. Wayne had an active hand in providing men for the crews of these boats, and in connection with this work we find in the minutes of the proceedings for July 15, 1775, that he was officially mentioned as Colonel Wayne.

On August 3d Wayne was appointed one of a subcommittee to write the rules and regulations for the government of the militia and naval forces of the province. But to avoid details that might prove wearisome it may be said that Wayne was a most active member of this committee, and he had a personal part in the most important work done until the 7th of February, 1776.

In the meantime, however, Congress, in preparing to resist the invading British, had requested (October 12, 1775) Pennsylvania to raise a battalion of infantry, at the expense of the continent, to consist of 8 companies, each of which was to have 68 privates, with 1

As a Citizen of Pennsylvania

captain, 1 lieutenant, and 1 ensign, besides 8 non-commissioned officers. On December 9th. Congress ordered that four more battalions of the same size be raised in Pennsylvania, and it was resolved that the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety be asked to choose "a number of gentlemen, to be recommended to the Congress as proper persons to be appointed colonels" of the four battalions.

Accordingly, on January 3d, a meeting of the committee was held, with 24 members present and Franklin in the chair. It appears that they began with the Fourth Battalion, for which Wayne was unanimously recommended by his associates on the committee. John Shee then received 23 votes for colonel of the Third, Arthur St. Clair 23 for colonel of the Second, and Robert Magan 20 for colonel of the First.

On the same day the Congress confirmed the choice thus made, and the commission of Anthony Wayne as a colonel in the Continental service bore that date.

CHAPTER III

IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR

ANTHONY WAYNE was just thirty years old when he was made commander of the Fourth Pennsylvania Battalion. He was above the average in height—"a handsome manly figure"—with dark waving hair, deep hazel eyes, and a frank and animated expression of the face that was wonderfully attractive. How far his looks depicted his character shall appear in the course of this memoir, but it may be observed here that he was fastidious in his dress to a point that eventually gave him the name of "Dandy" Wayne. And because this peculiarity of his character was manifested in notable fashion at one of the most interesting events of his career, it seems worth while to say something more about it here. It is certain, first of all, that he was quite as anxious to have his men elegantly clothed as he was to wear a fine uniform himself. Stille speaks of Wayne's "apparent anxiety for the military appearance of" his men as a "little piece of pardonable vanity,"

In the Early Days of the War

and adds that it seems "amusing enough when we recall the rough hard work which his regiment had to do." But the fact is that the desire for clothes for himself and men did not by any means rest on vanity. The matter was the subject of correspondence between Wayne and Washington. In a letter dated July 8, 1779 (when the assault on Stony Point was near at hand), Wayne wrote to Washington to call attention to the "difficulty that the light corps experience in receiving the necessary supplies of clothing," and suggests a plan for procuring what was desirable. He then says that with the clothing thus to be procured "I flatter myself that we shall have it in our power to introduce uniformity among the light corps belonging to the respective states, and *infuse a laudable pride and emulation into the whole, which, in a soldier, are a substitute for almost every other virtue.*"

"I must acknowledge that I have an insuperable bias in favor of an elegant uniform and soldierly appearance; so much so, that I would rather risk my life and reputation at the head of the same men in an attack, clothed and appointed as I could wish, merely with bayonets and a single charge of ammunition, than to take them as they appear in common,

Anthony Wayne

with sixty rounds of cartridges. It may be a false idea, but I cannot help cherishing it."

And let it not be forgotten that Washington replied to this: "*I agree perfectly with you as to the importance of dress.*"

Of the men Wayne first commanded we have a few glimpses worth reproducing. Bloodgood, the author of the *Sexagenary*, when a boy of twelve years, was employed as a teamster to haul supplies from Albany to the American forces in Canada during the winter of 1775-76, and the First Pennsylvania Battalion overhauled his convoy on the road to Lake Champlain. Bloodgood writes:

They were the most quarrelsome, and I regret to say, profligate set of men I had ever seen together. They had plenty of money with them, and spent it profusely. The vices of insubordination, gambling and rioting, marked their battalia, and we ourselves had great trouble with them.

After making due allowance for the prejudices of the boy "who had great trouble with them," it seems likely that this is not an unfair portrayal of Wayne's men as well as those of the First Battalion. They were boisterous on their way to Canada—had fist fights not a few among themselves, doubtless—and

In the Early Days of the War

it is certain that they were not overtender of the feelings of teamsters along the way.

Remembering that all the colonies lying southwest of the Delaware River were called "southern," the following from Thatcher's Journal is of interest:

Since the troops from the Southern states have been associated in military duty with those from New England, a strong prejudice has assumed its unhappy influence, and drawn a line of distinction between them. Many of the officers from the South are gentlemen of education, and unaccustomed to that equality which prevails in New England. . . . Hence we too frequently hear the burlesque epithet of Yankee from one party and that of Buckskin, by way of retort, from the other.

Under date of December 26, 1777 (when Wayne was in command at Ticonderoga), Thatcher writes this:

A singular kind of riot took place in our barracks last evening. Colonel A. W., of Massachusetts, made choice of his two sons, who were soldiers in his regiment, to discharge the menial duties of waiters, and one of them having been brought up a shoemaker, the Colonel was so inconsiderate as to allow him to work on his bench in the same room with himself. This ridiculous conduct has for

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some time drawn on the good old man the contemptuous sneers of the gentlemen officers, especially those from Pennsylvania. Lieutenant-Colonel C., of Wayne's regiment, being warmed with wine, took on himself the task of reprehending the "Yankee" Colonel for thus degrading his rank. With this view he rushed into the room in the evening and soon despatched the shoemaker's bench, after which he made an assault upon the Colonel's person, and bruised him severely. The noise and confusion soon collected a number of officers and soldiers, and it was a considerable time before the rioters could be quelled. Some of the soldiers of Colonel Wayne's regiment actually took to their arms and dared the Yankees, and then proceeded to the extremity of firing their guns. About thirty or forty rounds were aimed at the soldiers of our regiment, who were driven from their barracks, and several of them were severely wounded. . . . As if to complete the disgrace of the transaction, Colonel C. sent some soldiers into the woods to shoot a fat deer, with which he made an entertainment, and invited Colonel W. and his officers to partake of it; this effected a reconciliation.

Elsewhere Thatcher describes the Pennsylvanians as "remarkably stout and hardy men, many of them exceeding six feet in height. They are dressed in white frocks or rifle shirts, and round hats." He adds that

In the Early Days of the War

they were remarkable for the accuracy of their aim, "striking a mark with great certainty at two hundred yards distance." It should be observed, however, that only a few of the Pennsylvanians were experts with their rifles. These were quick to exhibit their skill, and thus all the others came to be regarded as experts.

For some weeks after receiving his commission (January 3, 1776), Wayne was employed in training his men and teaching them the value of discipline. That he had a long-time task in hand is apparent from what has already been noted about their conduct in garrison. The sturdy American spirit, even in a colony like Pennsylvania, where class distinctions were recognized to some extent, did not take kindly to the necessary subordination of an army. It is recorded that Wayne had to flog six of his men for desertion during the early training days.

On February 20, 1776, Congress ordered Wayne to march with his battalion to New York, and two days later orders were issued "to quicken Colonel Wayne in getting his battalion ready; and that as fast as he can get a company properly equipped he cause it immediately to march to New York."

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It appears that Wayne was doing his work of drilling the men thoroughly, and that it was only on the positive order of Congress that he sent away his battalion piecemeal. It appears also that muskets were not to be had, and Wayne was loath to send forward unarmed men. There were three companies in the first detachment, and they appeared in the "General Return" of the 10,235 men under Washington at New York on April 28th. The remainder went forward later, and eventually Wayne himself, with three companies only, was sent from New York to Canada.

For in the meantime (May, 1775), patriots in Massachusetts and Connecticut had turned their thoughts toward Lake Champlain, "the Northern Gateway." Ticonderoga and Crown Point were captured and held, and on June 27th Congress ordered General Philip Schuyler "immediately to take possession of St. Johns and Montreal."

The disastrous assault upon Quebec (December 31, 1775) and the long and painful, but most glorious siege of the city (January to May, 1776), followed.

Few more remarkable stories of war can be found than that of this siege of Quebec. For the besieging forces numbered less than

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800 at best. There were dissensions of a character that bordered on mutiny among them. They were not well clothed. They were living in tents in the midst of Canadian winter storms. They had no cannon suitable for battering the city walls, and the supply of ammunition was scant.

Smallpox became epidemic in the camp in February, and the effective force was reduced to less than 500 men. And yet by their unconquerable spirit and energy they held Carleton and 1,800 well-provided men close prisoners. And it was only because they had been absolutely destitute of gold throughout the campaign that they failed at last.

The experiences in Canada were worth gaining (if only the lessons might never be forgotten!). And among those who went there and gained knowledge from experience was Anthony Wayne.

CHAPTER IV

WAYNE'S FIRST BATTLE

As it happened, Wayne reached Canada too late to have any part in the siege of Quebec.

On the morning of May 5th General John Thomas, who had come to command the besieging force, "had certain intelligence that a [British] fleet was coming up the river" and was near by. Not more than 150 pounds of powder remained in the magazines, and there was on hand food for but three days. A retreat was at last inevitable.

The retreat began early the next day. As Thomas was placing his sick on the bateaux to transport them up the river five British war-ships appeared, and in spite of the clogging ice in the lower harbor, three of them worked in, and sent ashore their marines and a part of a regiment of regulars. Thus re-enforced, Carleton marched out of the city at the head of 1,000 men and six pieces of artillery. Only 250 Americans, armed and in good health, remained on the ground at this

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time to oppose him, and they retreated rapidly enough to escape, although they had some sick with them. They reached the mouth of the Sorel River, the outlet of Lake Champlain, on May 12th.

And Carleton, who, with 1,800 well-provided men, had been held a close prisoner by 500 ill-clad, half-armed, half-starved Americans during the winter, when reporting this sortie, said he "marched out of the ports St. Louis and St. John's to see what the mighty boasters were about."

In the meantime (April 25th), General Washington, who was then at New York, received orders to send six more battalions to Canada under General John Sullivan, who out-ranked Thomas. And with Sullivan went Colonel Anthony Wayne and three companies of his battalion.

A letter from Wayne to Washington, written at Albany on May 14th, shows that not until the day he wrote had his men received muskets; and not all the muskets received were in good repair. But finally, on June 2d, Sullivan and his men, including Wayne's battalion, reached Sorel, the village at the mouth of the outlet of Lake Champlain, to which Thomas had retreated.

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Thomas died of smallpox on the day that Sullivan arrived, and because of that disease the American force was in desperate straits. But it was by no means disheartened. A rumor having reached camp that an advance British force of from 400 to 800 men had taken post at Three Rivers, Colonel Arthur St. Clair had obtained permission to go down the river with 600 men and try to capture the post by surprise. He departed for Nicolet a few hours before Sullivan arrived, and Sullivan, on learning what was to be done, at once sent General William Thompson, with a still larger force, to join in and take command of the expedition.

With Thompson went Colonel Wayne, who had under him all told 202 men. Thompson overtook St. Clair at Nicolet, late in the night of June 6th, and the next night the united forces, amounting to 1,450 men, "all Pennsylvanians except Maxwell's battalion" (a force of 483 Jersey men), crossed the river, and landed at two o'clock in the morning.

It was a hopeless expedition from the start, for instead of a British colonel with 800 men having a post at Three Rivers, some thousands of British troops and several warships had advanced that far on the way to

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Montreal. To cross the river was to invite the destruction of the entire American command, but to add to the probabilities of that destruction, the command landed nine miles from the point of attack, and then marched toward Three Rivers, led by guides who took them astray through winding paths so long that the morning of June 8th came before they arrived in sight of the town.

After crossing the river, Thompson divided his force into five divisions, four for attack on the post and one for reserve. Colonels Maxwell, St. Clair, Wayne, and Irvine had command of the attacking divisions.

As the command, with St. Clair's division in the lead, hurried forward in the growing day, they saw the river filled with armed ships whose broadsides would sweep the river-road, and Thompson therefore turned off to the north until clear of the fire from the shipping, and then marched on parallel with the river. A thick wood before him seemed to offer an admirable shelter through which he might pass to get in the rear of the force supposed to be encamped near Three Rivers. But on entering the woods the men found it a swamp, three miles wide, in which they sank to their belts most of the time, and it was four

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hours before they emerged from the swamp into the open fields lying on the point of land between two of the rivers (St. Maurice and St. Lawrence), that unite where the village of Three Rivers stood.

And as the bedraggled Americans appeared in view General Fraser ran from the midst of the British camp to the edge of the bluff and shouted to the war-ships:

“‘For God’s sake, wake up, and send ashore all the guns you possibly can! The rebels are coming—two or three thousand of them. They’re within a mile of the town!’”
(Quoted by Justin Smith.)

Though the exact number of the British force on shore is not given, we know that it was ample to annihilate the American command. And although apparently surprised when the “rebels” appeared, Fraser was prompt in leading forth his veterans.

Accordingly, when Wayne and his battalion (who had obtained the lead in wading through the forest-covered swamp) reached the open ground, a strong British column marched to meet them. At the same time a number of men-of-war opened fire, and Wayne found himself within range of their shot.

Nevertheless, Wayne sent a company of

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light infantry "to advance and amuse" the enemy, and then, after forming the remainder of his battalion in line of battle, he marched on until within short range, when he swung the two ends of his line forward until his force was in the form of a crescent embracing the head of the British column. Then he "poured in a well Aimed and heavy fire." "They attempted to Retreat in good order," writes Wayne in his report, "but in a few minutes broke and ran in the utmost confusion." The cross-fire from Wayne's crescent was too much even for British regulars.

A little later a fresh force of British opened a heavy fire "with musketry, field-pieces, howitzers, &c.," on Wayne's right flank. But Wayne now formed his men in column, and seeing Maxwell coming from the swamp, off to the left, and the other American divisions coming out of the swamp to take position on his right, he marched straight forward toward the enemy's camp, but only to find that breastworks had been thrown up to protect the position, and that the force behind the works far exceeded his own.

As he approached within musket range of the breastworks Wayne looked about to see

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where his supporting columns were. He saw that a superior force was driving Maxwell back to the swamp, while the combined fire from the ships and British regulars on his right had been so deadly that two divisions there, though led by General Thompson in person, had been compelled to retreat also. In fact, Wayne, with a few more than 200 men, was left on the field where the fire of more than 3,000 British regulars, besides that of the guns on the ships, was to be concentrated upon him.

A retreat was necessary to save the division, and it was made. At the edge of the woods, however, the American reserves were found, and Wayne rallied his men, collected as many as he could from other divisions (in all nearly 800), and made a stand until it was seen that the enemy were coming in overwhelming numbers. Then detachment after detachment marched away until only 20 riflemen and 6 officers remained beside Wayne. And with this small squad he held his ground for an hour.

By driving home the first column of British that came to the attack, and by advancing with his tiny column to the breastworks of the enemy, Wayne had kept the British from

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coming out in sufficient force to cut off the Americans while they were on the open ground. And now when retreat was inevitable, Wayne, with 26 good men by his side, stood his ground for an hour, and held the enemy in check while the Americans escaped through the swamp.

CHAPTER V

ON THE RETREAT TO TICONDEROGA

AFTER passing through the swamp Wayne overhauled and gathered into an orderly command between 600 and 700 men. When they were nine miles from the field of battle a detachment of British regulars, estimated at from 700 to 1,500 men, "waylaid and engaged" the retreating Americans. But they "did us little damage," says Wayne. The boats had been taken from the landing-place by the guard left with them, in order to keep them from being captured by the British war-ships, and Wayne was obliged to march up along the north side of the St. Lawrence until opposite Sorel before he could cross. But on the "third day almost worn out with fatigue, Hunger & Difficulties, scarcely to be paralleled, we arrived with 1100 men."

General Thompson, Colonel Irvine, and a number of other officers were taken prisoners. The total American loss was over 200, of whom 150 were prisoners and the remainder

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killed and wounded—a mere trifle considering the force of the enemy. Wayne received a slight wound on the leg. The British loss was never learned, but one American officer wrote that their number of killed was greater than ours, and he adds, “Upon the whole we were repulsed, not beaten.”

General Sullivan, on reaching Sorel, had been exceedingly hopeful of driving the British from Canada. He now learned that they had an overwhelming force (13,000 regulars), that they were advancing toward Montreal, and that only by a prompt retreat could his force be saved from capture. On June 14th the British fleet was seen coming up the St. Lawrence. Sullivan immediately broke camp and retreated up the Sorel toward Lake Champlain, taking all the camp equipment and munitions; but there was some confusion in the retreat.

Meantime Arnold, who commanded at Montreal, sent Major James Wilkinson, his aid, to Sullivan to ask for reenforcements. Wilkinson in after-years became a most detestable traitor, and nothing he says in his Memoirs is to be trusted where there was any motive, real or imaginary, in his mind for misrepresenting the facts. But here he had

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no such motive. On meeting Sullivan at Chambly, Wilkinson says he was sent up the river with orders to Baron de Woedtke (a German volunteer), who commanded the rear-guard, to detach 500 men to Arnold's aid. Rain was falling and the mud was ankle deep, but Wilkinson started away on his errand.

"I found every house and hut in my route crowded with stragglers," he says, "men without officers and officers without men. . . . Despondency had seized all ranks, and under favor of a dark and tempestuous night, with 500 fresh men, the whole army could have been destroyed."

Next morning he met Lieutenant-Colonel William Allen, of St. Clair's regiment, to whom he told his errand. Allen said:

"This army is conquered by its fears, and I doubt whether you can draw assistance from it; but Colonel Wayne is in the rear, and if any one can do it, he is the man."

"Half an hour afterward," continues Wilkinson, "I met that gallant soldier as much at his ease as if he was marching to a parade of exercise, and without hesitation he determined to carry the order into execution if possible. For this purpose he halted at a bridge

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and posted a guard with orders to stop every man, without respect to corps, who appeared to be active, alert and equipped. In less than an hour the detachment was completely formed, and in motion for Longuille"—the town on the south side of the St. Lawrence opposite Montreal. "It was observable that those very men, who had been only the day before retreating in confusion before a division of the enemy, now marched with alacrity against his main body!"

After marching on this road two miles, Wayne learned that Arnold had escaped, and therefore turned toward Chambly. He was on a road on which the main body of Americans were looking for the enemy to appear, and when he arrived in view of the American camp, says Wilkinson, "we were taken for the enemy, and great alarm and confusion ensued in the main body of troops; the drums beat to arms, and General Sullivan and his officers were observed making great exertions to prepare for battle, but numbers were seen to seek safety in flight. Colonel Wayne halted his column, pulled out his glass, and seemed to enjoy the panic his appearance had produced."

It is not to be noted alone that Wayne was

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entirely self-possessed and at his ease during all this time; the most important fact is that he was able here, as at Three Rivers, to collect untrained men as they fled from the enemy, and form them into an orderly command, apparently as cool as himself, and ready to march against the main body of the enemy.

From Chambly the army retreated to St. John's. There the bateaux were loaded with all the munitions of war, including all the cannon save three pieces considered worthless, and after firing everything about the fort that would burn, the men shoved the bateaux up the rapids (six miles), officers as well as men wading in, neck deep, to push them against the current, and so they carried everything safely to Isle aux Noix, and thence, after a time, to Crown Point, where the army arrived on July 2, 1776.

A count at this post showed that Sullivan had 5,000 men all told, but of this force one-half were in the hospitals. The smallpox that had broken out before Quebec had spread to the reenforcements as they arrived in Canada. In spite of orders to the contrary, men and officers inoculated themselves with the virus, for it was observed that a smaller per

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cent died when inoculated than when the disease was taken in the ordinary way. In all, nearly 10,000 men, including militia, were sent into Canada in the early months of 1776, but of these only 2,500 were fit for battle on the day the Declaration of Independence was proclaimed at Philadelphia.

Nearly all historians speak of this campaign in Canada as disastrous to the colonial cause, and they say the army "failed because of neglect" (Lossing). But in the long run failure was better for the cause of American liberty than success. While the British were triumphant there was no hope that they would make any concessions to armed colonists, and the colonists were therefore compelled against their will to prepare for a prolonged war. The Declaration of Independence was made necessary by the failure to capture Quebec, and the war for absolute liberty followed on the retreat of the American army to Crown Point.

In saving the army Sullivan had done well, but Congress thought an "experienced general" was needed at the head of the Northern Army. There were but two experienced generals of the requisite rank in the American forces—the traitor Charles Lee

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and the incompetent Gates. These men had held rank and had seen considerable service in the British army; Gates was a captain under Braddock, for instance. Both were soldiers of fortune in the American army, and both exerted a most baleful influence on the American cause. But Lee was at first ordered to Lake Champlain, and then Gates was substituted. Sullivan resigned when superseded, but he was persuaded to remain in the army, and the field-officers under him wrote him a complimentary letter on July 8. It was one that he had fully earned, and Wayne was one of the signers.

On July 7th General Gates and General Schuyler having arrived meantime, a council of war considered the situation at Crown Point. It decided that the place was "not tenable . . . not capable of being made so this summer." It was therefore resolved to retire to Ticonderoga. Twenty-one field-officers sent a written protest to General Schuyler, urging him to remain at Crown Point, but Wayne was not one of the number. Washington, who supposed that the post was stronger than it was, was surprised to learn that it was to be evacuated, but the fact was that the army would have been captured

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there, once the enemy gained control of the lake, as they eventually did.

Accordingly the army was transferred to Ticonderoga, beginning in the middle of July, and the sick were sent on to Fort George. At Ticonderoga it was determined to make a final stand. To view this stand came Carleton after his victory over the little American fleet (October 11th) gave him command of the lake. But "the strength of the works, the difficulty of approach, the *countenance of the enemy*, with other cogent reasons prevented this design from taking place." After a little reconnoitering Carleton retreated to Canada, and went into winter quarters.

In the meantime Washington had been driven from New York, across New Jersey, and on December 8th he crossed the Delaware in his retreat, having with him but 3,000 men. "The days that try men's souls" were upon the patriots. But when Carleton, disheartened by a view of "the countenance" of the Americans, retreated, seven regiments were detached from the garrison at Ticonderoga and sent to join Washington; and when thus reenforced he was able to recross the Delaware. The capture of 1,000 Hessians at Trenton (December 26th) and the victory at

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Princeton (January 3, 1777) followed, and the British forces were finally housed at New Brunswick, Amboy, and Paulus Hook.

During the days while Carleton was on the lake, Wayne had part in an important piece of work that never amounted to anything because General Gates gave no attention to the matter. Colonel John Trumble, who was then an adjutant on Gates's staff, became convinced that Carleton, on coming to Ticonderoga, would turn the American left, cross the north end of Lake George, and place a battery on top of Mount Defiance, a hill 600 feet high, standing at the end of the long point of land between Lake George and Lake Champlain.

"I was ridiculed for advancing such an extravagant idea," Trumbull says in his autobiography, but with a long 12-pounder located in the Mount Independence works, he made trial of the range, and although the gun was loaded with two shot, it threw them more than half-way to the top.

There was now no denying that the mountain top was within range of the American works, "but still it was insisted upon that this summit was inaccessible to an enemy." Thereupon Trumbull took "General Arnold,

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Colonel Wayne, and several other active officers " in Gates's barge and landed "at the foot of the hill where it was most precipitous and rocky. . . . The ascent *was* difficult and laborious, but we clambered to the summit in a short time. . . . And when we looked down upon the outlet of Lake George, it was obvious to all that there could be no difficulty in driving up a loaded carriage."

A proper report of this expedition was made by the party to Gates, but with the lofty contempt which all the foreigners in the American army held for the native officers, the matter was ignored. When Burgoyne drove St. Clair from Ticonderoga in 1777 it was because Gates had ignored the report of this party, of whom Wayne was one.

When Carleton had returned to Canada and the seven regiments of Continentals were sent to reenforce Washington, Wayne was placed (November 18, 1776) in command at the Ticonderoga fortifications. On November 29th he had 2,451 men all told under his command, but of these only 1,109 were fit for duty.

By the British plan of action two great armies had been sent to America to sever the patriotic forces. Howe had taken New York

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and was overrunning New Jersey. Carleton had retreated to Canada, but it was by no means unlikely that he would advance once more to Ticonderoga when the ice on the lake was thick enough to bear the weight of an army, and this advance was particularly to be feared when he should hear of the depletion of the American garrison. In view of the British plans, therefore, the two most important commands in the patriot army were those opposed to the two great invading armies. The chief post of honor was that opposed to Howe, and the second was that where Anthony Wayne sat down to guard the Northern Gateway. By good work, and good work only, Wayne advanced that far in his first campaign.

CHAPTER VI

IN COMMAND AT TICONDEROGA

THE views which the documents of the period give of Wayne and his men at Ticonderoga are most interesting. To show the spirit of the men it may be related that when Carleton was supposed to be coming to attack the old fort, 100 Pennsylvanians, who were in the hospital at Fort George, and who, in some cases, had already been discharged from service, on hearing the news that Carleton was coming, got off their beds, buckled on their equipments, and "immediately returned to this place determined to conquer or die with their countrymen."

But when all danger from Carleton's army was over for the season the men began to think of home. There were many good reasons why they should do this. Wayne himself described Ticonderoga as "the last part of the world that God made & I have some reason to believe it was finished in the dark." The men were "destitute of almost

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every necessary fit for a soldier. Shoes, stockings, shirts and coats are articles not easily done without, yet they cannot be obtained," says Wayne in one letter. In another (to Dr. Franklin) he says of his men, "tho' poorly and thinly clad, . . . the fatigue they have undergone in the place is inexpressible."

On December 4, 1776, in a letter to the Pennsylvania committee, he completes the picture of the distress of his men. He says: "The wretched conditions they are now in for want of almost every necessary of the convenience of life, except flour and bad beef, is shocking to humanity and beggars all description. We have neither beds nor bedding for our sick to lay on, or under, other than their own clothing; no medicine or regimen suitable for them; the dead and dying laying mingled together in our hospital, or rather house of carnage, is no uncommon sight. These are objects truly worthy of your notice."

Then, fearing greatly the evils of a standing army, and knowing nothing of the necessity of giving men a thorough training before sending them into battle, Congress had enlisted men for one year only. The time of

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Wayne's own battalion was to expire on January 3, 1777, and that of other battalions expired earlier.

Foreseeing that he could not hold the garrison much beyond the terms for which the men had enlisted, Wayne began to make appeals for fresh troops. Schuyler forwarded appeals also, but Congress was loaded with all kinds of executive as well as legislative work, and the time passed without any proper effort being made to relieve the distresses of the garrison or to replace the men.

In February a crisis came. A company of riflemen under a Captain Neilson had been attached to Wayne's battalion (November 15th), and had been kept in the fort after their time expired because Wayne's battalion remained. But on the night of February 19th they determined they would equip themselves and on the next day "force their way through all opposition." Accordingly, at gun-fire they formed in column, and were just starting to leave when Wayne confronted them and demanded to know "the cause of such conduct."

"They began in tumultuous manner to inform me," wrote Wayne, "that their time of enlistment was expired, and that they

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looked upon themselves as at liberty to go home."

They kept marching on as they shouted this explanation, but Wayne ordered them, in a manner that compelled obedience, to halt, and then he directed some leader to step out and speak for them. A sergeant obeyed. Wayne "presented a pistol at his breast," and the man fell on his knees and begged for life. Then the company, on command, grounded arms.

A short address by Wayne led the company to agree to remain, but "a certain Jonah Holida," of Captain Coe's company, endeavored to excite the company to mutiny again, and in Wayne's presence. When Wayne began to question him, Holida "justified his conduct"—answered insolently and most impudently, for which Wayne instantly knocked him down.

"I thought proper to chastise him for his Insolence on the spot before the men, and then sent him to answer for his Crime to the main Guard," says Wayne. And when Captain Coe came to Wayne and said he knew "the cause for which his soldier was struck and confined," and expressed the opinion "that every Soldier had a Right to Deliver his Sentiments

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on every Occasion without being punished," Wayne put him under arrest as an "abettor of Mutiny."

The incident is memorable as showing that Wayne was a fighting man in more than one way—he could and would knock a man down if need be—and because it shows, too, what ideas of discipline prevailed among the officers under Wayne.

"Our garrison is now very weak," says Wayne in the letter in which he describes this mutiny. "If you have any good troops, *be they ever so few*, pray send them on with all possible despatch. I would rather risk my life and reputation and the fate of America on Two Hundred Good Soldiers than on all those now on the Ground . . . many of whom are children, twelve or fifteen years of age. Add to this that they have but about one month to stay and are badly armed, and the Officers are Enemies to Discipline."

And yet on January 22d Wayne had been able to report that "I shall soon Complete the Abattis Round the Old Fort, and Octagons on Mt. Independence, and two new Blockhouses; so that in a few days we hope to render this post tenable and leave it in much securer and better state than we found it. The manner in

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which I have kept our Guards and Sentries, and the constant succession of Scouts which I have out—if followed by my successors—will effectually prevent a surprise.”

The men had flour and bad beef only to eat. They were thinly clothed and many were barefooted in the midst of the Adirondack winter. Unable to endure such hardships, many were dying. And the condition of the sick as they lay mingled with the dead and dying “beggared all description.” Under such conditions these men had been detained beyond the time for which they had enlisted, and yet Wayne was able to complete the “Abattis Round the Old Fort and Octagons on Mt. Independence.”

During all this time it is plain from his letters that he was rapidly developing the abilities of a general. “I am well convinced that we shall never Establish our Liberties,” he writes, “Until we learn to beat the English Rebels *in the field*—I hope the day is not far off.”

To Richard Peters, secretary of the Board of War, he wrote: “If you have any regard for the Liberty of your Country, or the Honor of America . . . give more attention to Manœuvring, and less to working, and rest As-

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sured of Success." To another: "Are our people so used to *stand behind works* that they dare not face the foe in the field? That—that is the rock we have split on." "The Alarming Situation of Affairs in Penns'a and Jersey," he writes, after hearing how Washington had been driven from New York, "causes us most Ardently to Wish for Opportunity of meeting those Sons of War and Rapine face to face and *man to man*."

On February 21, 1777, the day after he quelled the last of the mutinous spirit at Ticonderoga by knocking down Jonah Halida and putting Captain Coe under arrest as an "Abettor of Mutiny," Colonel Wayne was promoted by Congress to the rank of brigadier-general. In September, 1776, Dr. Benjamin Rush, a member of the Continental Congress and a personal friend of Wayne, wrote him, saying:

"*Inter nos*—an attention in you to Gen'l Gates may facilitate" your own promotion. Wayne wrote back a letter in which he indignantly refused to do anything of the kind. And it may as well be said here as elsewhere that while Anthony Wayne was active and earnest in his efforts to procure promotion for deserving officers under him, he never

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used any influence whatever or made any appeal to any one to secure promotion for himself.

It is said by most of the writers that Wayne was promoted because of his gallant conduct in saving the force that had tried to take the British by surprise at Three Rivers. It may have been so, but Congress made no mention of the reasons for promoting him. That he had shown capacity and ability to serve in this rank after the retreat from Canada, as well as when first under fire, was very well known to Washington and other general officers, and to Congress; and it is fair to suppose that his work at Ticonderoga was of some influence in the matter.

On January 2, 1777, Wayne, in a letter to General Schuyler, said, speaking of his Pennsylvanians in connection with "the Alarming Situation of Affairs in Penns'a and Jersey":

"These worthy fellows are second to none in Courage, (I have seen them proved), and I know they are not far behind any Regulars in Point of Discipline. Such troops, actuated by Principle and fired with just resentment, must be an acceptable and *perhaps seasonable* Re-inforcement to Gen'l Washington at this critical Juncture. If you should be of the

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same opinion, and cause us . . . to march with all dispatch to join the Main Army . . . I would answer for it that they will not turn aside from Danger when the safety and Honor of their country require them to face it."

If Wayne were a naval officer in modern days we should find him seeking service in a big cruiser instead of a battle-ship. He chafed *when confined behind the walls* of Ticonderoga, and begged for permission to join the force under Washington, where there was a prospect of a fight.

Washington, after retrieving nearly all of New Jersey from the British grasp, had encamped for the winter at Morristown. On April 12, 1777, General Wayne was ordered to join him at that place. When there he was placed in command of eight regiments (1,700 men), known as the Pennsylvania Line, and with these he was to see of hot work not a little and of distress more than enough to make the heart ache even to this day.

CHAPTER VII

IN COMMAND OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LINE

GENERAL WAYNE arrived at Washington's camp, Morristown, N. J., near the middle of May, 1777. The force under Washington at this time amounted to 7,300 men, who were divided into five divisions of two brigades each. Though but a brigadier-general, the work and responsibility of a major-general were placed upon Wayne, for he was ordered to the command of one of these divisions—the Pennsylvania Line.

From the beginning the most important part of Wayne's work was the training of his men. Washington's army had been composed, as all the American forces were, of men enlisted for one year only. The time of these men had expired in midwinter. No provision was made by Congress to replace the regiments who were to return until after they were mustered out, and for many weeks Washington had to rely on the militia who turned out for the occasion to hold the camp. It was a time of great peril, but the inaction

Command of Pennsylvania Line

of the British forces saved the American army. Under these circumstances Wayne, on reaching Morristown, necessarily found his division composed of men who, save for a few of the last year's troops, knew nothing of the manual of arms and nothing of formations for the maneuvers needed in time of battle. Some of them were expert shots with the rifle. But when the kind of fighting that it was desirable to do was considered, the rifle was not the best weapon, and accordingly, after consultation with Washington, Wayne wrote (June 3, 1777), to the Board of the War saying that "His Excellency wishes to have our Rifles exchanged for Good Muskets and Bayonets. Experience has taught us that rifles are not fit for the field. A few only will be retained in each regiment, and those placed in the hands of Real marksmen."

The objection to the rifles as then made was that they had no bayonets. In a battle on the open field the Americans had to depend entirely on gun-fire, and while the Americans were reloading their rifles the British came, charging with bayonets fixed. Having no bayonets, the Americans had to fly.

On June 7th Wayne writes: "We are usefully employed in manœuvring. Our people

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are daily gaining Health, Spirits and Discipline—the spade & pick axe are thrown aside for British Rebels to pick up.”

A perusal of Wayne's correspondence shows that he used capital letters for the purpose of placing emphasis on his words, and that he frequently called the enemy “Rebels.”

On May 28th Washington marched from Morristown to Middlebrook, N. J. At Middlebrook Washington was a little farther from the Highlands, but he was nearer the enemy, and it was because of this advance that the army was in the good state of “Health, Spirits and Discipline” described by Wayne. Wayne's own “Spirits” certainly were high, and with good reason, for he says: “His Excellency has posted me in Front & honored me with the Charge of the most material pass leading to the Camp.”

Alexander Graydon, in his Memoirs, gives a description of Wayne as he appeared at this time (p. 277):

“General Wayne's quondam uniform as a Colonel of the Fourth Battalion was, I think, blue and white, in which he was accustomed to appear in exemplary neatness; whereas he now dressed in a dingy red coat, a black rusty cravat and tarnished hat.”

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'Apparently Wayne dressed thus with deliberate intent, and for a very good reason. In a letter dated July 3d, he speaks of one of his regiments, and says, "they have never received any Uniform except hunting shirts, which are worn out, and altho' a body of fine men, yet from being in rags and badly armed they are viewed with contempt by the other troops, and begin to despise themselves." While it was impossible to replace the ragged hunting shirts with a decent uniform Wayne would not make the rags more conspicuous by appearing among his men dressed with exemplary neatness.

When Wayne joined Washington's army he had not been at home for sixteen months. He wrote to his wife a letter on June 7th, telling why he could not visit her. "I can't be spared from camp. I have the Confidence of the General, and the Hearts of the Soldiers who will support me in the Day of Action. . . . The Times Require great Sacrifices to be made. The Blessings of Liberty cannot be purchased at too high a price—the Blood and treasure of the Choicest and best Spirits of this Land is but a trifling consideration for the Rich Inheritance."

But in no way, perhaps, can the patriot-

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ism of the man be shown to better advantage than by comparing his expression of it with the sentiments of Dr. Benjamin Rush, the member of Congress already mentioned, in letters written at this time. Rush's mind was full of State politics. When the British civil power was overthrown, the people of Pennsylvania as a mass took the civil power in their own hands and created a constitution that threw out of power those known before the war as "the governing class" (men of high social position), and these "did not hesitate to sneer at the work of the radical mob," as they called the new leaders. Some of these people of the former "governing class" were loyalists and some were active Tories, but a large number were sincere American patriots. Dr. Rush was unquestionably one of the patriots, but he sincerely believed that the new constitution would ruin the State. It must be remembered here that Wayne, too, was of the old "governing class," and that his personal friends and associates at home were also of it. It was therefore natural that Dr. Rush should write to Wayne to bewail the political situation in the State.

"The most respectable whig characters in the state are with us," says Rush. "I need

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not point out to *you* the danger and folly of the Constitution. It has substituted mob Government for one of the happiest governments in the world. . . . Alas! that our minds should be turned from opposing foreign tyranny. Some Change must be made or the Power of this important state will never be exerted for the Salvation of American Liberty. . . . Come and let us weep together. Let us unite our efforts once more, and perhaps we can recover Pennsylvania."

Thus wrote the politician. In reply Wayne wrote:

"I must for the present request you and every friend to his Country to exert yourselves in Calling forth the Strength of Penns'a and Completing our Battalions, which are yet very weak. Let us once be in condition to Vanquish these British Rebels, and I answer for it that then your present Rulers will give way for better men which will produce better Measures."

He thought more of the "Country" than of "Penns'a," and he spelled country with a capital C. And then to stir the latent patriotism of the doctor, Wayne adds:

"We Offered General Grant Battle six times the other day. He as often formed

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but always on our approach his people broke and Ran after firing a few volleys which we never returned, being determined to let them feel the force of our fire at close quarters and *give them the Bayonet under cover of the smoke.* This Howe [slip of the pen—he meant Grant], who was to March through America at the head of 5000 men had his Coat much Dirtied, his horse's head taken off, and himself badly Bruis'd for having the presumption at the head of 700 British Troops to face 500 Penns'as."

Graydon wrote in his Memoirs that Wayne had a "vaunting style," but adds that he was "unquestionably as brave as any man in the army," and that he "*could fight as well as brag*"—the truth of which shall appear.

On July 5th St. Clair was driven from Ticonderoga by Burgoyne's advancing host, and by the plan of the British ministry, Howe should have gone up the river to join him. But in the meantime General Charles Lee had been captured by the British, and turning traitor to the Americans, he gave Howe such attractive plans for capturing Philadelphia, "the rebel capital," that Howe adopted them instead of going to join Burgoyne. On July 23, 1777, Howe and the British fleet left New

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York. They entered the Chesapeake Bay on August 15th, and on the 25th landed at Elk Ferry, near where the Delaware and Chesapeake Canal now enters Chesapeake Bay. The battle at the Brandywine was at hand.

CHAPTER VIII

ON THE BRANDYWINE

HAVING learned definitely that Howe was to attack Philadelphia, Washington marched south to meet him, and sent Anthony Wayne to organize the Pennsylvania militia to assist the regular army. Wayne did this work in Chester County, because that county lay in the direct route that the British must take. Wayne was in his home county, and yet on August 26th he was obliged to write this to his wife:

“My Dear Girl—I am peremptorily forbid by His Excellency to leave the Army—My case is hard. I am obliged to do the duty of three General Officers, but if it was not the case, as a Gen’l Officer I could not obtain leave of absence.”

Accordingly he begs her to come to him the next day, and bring their two children (a son and a daughter) with her. One may notice here in passing that Wayne almost invariably addressed his wife as “My Dear Girl”

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or "My Dear Polly." Polly was a pet name, for her given name was Mary.

Washington, in the meantime, passed down through Philadelphia (the men wearing "sprigs of green in their hats" to "give them some uniformity"), and he finally camped on the easterly side of Red Clay Creek, in Delaware. The camp was on the direct line from Elk Ferry to Philadelphia. Here Wayne once more took command of the Pennsylvania Line when the militia had been organized.

A letter written by Wayne while in this camp (September 2nd) shows very well his character as a fighting man. It was written to Washington and contains these paragraphs:

"I took the liberty some days since to suggest the selecting 2,500 or 3,000 of our best Armed and Most Disciplined troops, who should hold themselves in Readiness on the approach of the Enemy to make a Regular and Vigorous Assault on their right or left flank—or such part of their army as should then be thought most expedient—and *not wait the attack from them.*

"This Sir, I am well convinced would Surprise them much—from a persuasion that you dare not leave your works. It would totally

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stop the Other part from advancing—and should the Attack be fortunate, which I have not the least doubt of, the Enemy would have no other Alternative than to Retreat.”

And to this he adds:

“Should I be happy enough to meet your Excellency in Opinion, I wish to be of the number assigned to this business.”

Anthony Wayne was not of the porcupine class of fighters.

However, Howe had 15,000 effective men where the Americans numbered but 11,000 at most, including militia, and Washington determined (September 8th) to retreat north to Brandywine Creek, where the ground was better suited for defensive work, and there make his final stand.

By two o'clock next morning (9th), the Americans were on their way, and by night-fall they were encamped on the northerly side of Brandywine.

Brandywine Creek empties into the Delaware River at Wilmington, Del. Its general course is nearly southeast, and from the mouth at Wilmington up to the forks of the west and east branches, the distance is not far from twenty-two miles. The American camp was made on the northerly side of this creek.

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It extended from Jones's Ford on the right or up-stream end of the line, down to Pyle's Ford on the left, a distance of perhaps two and a half miles. But the main road over which Howe was coming crossed the stream at Chadd's Ford, which was perhaps half a mile from Pyle's Ford, or the left end of the American line. Another ford, called Brinton's, was found between Chadd's Ford and the American right at Jones's Ford, and the Americans had to defend, therefore, four fords — Jones's, Brinton's, Chadd's, and Pyle's.

On the American left, at Pyle's Ford, the stream was a "roaring torrent," and the banks extremely precipitous and well wooded. The ground below this was still more rugged. This ford was therefore to be defended easily, and Washington placed there the militia under General John Armstrong.

At Chadd's Ford, as said, the main road from the south crossed the creek, and it was the ford that could be most readily passed by the enemy. Here, in the post of honor, ✓ Wayne was stationed with his Pennsylvania Line, a Virginia regiment, and Proctor's artillery.

Weedon's and Muhlenberg's brigades,

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under Major-General Greene, were placed on the heights behind Wayne as a reserve, while the right wing, that was to cover Brinton's and Jones's fords up-stream, was under the command of Major-General Sullivan. Maxwell's light infantry (it was but a small force) was left on the southerly side of the stream to observe and annoy the enemy's advance.

While it is not necessary to describe the battle that followed in all its details, it must be remembered that Howe divided his army and sent half of it, under General Knyphausen, to Chadd's Ford. The remainder, under Lord Cornwallis, and Howe himself marched up the valley on the south side of the stream, crossed the forks, and came down upon the rear of the American right wing under Sullivan.

While waiting for Cornwallis to turn the American right, Knyphausen strove only to hold Washington's attention by false moves. But hearing from a scout that the British force was divided, Washington ordered his army to charge across the stream to force the fighting.

The supreme moment of the battle had come. Led by Anthony Wayne, the head of the American column was already splashing

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the shallow waters of the ford, and victory was within their grasp, when word was received from Sullivan that the report of a British column going above the forks was untrue, and in the delay which this message caused the opportunity for a decisive victory slipped away.

Cornwallis, with his 7,000 men, drove the American right flank down toward the center. Washington sent Greene with the reserves to aid Sullivan, and then Knyphausen came down to Chadd's Ford, this time with full determination to cross.

He had 7,000 men at least with which to attack the Americans, and it included Major Patrick Ferguson's corps of riflemen, with their breech-loaders. Knyphausen's force was superior in numbers to Wayne's, and they were all well-disciplined soldiers, while the greater part of Wayne's men were raw recruits and militia who had never been under fire. Nevertheless, Wayne held his ground—held the post of honor—from two o'clock until the sun went down (after six o'clock), and then he retreated only when he learned positively that a division of Cornwallis's victorious force was coming to attack him in the rear. He retreated in order to avoid being sur-

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rounded, and he did it in such good order that he was not interrupted.

Says Colonel James Chambers, of the First Pennsylvania, in a letter describing the retreat:

“The general [Wayne] sent orders for our artillery to retreat, and ordered me to cover it with a part of my regiment. It was done, but to my surprise the artillerymen had run and left the howitzer behind. The two [field] pieces went up the road protected by about sixty of my men, who had very warm work, but brought them safe. I then ordered another party to fly to the howitzer and bring it off. Captain Buchanan, Lieutenant Simpson, and Lieutenant Douglass went immediately to the gun, and the men following their example, I covered them with the few I had remaining. But before this could be done the main body of the foe came within thirty yards, and kept up the most terrible fire ever heard in America, though with very little loss on our side. I brought all the brigade artillery safely off, and I hope to see them again fire at the scoundrels. We retreated to the next height in good order in the midst of a very heavy fire of cannon and small arms. Not thirty yards distant we formed to re-

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ceive them, but they did not choose to follow."

As a matter of fact, these guns mentioned here were actually in the possession of the enemy when Colonel Chambers went after them, and Howe's official despatch mentions the capture. But he makes no mention of the gallant force that Wayne sent to retake them—with entire success.

The Americans were driven from their position, but they were not routed. They passed the night at Chester—a retreat of twelve miles—but Washington testified that his army was "in good spirits and nowise disheartened by the recent affair, which it seemed to consider as a check rather than a defeat."

The American loss in killed and wounded and prisoners was not far from 1,000. The British admitted a loss of 579, but by "rolls afterward captured at Germantown, it appeared that their loss exceeded that of the Americans" (Fiske).

CHAPTER IX

ATTACKED IN THE NIGHT

ON the next morning (September 12, 1777), after the battle of the Brandywine, Washington retreated from Chester up to Philadelphia, and went thence to Germantown, where he rested his men during the 13th. On the 14th, finding his men quite willing to meet the British once more, he recrossed to the westerly side of the Schuylkill at Conshohocken, and taking the Lancaster road, went in search of Howe. The British, meantime, had marched to the north and west to reach some of the fords of the Schuylkill, where they might hope to cross unmolested. In spite of his superior force, Howe had not been anxious to overtake Washington's retreating army, or even to meet it in another battle where fords were to be fought for. It was by such action that General Howe expressed his opinion of the American army. And by hunting the British Washington expressed his opinion.

On the 16th the two armies met near

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the Warren tavern, which was 22 miles from Philadelphia, on the Lancaster road. To Wayne was given the honor of leading in the attack, and his skirmishers were already firing on the enemy's advanced line under Lord Cornwallis, when a rain-storm that was so furious as to stop the combat came on. For twenty-four hours the furious rainfall continued—a genuine cyclone was working up the coast.

How the battle would have terminated had no rain fallen, it is idle to conjecture, but every patriot who can share in Wayne's enthusiasm will regret the storm. Moreover, the rain destroyed the entire supply of ammunition in the American camp, and Washington was obliged to retreat. He reached Warwick, on French Creek (west of Phenixville), during the 17th, and from thence marched north to Parker's Ford (Lawrenceville, Pa.), at the mouth of Pigeon Creek, where he arrived on September 19th.

Meantime, while at Warwick, he detached Wayne, with from 1,200 to 1,500 men and 4 field-pieces, to fall in the rear of the British army and try to cut off their baggage-train or do whatever would most annoy them, so that they could not reach the Schuylkill until

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after Washington should have time to cross, and with a renewed supply of ammunition meet them at the fords.

Accordingly, on September 18th, Wayne took post to the south of and between the Warren and the Paoli taverns. The spot is within half a mile of Malvern station on the Pennsylvania Railroad now, and it is conspicuously marked by a monument. The British camp was four miles away to the northeast, and Wayne was expecting General William Smallwood, who had 1,850 militia at the White Horse tavern, on the Lancaster road, a few miles west of the Warren tavern, to join him. Wayne fully comprehended that he was on a dangerous mission, but he had such faith in his men that he even contemplated an assault on the enemy single-handed, when a favoring moment should come.

At seven o'clock on the morning of September 19th he wrote to Washington to say:

"On the enemy's beating the reveille, I ordered the troops under arms, and began our march for their left flank, but when we arrived within a half a mile of their encampment found they had not stirred, but lay too compact to admit of attack with prudence. Indeed their supineness answers every pur-

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pose of giving you time to get up. If they attempt to move I shall attack them at all events. . . . There never was nor never will be a finer opportunity of giving the enemy a fatal blow than the present. For God's sake push on as soon as possible."

At ten o'clock he wrote again to say that the "enemy are very quiet, washing and cooking," and that he looked for them to move toward evening. Maxwell was on their east flank and Wayne on their west, and with this in mind he said to Washington, "we only want you in their rear to complete Mr. Howe's business." By rear he meant on the north side. He added that he believed the enemy knew nothing of his situation, but he was mistaken. A Tory had given General Howe full details of the number of Wayne's force, and an accurate description of the camp. And on the night of the 20th a British force twice as large as Wayne's was sent to take him by surprise.

In the meantime Wayne had heard that Howe was to march for the Schuylkill at two o'clock in the morning of the 21st. An officer was immediately sent to bring up Smallwood's militia, and every preparation was made to dash among the British during the confusion of breaking camp. The sick of

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Wayne's command appear to have lodged in rude huts (wigwams one writer calls them), and it is certain that some of the well men sneaked into these; but the force as a whole lay down with their arms in hand and in such a position that at the call they would find themselves in line as soon as they arose to their feet.

Between nine and ten o'clock that night one of Wayne's neighbors (Wayne's house was less than two miles away), brought third-hand information that a British detachment was coming to attack the American camp. Wayne at once sent out extra pickets, including a number of mounted men. He then allowed his men to continue sleeping, for he was looking for Smallwood to arrive at any minute, when he meant to assume the offensive; and he had confidence in the vigilance of his pickets.

Unfortunately, however, Smallwood failed to arrive, while the British, under General Grey, came on, silently bayoneting such pickets as they met, until so near the camp that when the alarm was given the sleeping Americans were aroused by the cry:

"Up, men! the British are upon you."

"Dash on, light infantry!" shouted Gen-

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eral Grey to his men, and with bayonets ready they charged the American camp, assisted by a regiment of light dragoons who had sword in hand.

Though many of his men were asleep, Wayne himself was awake and alert. As the alarm was heard Wayne mounted his horse, and the sleeping men rose up in line. Then ordering Colonel Richard Humpton (second in command) to wheel the men by subplatoons into column and march away toward the northwest (on the route by which Smallwood was coming), Wayne spurred over to the right of his line, where, with the light infantry and the First Pennsylvania Regiment, he strove to cover the retreat.

As Wayne rode away, Humpton wheeled his men into column and sent off the artillery, but it was not until Wayne had sent him orders for the third time to march off that he did so. And then, when he did march away, he led the column between the camp-fires and the coming British, and thus showed the enemy where to strike.

As the British became visible (and the distance was "not more than Ten Yards"), Wayne gave them a volley, and then fell back "a Little Distance," when he formed a front

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to oppose them, but "they did not think prudent to push matters further."

They had found a considerable number of sick men in the camp, and there were stragglers who had failed to get into line promptly when the alarm came. These sick and straggling men were mercilessly bayoneted by the British. The British authorities on the battle make no effort to conceal the fact that Grey's force was determined to massacre the Americans.

"The light infantry bayoneted every man they came up with," says the diary of Lieutenant Hunter, of the Fifty-second British Regiment. "The light infantry being ordered to form the front, rushed along the line, putting to the bayonet all they came up with, and, overtaking the main herd of fugitives, stabbed great numbers," says Gaines' Mercury.

"What a running about barefoot, and half clothed, and in the light of their own fires! . . . I stuck them myself like so many pigs, one after another, until the blood ran out of the touch-hole of my musket," said a Hessian sergeant, in boasting of his work that night. As a matter of fact, however, the British accounts all exaggerate the extent of the British cruelty. Grey certainly gave orders to give no

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quarter, but instead of butchering from 200 to 460, as the various British accounts assert, the exact number killed was 63. Seventy prisoners were taken alive, and of these 40, who were badly wounded, were left at various houses along the road when Grey returned to the main army. The British lost 3 killed and 6 wounded. This fight is called the massacre of Paoli, because Wayne was camped near the Paoli tavern.

It is worth noting that while Grey was charging the American camp a detachment of the British force surrounded Wayne's home. They supposed that they would find Wayne at home, as a matter of course. They "behaved with the utmost politeness to the women," and "they did not disturb the least article." Such unusual conduct on the part of British raiders in that war is memorable.

General Smallwood's militia were met a mile away toward the White Horse tavern, but the militiamen were so greatly alarmed by the sight of Wayne's retreating command that they could not be coaxed or driven into a pursuit of Grey's regulars. As to the Pennsylvanians, Wayne wrote at noon of the 21st:

"It will not be in our power to render you

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such service as I could wish, but all that can, you may Depend on being done."

It is agreed by military critics that Wayne's orders that night were right for the occasion, and that his coolness and prompt decision as to what should be done saved his command from annihilation. But it was charged in Washington's army that Wayne had been negligent and thus had allowed his command to be surprised. Curiously enough, Colonel Humpton was active in supporting this charge. Wayne instantly demanded a court-martial. The court was granted. After a patient hearing of the prosecution, in which Colonel Humpton took the lead, the evidence showed that the great part of the American loss was due to Humpton's failure to obey Wayne's first order, and the court unanimously decided that Wayne was "not guilty of the charge exhibited against him, but that he, on the night of the 20th of September last, did every duty that could be expected from an active, brave and vigilant officer, under the orders which he then had."

CHAPTER X

A BATTLE IN A FOG

As Wayne had learned they would do, the British broke camp on the morning of September 21, 1777, and made a march up the southerly side of the Schuylkill, on the road leading to Reading, as if bound for that city, where the Americans had large quantities of supplies. Washington, being on the northerly side of the river, kept pace with them, but on the night of the 22d Howe left his camp-fire burning and marched down the river to Flatland Ford (just below Valley Forge), and there crossed to the northerly side of the river.

By this strategic move—without risking a battle—Howe had placed himself between Washington and Philadelphia, and the road to the American capital city was open before him. But one can not help noting here that a British general has but rarely been known to dodge an enemy of inferior force in such fashion as this.

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From the ford Howe marched to Germantown, a long straggling village, then a few miles north of Philadelphia, and from that point sent Cornwallis to take possession of Philadelphia, to capture the forts below the city, and to remove the obstructions on which the Americans had relied to stop the advance of the British fleet. It was necessary for the British to open free communication with their fleet if they were to hold Philadelphia, for if they did not do so, they would simply starve in the city they had come to take.

In detaching men for this purpose, however, Howe weakened the army at Germantown, and Washington, who had been joined by Wayne and Smallwood, called his generals together (September 28th), and asked them if it would not be good policy to attack the British at Germantown. There were fourteen of these generals, Lafayette being among the number. Ten of the fourteen, having no confidence in the untrained men of the American forces, urged Washington to wait for reinforcements from the north, but Wayne, Smallwood, Scott, and Porter had faith in their men, and spoke for an immediate attack.

"Our army is full of health and spirits," wrote Wayne in a letter to his wife at this

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time (September 30th), "and far stronger than it was at the Battle of Brandywine."

Washington was similarly hopeful, and between September 29th and October 3d he moved his army from its camp between the Perkiomen and Shippack Creeks down to within striking distance of the enemy, in order to attack at daylight the morning of October 4th.

Germantown in those days consisted of a single street (running somewhere near north and south), that was lined on each side for a distance of two miles by stone houses standing close to the street, and perhaps a hundred yards apart. Between the houses were stout fences, some of stone and some of wood, that extended back for several hundred yards, enclosing gardens and fields.

A little south of the middle of this long single-street village was a road that crossed the main street at right angles. On the east side of the main street this cross-road was called Church Lane; on the west it was called Old School Lane. At the corners stood the market and a German Reformed church. And just south of this cross-road was camped the British army. The right wing lay east of the Germantown road, and was under General

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Grant (he who had said he could march through America with 5,000 men). The left wing lay to the west, and was commanded by Knyphausen, while on the extreme left, and near the Schuylkill River, was a detachment of light troops under General Grey.

The market-house at the corners was just five miles north of Philadelphia. A mile above (north of) the market-house was another cross-road leading to Abington, now Washington. This cross-road marked the north limit of Germantown. In the northeast corner of this cross stood a large mansion, the property of Benjamin Chew, formerly a chief justice of the colony. In a field near this house was camped a British regiment under Colonel Musgrave.

The rows of houses lined the main street still farther north, but that part of the settlement was known as Beggarstown and Beckers Town. A mile north of Chew's house was a hill known as Mount Airy, and here was a battalion of light infantry that had formed a part of the command under General Grey when he stormed Wayne's camp, near the Paoli tavern.

In planning an attack on the British, Washington divided his forces into four col-

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umns. General Armstrong, with his Pennsylvania militia, was sent over to a road near the Schuylkill to pass around and attack the extreme left (west) flank of the British line. General Greene, with three brigades, was sent over to the east as far as the Lime Kiln road, a road that ran southerly to the British right wing, which Greene was to attack.

The main or center column was composed of the divisions under Sullivan and Wayne, with Conway's brigade in advance, and Maxwell's and Nash's in the rear, the whole being under the command of Sullivan.

The Americans left their camp on the evening of October 3, 1777, and after a wearisome march over a rough road, reached at daylight Chestnut Hill, a mile north of Mount Airy. A detachment was then sent forward (it was a dark, foggy morning) to bayonet the sentries posted by the light infantry at Mount Airy, and this was done, but not swiftly enough to prevent an alarm.

Two 6-pounders were fired immediately after the first outcry, "and so much had we all Wayne's affair in our remembrance, that the battalion were out and under arms in a minute," as one of them wrote.

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They had need to make haste, for Sullivan and Wayne were on the heels of the advance detachment, and no sooner were the two forces in sight of each other than the Americans raised the cry, "Have at the bloodhounds! Revenge Wayne's affair!"

The light infantry were overwhelmed, and they fled, with Wayne's men chasing the larger part of them from fence to fence down the east side of the main road, while Sullivan followed those that fled down the west side of the road. In due time the regiment under Colonel Musgrave was reached. It had come marching up to support the light infantry, but it was quickly overwhelmed, and in part surrounded, when to save their lives, or sell them dear, six companies took refuge in Chew's house.

Sullivan and Wayne then swept on in pursuit of the retreating enemy. The Pennsylvanians were especially eager.

"They pushed on with the bayonet, and took ample vengeance for that Night's Work," wrote Wayne. "The Rage and Fury of the men was not to be Restrained." Even when Howe came up and shouted to his men, "For shame, light infantry! I never saw you retreat before," he could not stop them, and was

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himself obliged to ride hastily back to his main line.

But as the men of the American reserve, under Maxwell and Nash, came up, the British in Chew's house fired on them, and General Henry Knox (he who was afterward Secretary of War) thought it necessary to stop a whole brigade in order to carry the stone house in which the six companies of British soldiers had taken refuge. To leave that house full of the enemy might endanger the whole American army of 11,000 men, he thought, and his rank enabled him to gather a force about the house, and spend a half hour of the most valuable time of the day in a vain effort to carry it. Wayne, in disgust, wrote of Knox's effort as "a *Wind Mill* (i. e., Don Quixote) attack." Knox finally left a regiment to guard the house, as should have been done in the first place, and marched on; but he was then too late.

For in the meantime Sullivan and Wayne had driven the light infantry home to the main British line, and had made a successful attack on the British center. Washington himself here took the lead and dashed in among the enemy. As the British gave way before the impetuous Americans at the center,

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Greene charged in on the British right, and forced it back. "Tumult, disorder and even despair" appeared in the British line. Howe admitted a defeat, appointed Chester as a rendezvous for his broken forces, and 2,000 of Knyphausen's Hessians crossed the Schuylkill on their way thither.

"We had full possession of the enemy's camp, which was on fire in several places," wrote Colonel Lacy, and yet when victory was within their grasp the Americans suddenly began to retreat.

The origin of the trouble was in the divisions of the Americans into four separate columns for an assault in the fog. It was well to get rid of the militia, perhaps, by sending them off to turn the flanks of the enemy, if they could do so. For the main attack, however, Napoleon would have kept Greene's men in the main column, and then would have sent his whole mass in column down to and through the British line. Then he would have taken the two parts, one at a time, and would have annihilated them. The single-column attack was all the more desirable because so many of the Americans were raw recruits. Nevertheless, Washington's plan was excellent for that age (as were all of his disposi-

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tions of troops), and it would have succeeded but for the fact that the stupid Knox thought it necessary to stop and batter a stone dwelling in the midst of an attack where success depended wholly on an uninterrupted swoop into the enemy's line. By his attack on the Chew house so much noise was made that a part of Greene's men (a brigade under Stephen) were diverted from the main attack, and while marching through the fog in search of the enemy's flank fell upon the flank of Wayne's division.

Wayne's men had been chasing the British for more than two miles and were weary. Stephen's men had had no fighting and were eager. Their fire took Wayne's men in the rear as well as the flank, and being wholly unexpected, it threw the Pennsylvanians into disorder. Though Wayne stormed to and fro to stop them, they fled away until another brigade behind them was thrown into confusion, and then the main line, under Washington and Sullivan, was forced to fall back.

When the Americans turned, the British, being veterans and well disciplined, quickly rallied. Grey, with his chasseurs, then came from the extreme left to support the British

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right, and was able to charge in on the faltering Americans and keep them going.

Cornwallis, who had heard the cannon while yet in bed at Philadelphia, came up with reenforcements on the run, and joined in the pursuit, and they followed the Americans to White Marsh Church, several miles north of Germantown.

Here, however, the pursuit came to an end. Wayne had at last overcome the panic of his men, and with the brigade that had been under General Stephen added, a stand was made "*in order to collect stragglers from the army,*" as Wayne reported to Washington. Wayne was repeating here the work he did after the failure at Three Rivers.

As the stragglers came in, the enemy appeared with a troop of light horsemen and 1,500 infantry. The main body of the Americans was ordered off, but Wayne remained behind to cover the retreat. Posting some cannon on a low hill, he supported them with "some infantry and Colonel Bland's dragoons" until the enemy "were induced to retire back over the ridge and give up further pursuit."

The Americans carried away all their own cannon and a number taken from the British,

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and they retreated in good order. The American loss in killed and wounded was 673; the British, by their own accounts, 535, but Gordon's History of the American Revolution says, "They (the Loyal Army) suffered probably more than they allowed."

Wayne was among those slightly wounded.

The chagrin of the American officers over the retreat was great. Washington wrote to Congress saying: "Our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring herself in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which it seems had taken place in the British army, were scarcely to be paralleled; and it is said that so strongly did the ideas of retreat prevail, that Chester was fixed on for their rendezvous."

Says Captain Heth, of Virginia: "What makes this inglorious flight more grating to us is that we know the enemy had orders to retreat, and rendezvous at Chester, and that upwards of two thousand Hessians had actually crossed the Schuylkill for that purpose; that the Tories were in the utmost distress and moving out of the city; that our friends confined in the new jail made it ring with shouts of joy; that we passed in pursuing them upwards of twenty pieces of cannon,

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their tents standing filled with their choicest baggage; in fine every thing was as we could wish when the flight took place."

But here again, as usual, we get a glimpse of Wayne's mind that is cheering. For while others were complaining, he writes to "Dear Polly"—his wife—and says, "upon the whole it was a glorious day. Our men are in high spirits, and I am confident that we shall give them a total defeat in the next action."

CHAPTER XI

THE CONDITIONS AFTER THE BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN

HAVING by good luck held his own at Germantown, the British general turned his attention to the reduction of the American defenses below Philadelphia in order to open communication with the British fleet. The Americans had a fleet of small armed vessels under Commodore Hazlewood, and they yet occupied two forts, Fort Mercer at Red Bank, opposite the mouth of the Schuylkill—that is, on the east bank of the Delaware—and Fort Mifflin on Mud Island, just below the mouth of the Schuylkill and on the west side of the Delaware. The guns of these forts covered several lines of submarine obstructions made of heavy timbers that were likely to pierce and sure to stop any ship sailed against them. An attempt was made by the British to carry Mercer by assault (October 22d), but it failed, and then Howe constructed batteries on Province Island within 500 yards of Fort Mifflin.

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Aided by this fort the British, after a siege of six weeks, took Fort Mifflin (November 10th), and thus opened the river. In connection with the surrender of Fort Mifflin Wayne wrote (November 18, 1777) to Richard Peters, Secretary of War:

"Six weeks' investiture and no attempt to raise the siege of that fort, will scarcely be credited at an other day.

"Whenever that subject was mentioned new difficulties were always raised sufficient to prevent any measures being taken for that purpose, until his Excellency, seeing the Absolute necessity of making every possible effort to effect so desirable an object, ordered some Gent'n in whom he could confide to reconnoitre the ground in the vicinity of Province Island. . . . On their return a Council was held. The practicability as well as the immediate necessity of raising the Siege was urged in the most clear and pointed terms. The measure was again overruled [by vote], but His Excellency had determined to act the General. The army was to have passed the Schukill and taken post near the middle ferry (Market street), whilst my Division with Morgan's corps were to proceed to Province Island, and there storm the enemy's

After the Battle of Germantown

lines, spike their cannon and Ruin their works.

“There was some Difficulty as well as Danger in the Attempt, but the success depended more on the fortitude of the Troops than upon Numbers. His excellency had charged me with the Conduct and execution of this business. I knew my troops & gladly Embraced the command, but the Evacuation of that important fortress the evening preceding the day on which the storm was to have taken place frustrated an expedition which afforded the most flattering prospect.”

Wayne then expresses the opinion that “the surest way to do nothing” is to call a council, and concludes the paragraph by the assertion that “there has been more than one instance of the truth of this observation during this campaign.”

Three letters in like vein were written by Wayne to General Washington. In the one dated November 25th, he says: “I am solemnly and clearly of Opinion; that the Credit of the army under your Command, the Safety of the Country, the Honor of the American Arms, the Approach of winter that must in a few days force you from the field.

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and above all the depreciation of the Currency of these States, point out the Immediate Necessity of giving the Enemy Battle."

A plan for an attack on Philadelphia is then given, and the letter closes with this remarkable sentence:

"It is not in our power to Command Success, but it is in our power to produce a Conviction to the world that we deserve it."

Wayne used that expression very often in his letters during the Revolution, but it failed to effect his purpose in this case. With all but two or three of his other officers opposed to an attack on the entrenched British, Washington felt obliged to go into camp for the winter, and Valley Forge was chosen as the site for the camp.

CHAPTER XII

THE VALLEY FORGE WINTER

FROM October 4, 1777, to December 1st, Washington's army lay encamped at White Marsh Church. Washington, in his modesty, felt obliged to listen to the cautions of the timid majority of his advisers rather than to the urgent appeal of the courageous, of whom Wayne was chief, and so no attack was made on Howe. He held his ground when, on one occasion, the British marched up to give battle, but on seeing the "countenance" of the Americans the knighted Howe hunted winter quarters, as the knighted Carleton had done a year before in the north.

But when the storms of winter came, the countenance of the American force blanched, and on December 11th they marched away unmolested to settle down for the winter in Valley Forge.

A memorable march was that. The ground was snow-covered, save on the faces of ridges where the wind had blown it away,

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and hundreds of the soldiers were barefooted; but the barefooted found the snow less painful than the wind-swept ground. For the ground was frozen into knobs, and the knobs were full of sharp rock and bits of iron ore that cut and tore the feet of the marching host till their trail was marked with blood. And yet, though their sufferings were just begun, after they reached their destination (on the 17th) the whole army united in a devout service of thanksgiving that had been appointed by Congress.

Valley Forge is "a deep, short hollow scooped out from a low, rugged mountain" that stands on the west side of the Schuylkill, six or seven miles above Morristown, and it was in 1777, 20 miles from Philadelphia by the highway. This hollow opened upon the great valley of the Schuylkill toward Phenixville. A small creek ran through the hollow. On this creek old Isaac Potts, a Quaker, had established a forge for supplying the region with iron, and thus had given a name to the little hollow.

The army, when it reached the hollow, numbered 11,098 men, but of these 2,898 were unfit for duty because they were naked or barefooted, and had marched 19 miles bare-

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footed over the rock-pointed knobs of the wind-swept ridges. Those who could work at once started for the forest trees that stood in abundance about the valley, and cutting them down they built log cabins, with stick-and-mud chimneys, and roofs made of puncheons, or boards that were split instead of sawed from logs. The cracks between the logs—the chinks—were stuffed with moss, bark, or mud. There were no floors to the huts, and the wind came driving through many a crevice in spite of the care of the builders. There were no beds, and not one blanket, on the average, to the hut. The men in each hut had to lie on the ground, sick or well, and with their bare feet to the fire shiver the night away, while in the coldest weather they sat up in a huddle around the fire all night long because unable to endure the cold when stretched out.

The naked, when their turn came to mount guard, were obliged to borrow the clothing of comrades before they went out. And to add to the misery of all, food was so scarce that they were often without meat for days at a stretch, and sometimes without flour, or any substitute for it.

And yet at this time the Legislature of

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Pennsylvania—the patriots who were careful to stay at home to serve their country—addressed a formal remonstrance to Congress against allowing the army to go into winter quarters.

The energy and vitality which Anthony Wayne might have used in fighting the enemy—energy and vitality that would have thrived on battle—were drawn to the lowest ebb by his daily views of the distress about him and his unceasing and all but fruitless efforts to provide for his men. For his efforts were steadily thwarted by the politicians to whom he was obliged to apply to obtain supplies.

In a letter to Richard Peters, Secretary of War, dated January 26, 1778, he tells something of the destitution of his men, and begs that the board “will fall upon some other mode than orders on the Clothier General” for supplying the needed clothing, because, as he explains, “every let and hindrance in the power of the Clothier General seems to be thrown in the way.” He appealed to Commissary James Long, and that official replied (February 7th): “You cannot conceive how Uneasy I am from *want of instructions* from the Council concerning the sending necessaries to Camp for the troops.” He says shoes

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might be forwarded, but the council "has not fixed the issueing time." "Some shirts & stockings & good Breeches are in my possession, on which account I only await your Orders and *their Leave*."

In another letter to Peters Wayne declares: "I am not fond of danger, but I would most cheerfully agree to enter into action, once every week in place of visiting each hut of my encampment (which is my constant practice), and where objects strike my eye whose wretched condition beggars all description. . . . For God's sake give us, if you can't give us anything else, give us linen that we may be Enabled to preserve the poor Worthy fellows from the Vermin that are now devouring them. . . . Some hundreds 'we have buried' who have died of a disorder produced by a want of Clothing."

"One loses patience as he reads Wayne's complaints of the neglect of the commonest wants of the soldier, and the ridiculous excuses that were made for not supplying them," as Stille says. "It is humiliating to discover, for instance, that such were the destitution and nakedness of the troops at Valley Forge that Wayne himself purchased the cloth for the articles his men most needed,

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hoping, (as it turned out in vain), to have the garments made up in camp; that the State Clothier General refused to issue the cloth which he had in store, through some absurd rule in his opinion justifying his actions. Thus when the proper officer called for shoes repeatedly they were not issued because no order of Council had been voted. On the 12th of March Wayne sends Colonel Bayard to Lancaster to procure arms and clothing, but the result is broken promises only. In despair he turns to the President of the Council, or Governor, and is told in reply, that he should send out more recruiting officers, and that as to the non-receipt of the clothing, the delay is caused by a want of buttons."

In fact this President (Thomas Wharton) wrote on April 2d to say to Wayne (who had previously complained that some of the officers were also without proper clothing): "If money is an inducement to enlist in our regiments this State has given generously, and the officers, I think, have sufficient encouragement to do their duty."

But heartrending as most of the details of life at Valley Forge are, the reader can yet see that hope for American freedom had not yet fled—indeed, *hope never was stronger.*

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When a foreign officer visited the camp and "saw a gaunt figure flitting from one hut to another, its nakedness covered with only a dirty blanket," he "despaired of the independence of America."

But the incident that gave despair to the foreigner gave hope to men like Anthony Wayne. That figure *remained in camp*, waiting for the clothing that would enable him to go out and fight for the gridiron flag, instead of deserting when out on picket duty in borrowed clothing. *There is no picture of American patriotism so graphic as that of the naked soldiers crouching by their fires during the winters of the Revolution.*

Toward the end of the winter Baron Steuben came to Valley Forge. Steuben had been trained under Frederick the Great. He was an earnest, capable, hot-tempered man, who knew the manual of arms and how to maneuver troops on the field better than any other man in America. He came to Valley Forge to show the soldiers how to do their work in the best way, and he trained officers as well as men. Wayne's men had used the bayonet, and so had others—as a farmer uses a pitchfork. Steuben, with musket in hand, taught the men how to thrust and parry in the

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scientific manner of the Prussian veterans under Frederick the Great. He taught them how to march in column, and deploy in line quickly, and what was of still greater importance, how to act together. He saw the advantages of the backwoods American plan of scattering behind trees, on proper occasions, and developed from it the modern skirmish line.

Wayne was a constant spectator of Steuben's work, and how he profited by it shall appear. The bayonet exercises particularly interested him. In a letter to Secretary of War Peters (February 8, 1777), we find this:

"I find the enclosed deficiency in Bayonets which I wish an order for from the Board of War on Mr. William Henry, at Lancaster, with directions to make them eighteen inches long in the blade. . . . I would also wish to exchange a number of rifles for muskets and bayonets. I don't like rifles. I would almost as soon face an enemy with a good musket and bayonet without ammunition, as with ammunition without a bayonet, for although there are not many instances of bloody bayonets, yet I am confident that one bayonet keeps off another, and for want of which the

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Chief of the Defeats we have met with ought in a great measure to be attributed. The Enemy, knowing the defenceless state of our Riflemen, rush on. They [the riflemen] fly, mix with or pass thro' the other troops, and communicate fears that is ever incident to a retiring corps. This would not be the case if the riflemen had bayonets. But it would be still better if good muskets and bayonets were put into the hands of good marksmen, and rifles entirely laid aside. For my part I never wish to see one [a rifle], at least without a bayonet. I don't give this as a mere matter of opinion or speculation, but as a matter of fact to the truth of which I have more than once been an unhappy witness."

This dissertation on the advantages of the use of the bayonet becomes all the more interesting if the reader will recall what Wayne had to say, while at Ticonderoga, about the need of training men to maneuver in the open field. According to his ideas, to hide behind breastworks was to cultivate cowardice. To get out in the field and meet the enemy, man to man and steel to steel, was to cultivate manhood.

We see now Wayne's ideal of a soldier—a man in a dress that would appeal to pride;

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carrying a musket with bayonet fixed; trained to shoot the musket accurately, and ply the bayonet effectively; and willing, as well as able, to go through all necessary maneuvers on the open field and under fire.

In March food became so scarce at Valley Forge that Wayne was sent over to New Jersey to forage for supplies. He was, of course, to give to the owners of the stuff taken receipts which were to be cashed by Congress. It was not pleasant work, but it was necessary, and Wayne obeyed orders cheerfully. He found some pleasure in it, too, when actually in the field, for the British had foraging parties in the same region, and Wayne chased them back to Philadelphia, where they arrived "not without some loss attended with Circumstances of Disgrace." That he obtained the needed supplies scarcely need be stated.

Finally, on April 21, 1776, Wayne wrote a letter to Washington offering suggestions in detail for the coming campaign.

"I took the Liberty to suggest to your Excellency, (some time since), the Idea of making an Offensive Campaign against such places as afford the greatest prospect of Success to us & injury to the enemy. . . . Many Reasons (in my humble opinion), both political and

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prudential point to the expediency of putting the enemy on the Defensive.”

It was in the spirit thus expressed that Wayne went into the battle of Monmouth, which was now to come.

CHAPTER XIII

MONMOUTH

It was on September 26, 1777, that a part of Howe's army under Cornwallis entered Philadelphia with banners flying and brass bands playing "God save the King." They thought it a great triumph to capture "the rebel capital." By good luck they held it, and settled down for the winter. But in the meantime the American representatives in France had been able to negotiate a treaty whereby the independence of the United States was recognized, and an alliance for the purpose of war was formed (February 6, 1778). The British at once declared war against France, and then France prepared a powerful fleet and an army to send to the relief of the Americans.

Acting in fear of what this force might do in the way of blockading the Delaware and capturing the smaller British squadron there, the British ministry ordered Sir Henry Clinton to leave Philadelphia and take the army to New York.

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This order reached Sir Henry on June 4, 1778. At the dawn of June 18th the British army crossed to Gloucester Point on the Jersey shore, and marched away to Haddenfield.

On learning the facts, Washington marched to the northeast (nearly parallel with the course of the British), to cross the Delaware above Trenton. On June 24th (when in camp at Hopewell, N. J., a few miles from Princeton) Washington invited his generals to a council, wherein he stated to them his own force and that of the enemy, and then asked them to reply to this question:

“Will it be advisable to hazard a general action?”

A most memorable council was that. Sixteen generals were gathered before Washington, with Lee, the Marquis de Lafayette, Lord Stirling, of New Jersey, and Baron Steuben as the lights from Europe. By right of rank Lee answered first, and with arguments that seemed to all the foreigners, and to some of the Americans, conclusive, he declared against such an action. Others followed with similar arguments.

One sees herein how the foreigners in the American army served the patriot cause—what an incubus they were. For they had no

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confidence in the ragged hosts of men who marched as if they had one foot in the furrow and one on the land-side. Even the enthusiastic but much overrated Lafayette and the capable Steuben* spoke against an attack upon the enemy.

But when the turn of Anthony Wayne had come, and Washington said to him, "What would you do, general?" he arose in his place and replied with emphasis:

"Fight, sir!"

That was the greatest speech known to the records of the American councils of war. There were but two other generals in the council who agreed with Wayne, but Washington was one of the two, and "Fight, sir," would have ended the war on the plains of Monmouth but for the work of the traitor Lee.

While Washington was holding his council of war at Hopewell, the British were in a camp that extended from Imlaystown, in Monmouth County, to the southwest for three miles—as far as Allentown, where the main part of the camp lay.

Up to this date Sir Henry Clinton had purposed marching to Amboy, and thence to the

* Kapp says Steuben voted to fight.

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Hudson River, but Lieutenant-Colonel John Graves Simcoe, who was in command of a band of Tories (and was a man of whom we shall learn something more in this biography), discovered the threatening position of Washington's men, and Clinton "was led to wish for a route less liable to obstacles" than the one he had previously decided on, to quote his report.

Accordingly, Sir Henry decided to march to Sandy Hook instead of Amboy, hoping thereby to "outwit" the Americans, instead of fighting them. And on the morning of June 25th he sent Knyphausen, with the Hessians in charge of the baggage, in a procession 12 miles long, from Imlaystown on the road to Monmouth Court-House (now Freehold, N. J.), while he himself, with the British portion of the army, covered the retreat.

The heat of the season is described as something almost intolerable, but Knyphausen pushed on 13 miles before he halted. Clinton halted at the Rising Sun tavern, say 4 miles out. The next morning (June 26th), Knyphausen marched on to Freehold (a distance of 4 miles), and here he was overtaken by the main body under Clinton, and the entire force then camped to the west and

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north of the court-house, and out along the highway that comes to Freehold from the southwest.

It should be remembered now that when, on the 25th (after reaching Kingston, 3 miles east of Princeton), Washington learned that Clinton was heading for Sandy Hook, instead of Amboy, he ordered forward Wayne with 1,000 picked men, and gave Lafayette general oversight of all the forces that had been sent on in advance. Then, when night came, Washington left his baggage-train at Kingston and marched to Cranberry (a place 8 miles to the northwest of Freehold), where he arrived on Friday morning, June 26th. At the same time the advance corps under Lafayette took post at Englishtown, 5 miles northwest of Freehold.

Seeing that Washington was determined to fight, Gen. Charles Lee now claimed the right to command the advance corps, and because he was the senior major-general, Washington permitted him to go forward with two more brigades and displace Lafayette. Lee took command of the advance on the 27th, and at sunset Washington rode from Cranberry to the advance post at Englishtown, and "anxiously reconnoitered Sir Henry's po-

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sition." He found it was "protected by woods and morasses, and too strong to be attacked with prospects of success," but he knew that when at Middletown, another day's march toward Sandy Hook, Sir Henry would have a still stronger position, and he saw, therefore, that he must fight now if at all.

Accordingly, he ordered Lee to attack the British rear as soon as the head of their column should be under way next morning. Washington then rode back to his own camp at Cranberry, but during the night he began to fear that the British would sneak away in the night, as Howe had done on the Schuylkill, and so ordered Lee to send forward 700 men to observe the movements, and in case of their flight, to attack and to hold them as long as possible.

General Dickinson was sent forward on this duty, but it was not until sunrise (Sunday, June 28, 1778) that Lee started Dickinson from camp. As Dickinson marched forward (heading southeast), he saw the enemy was in motion, and sent word to Washington as well as Lee. Then he boldly continued on his way, and after crossing what is known as the west ravine, he opened fire on Clinton's rear-guard.

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The messenger who carried the news to Washington arrived at five o'clock, and Washington immediately sent orders to Lee to march forward in pursuit of the enemy, and notified him that the main army had thrown aside their packs and were coming forward to join the advance.

In obedience to this order Lee moved forward from Englishtown, Colonel Richard Butler, with 200 Pennsylvanians, heading the column. General Woodford's brigade (600 men) came next, General Varnum following with 600 men, and then came Wayne with his picked men, 1,000 in number, and 2 pieces of field-artillery. After Wayne came other brigades under Scott and Maxwell, making in all nearly 5,000 men and 12 pieces of artillery.

This column was frequently halted by Lee during its march, and at one of these halts Wayne was ordered to leave his picked men, take command of 600 men, and with them go forward to beat up the country and locate the enemy's rear-guard.

It was an order to Wayne's taste, and crossing the west ravine, through which flows Wemrock Brook, he soon discovered a small covering party of the enemy, and made

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them fly in "very great disorder and confusion."

In the meantime Sir Henry Clinton had been careful to place the best of his command in the rear of all, because he was looking for an attack. As Clinton marched away Wayne saw him, and sent a messenger to Lee asking that "the troops might be pushed on." Lee, of course, omitted to push on, until he learned that a party, 800 or 900 strong, had stopped to the east of the court-house, and were plainly waiting for the Americans. Lee then ordered Wayne, whose earnestness and activity were manifest, to take 700 men from his Pennsylvanians (Butler with his battalion of 200 being among them), with two pieces of artillery, and charge this covering party of at least 800 men. And "with his wonted gallantry, General Wayne did so." This Wayne did so effectually that Clinton sent back the Queen's light dragoons to help the 800 resist the 700 Pennsylvanians.

As the dragoons came galloping back, Wayne's men promptly formed to receive them, with Butler's 200 at the fore, and they not only stood the shock, but at the point of the bayonet drove the horsemen through the British infantry, and then across the east

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ravine, as a low stretch of ground east of the court-house was called. Thither Wayne pursued them, and on reaching an eminence beyond the ravine he planted two pieces of artillery (under Colonel Oswald) and opened fire on a third detachment that was coming back to attack him.

In the meantime Lee had carried his column in a detour off to the north of where Wayne was fighting against odds, and had advanced so far to the east of the court-house that his column had crossed the east ravine. On seeing this, Clinton turned back with the main body of his army and began to form in line to give battle.

The supreme moment for which Washington had hoped had come. If any patriot of the army had been in command in place of the traitor Lee, the fight would have been forced by the Americans until Washington (whose men were coming in hot haste) could arrive and decide the fate of the day quickly. With a man of Wayne's temper in command, there would have been no need to wait for Washington. But Lee, to aid Clinton, immediately began to retreat with his column. And apparently this order for retreat had in it something more than a desire to aid the British,

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for although Wayne had sent for reenforcements, Lee abandoned him to his fate. Lee knew that at this moment, to quote his own words in a letter to Robert Morris, that "the force opposed to the American Army was the whole flower of the British Army, Grenadiers, Light Infantry, Cavalry & Artillery, amounting in all to 7,000 men."

With only 700 men and two pieces of artillery, Wayne was left to face "the whole flower of the British Army." But Wayne was the man for the occasion. Holding his men together he backed away. He was "often hard pushed and frequently surrounded," but he cut his way through and saved his guns as well as his men. And when the retreating host came to the middle ravine once more Wayne was found with his unsurpassed Pennsylvanians, "in the post of danger, next to the enemy," whom he was keeping "two, three or four hundred yards distant."

It was in this fashion that Wayne covered Lee's retreating force as it crossed the causeway over the middle ravine, which lay halfway between the east ravine and the west. No point had been assigned for a halt to check the exultant British, though Wayne saw no difficulty in holding them back, "provided

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any effort or exertion was made for the purpose."

Meantime stragglers got on ahead of the main part of Lee's command, and from them Washington learned that, although Lee had sent word that success was assured, the whole advanced American force was retreating.

At this time Washington's part of the army was approaching the west ravine. Not able to believe the reports, Washington sent aids forward, and these soon brought back a confirmation.

With his blood on fire, Washington dashed forward, down into the west ravine, and up on the side toward the enemy, into the midst of Lee's retreating column. Facing them about, he ordered them into line across the road, with Wayne on the right. And then as the men with thankfulness and enthusiasm obeyed these orders, the traitor Lee rode up.

"What is the meaning of all this?" demanded Washington fiercely. "I desire to know the meaning of this disorder and confusion?"

"By God, sir, American soldiers can not fight British grenadiers," replied Lee.

"By God, they can fight any upon the face

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of the earth," said Washington, "and you are a damned poltroon."

Washington then went on directing Lee's column into line, and when that was done, he went back to bring forward the remainder of the army.

It is a matter of just pride in Pennsylvania that Wayne, with three regiments from his own State and one each from Virginia and Maryland, was placed in the post of honor—an orchard on the southerly side of the road. This post they were to hold until Washington brought up the reenforcements, and they did it for a time without difficulty, because the British, save for two brigades, were yet a considerable distance away. As the American reenforcements came up and took position in the line, however, the main body of the enemy under Lord Cornwallis arrived within range, and there halted.

But the halt was only momentary. As soon as he had observed the position and strength of the American line, Cornwallis ordered Colonel Monckton, commander of the British grenadiers, to charge with the bayonet, and Monckton formed his men directly in front of the division that was under Anthony Wayne.

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Wayne had been hard pressed and even surrounded while retreating. His command had been in deadly peril from the time of their charge on the rear-guard at the courthouse, but for him and them the critical moment of the battle was now at hand. For the grenadiers were picked men of known strength, proved courage, and unequaled skill with the bayonet. They were officered by the pick of the British aristocracy—by men who were the pride of the British nation.

Advancing before his men, Monckton made them a speech, "in which he urged them by all the motives that appeal to a soldier's pride and *esprit de corps*" to do their work man-fashion. And while he spoke the field of battle became so quiet that every word was heard by every man who stood behind Anthony Wayne.

And then as Monckton ceased to talk, the drums rolled the charge, and the grenadiers, in their gorgeous uniforms, leaped forward with eager shouts and with bayonets down. As they came the ragged host with Wayne waited in dead silence until the range was no more than 30 yards, and then they put their muskets to their faces and opened a fire that flung back the red line of the enc-

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my as a gust of wind flings dead leaves before it.

Monckton himself fell dead at the first fire, and on learning that he was killed, his men returned in desperation to recover his body. They even continued their efforts till some of them fell dead from heat and sheer exhaustion—but without avail. For neither pride nor courage nor skill could drive them through the line where Wayne commanded. It was of these men that Washington had said:

“By God, they can fight any upon the face of the earth.”

And the race seems not to have deteriorated since that day.

It was against Wayne, who was the nerve center of the American army, that the flower of the British army was hurled, and when it had fallen into disordered petals and broken stamens, the whole British force retreated. But because of their exhaustion under the frightful heat of the day Washington allowed his men to camp on the field.

Of Wayne's part in the battle Washington, who mentioned no other officer by name, wrote: “I cannot forbear mentioning Brigadier-General Wayne, whose good conduct and

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bravery through the whole action deserves particular commendation." And to this Stille adds, that "to many the orchard at Monmouth seemed a second Thermopylæ, and Wayne was spoken of as a modern Leonidas."

At Germantown Wayne had shown what he and his men could do in charging the enemy with the bayonet. At Monmouth he demonstrated that they could also stand the shock of cavalry and the bayonet charge of the most powerful grenadiers of Europe. He had earned all the praise that was given him, and more. But there was one feature of his character that was brought out at this time that endears him even more than his work in battle to the heart of a soldier. For when the battle was over he sat down to write to his personal friend, Major "Light-Horse Harry" Lee, and this is what he had to say about the battle:

"I wished for you to come in for a share of the Glory of the 28th. Col. Butler wanted you much. The Enemy's Horse, supported by the first Regiment of the Guards, made a charge upon his Reg't, consisting of 200 men. He sustained the shock, broke them & pursued both horse & foot, the Latter having been thrown into Disorder by the former running

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through them. Here was a field for you to act in."

The whole praise of the splendid fighting at the court-house early in the day is thus given to a subordinate officer, Colonel Richard Butler.

CHAPTER XIV.

WHEN WAYNE WAS SUPERSEDED BY ST. CLAIR

FOR more than a year after the Battle of Monmouth the British were blockaded in New York by a thin line of rags—a line through which the British were able to break by an occasional raiding party, it is true, but which bound them to inaction. But in the meantime there were incidents of interest in the career of Anthony Wayne that shall receive consideration here.

The traitor Lee, with the instincts of a blackleg, thought to bluff the whole American nation, and succeeded to an astonishing degree. He wrote letters to the newspapers in which he attacked Washington, Steuben, and Wayne, and maintained such an attitude of haughty defiance when tried for his crime at Monmouth that the court-martial, though it found him guilty as charged, merely suspended him for one year. He was eventually dismissed from the army for writing an insolent letter to Congress, but, sad to relate, died a natural death.

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In the meantime his attack on the officers mentioned brought him three challenges to fight duels. The insult to Washington was taken up by Colonel John Laurens, of Washington's staff. Lee had shown sufficient physical courage in battle, but when it came to dueling he promptly accepted the challenge of Laurens, who was the least capable, as he supposed, of doing him harm in a duel. He had no relish for meeting the man who had led the Pennsylvanians against superior forces beside Monmouth Court-House, nor did he dare face the grim German warrior from the army of Frederick the Great. Laurens wounded him, and with that wound as an excuse, he evaded the other challenges.

It is a pleasing fact that while biographers of Andrew Jackson, and even of John Paul Jones, have felt obliged to apologize for the fact that these great men were duelists, no one has made a similar apology for Wayne. When rightly viewed, the duels of Jackson and the willingness of Wayne and Jones to fight duels are entirely commendable. Wayne, like Jones, did not fight even one duel, but he failed to do so only because his enemies dared not face him. Like Jones, Wayne was "every kind of a fighting man there was."

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Wayne was engaged for a time as a witness before the court-martial that tried Lee. When he had thereafter gone to his post under Washington, we once more find him making appeals for supplies for his men, and for justice in the matter of rank for his officers. The people of the whole country, and especially those in authority, were fully persuaded that the French would now end the war quickly. Count d'Estaing, with a big fleet of ships, arrived on the American coast bringing 4,000 men. He found the British fleet inside of Sandy Hook. If he had had half the ability of a Nelson he would have swooped in on that fleet and captured it, but he sailed away, giving as an excuse that there was not depth of water enough for maneuvering his ships. He went to Rhode Island, and there failed again. But not even then were the American people deprived of the illusion that the French were to end the war, and it was therefore next to impossible to secure either recruits or supplies for the army.

In a letter to the Secretary of the War Board, dated July 12, 1778, Wayne says his troops were "naked." In a letter to Robert Morris, dated October 5, 1778, he says: "In the article of Clothing their Distresses are

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great." On December 28th he wrote to President Joseph Reed, of Pennsylvania, saying, "all the Pennsylvania Line are at this inclement season exposed to wind and weather in their old tents, one-third of them being quite destitute of blankets and *without hats*." Many of the officers were "actually so naked as not to be fit to appear on parade."

And yet society in Philadelphia at this time was described by Colonel Walter Stewart, who had been sent there to urge the needs of the soldiers, as follows:

"It is all gaiety, and from what I can observe, every lady and gentleman endeavors to outdo the other in splendor & show." To this Washington adds a still more striking description:

"Idleness, dissipation and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of the generality, and speculation, speculation & an insatiable thirst for riches to have gotten the better of every other consideration, and of almost every order of men. . . . The momentous concerns of the empire, a great & accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money & want of credit, which is want of everything, are secondary considerations, and postponed by Congress from time to time, as if their af-

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fairs wore the most promising aspect. The paper [money] is daily sinking fifty per cent, and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner or a supper which costs from £200 to £300 does not only take men off from acting, but even from thinking of their business."

To such congressmen as are here described and other stay-at-home patriots of like character Wayne was obliged to appeal for the necessaries of life for his men, and in his letter to Reed he was so much discouraged that he said:

"I neither ask nor wish for anything on my own account, and wish for nothing more than an opportunity of returning to my Sabine fields with safety to my country and honor to myself; and I am determined to seize the first favorable opportunity to put that wish into execution."

And then in a letter to Robert Morris he says:

"I have more than once expressed a wish for a favorable opportunity of quitting the army. That period is now drawing nigh. I therefore can have no interest in view other than wishing to see brave and worthy officers who have shared every vicissitude of fortune with me, and who have nobly fought and bled

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in every field of action, honorably provided for, not left, (when crippled with honest wounds & grown gray in arms), to depend upon the cold charity of men who have grown rich under the shelter of their protecting swords."

Finally he went before the Pennsylvania Assembly (whose duty it was, rather than that of Congress, to provide for the Pennsylvania Line), and by a speech, of which we know only that it was full of pathos, caused them to pass an act by which the men of the line were to receive half pay for life, suitable uniforms, and exemption from taxation of the land grants that had been made to them. This act gave the men temporary relief, but it was not passed until in March. The men might have passed this winter in tents, for all the Assembly did, but Wayne had built huts, so that they were no worse off (and no better) than at Valley Forge.

In the meantime Wayne had himself been subjected to a serious indignity. Major-General St. Clair was placed in command of the Pennsylvania Line over Wayne's head. In itself the ordering of a major-general to command this division was not necessarily an indignity, for the superior rank of St. Clair

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gave him the legal right to the command after he had been court-martialed and acquitted on the charge that he abandoned Ticonderoga improperly. But Wayne had good reasons for disliking to serve under St. Clair. St. Clair had been an ensign in the British line before the war, and had been promoted rapidly because of the supposed superiority his experience had given him. Though he had done nothing in battle or elsewhere of which his latter-day biographer is able to boast, he had been a major-general since February 19, 1777.

Wayne had won the plaudits of every fighting man of the army at every battle where he had been present, from Three Rivers to Monmouth, and was yet a brigadier-general. And he had made the Pennsylvania Line the best-trained division in the patriot army. He did not care for the rank of major-general, but he had been doing a major-general's work for more than a year, and he felt that to be returned to the work of a brigadier-general was, under the circumstances, a personal degradation.

There was still further reason why he should object to serving under St. Clair. When Wayne had been tried and acquitted on

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the charge that he had neglected his duty at the Paoli massacre, St. Clair openly sneered at the finding of the court. And at the Battle of Monmouth, when Wayne was leading the advance against superior numbers, and sent for three more brigades to come to his aid, St. Clair, who was present as a volunteer, "peremptorily ordered them not to advance." Wayne believed that St. Clair was unwilling to see him gain the honor of success on that field, or else that he was ignorant of the needs of the occasion. From what we know now of St. Clair it seems likely that ignorance rather than malice actuated him. In any event, Wayne gained success in spite of him, and St. Clair held a hearty ill will against him.

It was under such circumstances that Wayne, on learning that St. Clair's wish to supersede him was to be granted, wrote a letter of protest in which are these words:

"I don't mean by this to ask for promotion. My only ambition was a Brigadier General's Command of the Penn'a line, which command I have been indulged in for two campaigns and therefore thought I had some claim to that honor in future. But to be superseded at this late hour by a man in

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whose conduct and candor I can have no confidence hurts me not a little. . . . I only hoped not to be degraded, that is, reduced from the command of a division to a brigade, and that under a man, who for reasons I have already mentioned, I can never submit to. I have therefore determined to return to domestic life, and leave the blustering field of Mars to the possession of gentlemen of more worth."

All men of military experience justify Wayne in the position taken here, but the patriotism of the man rose above his just indignation. He would do his whole duty by his country in spite of ill treatment, and holding back this letter, he sent instead a request for a leave of absence (February, 1779). And in this application for a leave of absence he shows his interest in the men who had served with him by saying that if he were allowed to leave the command, Colonel Richard Butler and Colonel William Irvine would not be degraded from the work of brigadiers, which they had been doing, to that of colonels.

The leave was granted, and then for the first time in his career he writes of his own work to Washington, as if he wished for words or thoughts of commendation. This is what he says:

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“I made a point of having my people well and comfortably covered previously to my leaving them, and hope that the appearance of the men, and the regularity and internal police of our new city, have met your Excellency’s approbation.”

To this he adds: “I also flatter myself that General St. Clair will be pleased with the command that always have and ever will do their duty in the field.”

One would naturally infer that Wayne wrote such words as these only when some important end was in view, and that was the case. The formation of a light corps of men to be selected because of their experience, strength, skill, and proved courage for work at the front during the campaign of 1779 had been under consideration by Washington and his generals, and Wayne, after mentioning his own services, as just quoted, says:

“I therefore wish to be indulged with a situation in the *light corps*, if it can take place without prejudice to the service, or the exclusion of an officer of more worth and experience.

“But if that cannot be done, I beg your excellency not to spend another thought, or give yourself a single moment’s uneasiness on the

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occasion; but permit me to hope for the continuance of that friendship with which you have hitherto honored me, and in case of an active campaign, the pleasure of serving near your person as a volunteer."

An appeal like that from a man who had done such work as Wayne had done was not to be resisted. Washington came to a definite decision to form the light corps, and to place Wayne in command of it. Thus it happened that permitting St. Clair to take command of the Pennsylvanian line, though manifestly an outrage, was one of the most fortunate events of Wayne's life. For now the assault upon Stony Point was at hand.

CHAPTER XV

STONY POINT

IN a letter dated January 23, 1779, Lord George Germain, the British Minister of War, wrote to Sir Henry Clinton, who still commanded in New York, to say: "It is most earnestly wished that you may be able to bring Mr. Washington to a *general* and *decisive* action at the opening campaign." If unable to do this, then "Mr. Washington" was to be cooped in the Highlands of the Hudson, and civil government established in the open country.

In order to carry out these instructions, Sir Henry placed a considerable force on his ships, late in May, 1779, and sailing up the Hudson by easy stages, he took possession (June 1, 1779) of Stony Point on the west side of the river, and Verplanck's Point, opposite, on the east side. The Americans had small detachments of men at work fortifying both points at the time, and that on Stony Point escaped by a retreat over Dunderberg

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Mountain, while the 70 men on Verplanck's Point were surrounded and captured.

Washington was encamped at this time at Middlebrook, N. J. Clinton wished to draw the American forces to the Highlands of the Hudson in order to open the way for the capture of the American base of supplies at Easton, Pa.

This threatened attack on the Highlands drew Washington from Middlebrook, as Clinton hoped it would. For there was a regular ferry (called King's) from Stony Point to Verplanck's, and it had been in daily use by the Americans in sending communications between Washington and the forces east of the Hudson. The Americans left their quarters at Middlebrook on May 30th, and on June 6th they passed Tuxedo Lake to enter "the valley running northeasterly from that point"—a valley then known as Smith's Cove. The next day the Virginia division camped at Jones's tavern, near the modern Turner's Station, on the Erie Railroad. There they could cover the road to Haverstraw, while the Pennsylvania division took post 5 miles farther on (where a road led off to Fort Montgomery, on the Hudson) and within 12 miles of West Point. It was a tribute to Wayne, let it be

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noted, that the men he had trained were placed in advance—at the post of honor.

At this time Clinton's force included 12,000 veterans and 4,000 well-armed Tories. Washington's immediate command numbered 5,000 men, of whom 3,000 only were fit for an active campaign. But with all his superior numbers, Clinton still felt unable to march across New Jersey. He therefore thought to draw Washington to the east side of the Hudson by sending General William Tryon and Sir George Collier (July 3, 1779) to ravage the Connecticut coast. And it was then that Washington showed himself the general, as Wayne used to say, for instead of marching to the defense of Connecticut he ordered Anthony Wayne to attack the enemy on the Hudson, and the work was done so thoroughly that the marauders in Connecticut were frightened from their outrageous task.

On June 21st Washington wrote to Wayne (who was still in Pennsylvania) to "join the army as soon as you can." Washington was now selecting men for the light corps already mentioned, and they were organized into four regiments of 340 men each. Each regiment was divided into two battalions. The First Regiment was commanded by Colonel Chris-

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tian Febiger, and his battalions were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury, a Frenchman, and Major Thomas Posey, a Virginian, afterward Governor of Indiana. The Second Regiment was commanded by Colonel Richard Butler, of Pennsylvania, and Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Hay, of Pennsylvania, and Major "Jack" Steward (one of the famous Marylanders of the war) commanded the two battalions. The Third Regiment was commanded by Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs, a noted figure in the West later on, while Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Sherman and Captain Henry Champion headed the battalions. The Fourth Regiment was commanded by Colonel Rufus Putnam (afterward well known to Ohio history), and the battalions by Major William Hull (who threw away his reputation at Detroit during the next war) and by Major Hardy Murfree, of North Carolina. Men from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina—men who had fought at Bunker Hill, stormed the gates at Quebec, defended the fords at Brandywine, and charged through the fog at Germantown—now stood shoulder to shoulder. They were equipped for swift movements, and

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every man of them knew and trusted Anthony Wayne, who was to command them.

The First and Second Regiments were organized in Washington's camp, and the Third and Fourth in the New England division, east of the Hudson. The First and Second Regiments were stationed at Sandy Beach, just above Fort Montgomery. The regiments east of the river were left there, and not even the officers of any of the four regiments learned what their first work was to be until it was ready in hand.

Immediately on Wayne's arrival he was ordered (July 1st) to his command at Sandy Beach, a mile or more above Fort Montgomery, where the regiments of the light infantry under Butler and Febiger were encamped on the farm of Benjamin Jaques, a patriot who had had a part in the defense of Fort Montgomery in the massacre of 1777. At Sandy Beach Wayne was to "exert himself to gain an accurate knowledge of the scene of action."

Stony Point, at that time, was a rugged, thumb-shaped island, 100 acres in extent, lying close to the west bank of the Hudson River, 12 miles (by water) below West Point. At its highest point it rose 140 feet above the tide, and it was precipitous and

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rough on all sides, but particularly so on the west, or shore side. Between the island and mainland was a marsh through which ran a channel, originally deep enough for row-boats. A causeway, or dirt roadway, had been built across the marsh, opposite the center of the island, by the Americans, in order to reach their ferry landing (on the north side of the island), and the roadway obstructed the flow of the tidal current. In consequence of this the waves threw up the sand at both ends of the marsh until at low tide a narrow beach extending from the mainland to the island was uncovered.

On taking possession of Stony Point the British went to "work like a Parsels of Devils in fortifying both" it and Verplanck's, as Colonel Malcom reported on June 7th. No less than fourteen different breastworks were created at various points on the irregular crest of the island. Three of them were located in a line to command the whole sweep of the land approach to the point, while six others were placed where they would command storming patriots that might approach from various points.

In front of the line of three breastworks was placed a strong line of abatis, reaching

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across the island from water to water, and another line of abatis was drawn across farther out from the west shore, where it would protect the irregularly placed works just mentioned.

In the breastworks were mounted "two 24 Prs. and two 18 Prs., four 12 Prs., six 6 Prs., and one 3 Pr., one 10 Inch Mortar, one 8 Inch Howitzer, two Royal Mortars, and two Cohorns" (Gen. Pattison's letter to Lord Townshend). The post was garrisoned by 607 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Johnson, of the Seventeenth British Regiment of foot, and to them came three deserters from the American army soon after Washington reached Smith's Cove. So well adapted for defense was the point both by nature and by the works created that the garrison habitually spoke of it as their "Little Gibraltar."

All these works for defense Wayne saw as he gazed upon the point from the heights of Donderberg, and on July 3d he reported to Washington, saying, "I do not think a storm practicable," but when he came to talk the matter over with Washington, and the possibilities of success in case a storm was attempted, were considered, Wayne said to his chief:

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“General, I’ll storm hell, if you will plan it.”

Some fastidious people have tried to throw a shade of doubt over the account (in Irving’s Washington) which gives these vigorous words of Wayne, but it was unquestionably in Wayne to say just that.

At Wayne’s suggestion Washington himself went (July 6th), with an escort of the light infantry, to take a look at the point, and because of the strength of the works, it was then decided to make a night assault rather than to try to storm it by day.

The details of the preparation for the assault are of special interest to this biography. It was then that Wayne wrote to Washington (July 8th) to say: “I have an insuperable bias in favor of an elegant uniform.” Next he asked that a copy of Baron Steuben’s textbook of instructions in the manual of arms and field maneuvers be furnished to each officer of the corps. And then he said: “Your excellency must must have observed how wretchedly our platoon officers are armed,” and asked that 50 “espontoons”—a short-handled, broad-bladed, keen-pointed spear—“the neatest and best” to be had, might be sent to him. And they were wanted quickly,

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says Wayne, "as I wish immediately to practise with them."

He got the spears, but only a few of the books, and no fine uniforms at all.

As the time passed Wayne kept "a small party of rifle men hovering about" the point. They had orders to keep the enemy "in constant alarm, with a promise of 20 dollars bounty for each deserter from our army that they can take up." "I have given the most pointed orders against a surprise," he adds, "and *not* to trust any man in that country."

On July 10th Washington decided on the plan of attack. He sent it to Wayne, going into considerable detail, and yet allowing him to change it as might seem best when the time came. Accordingly, on July 11th, Wayne, with his colonels, Butler and Febiger—the light infantry selected east of the Hudson had been left there lest transferring them across to Sandy Beach might arouse suspicion—made another careful examination of the land about the point, and this was followed by the most careful patrolling of the land by "Light-Horse Harry" Lee, with 150 scouts, and by Captain James Chrystie, of Pennsylvania, with a smaller detachment, while Captain Allen McLane had charge of the sentries. So thor-

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ough was the work of keeping all knowledge of the movement from the enemy that Captain McLane arrested "the Widow Calhoun and another widow going to the enemy with chickens and greens," while the men under Lee killed every dog within 3 miles of the point lest the bark of a cur give an untimely warning.

Finally, on July 14th, the light-infantry regiments lying east of the river were brought across to Sandy Beach, where they were hutted in brush and bark shelters, for Wayne had been ordered to start for Stony Point the next day at noon. At this time not a man in the ranks, nor even the field-officers, save those that had been scouting, knew what work was in hand. Late in the next morning all the battalions of light infantry—1,350 men all told—were ordered out on parade, and the order said distinctly that every man must appear "fresh shaved and well powdered," and fully equipped and rationed, that the general might judge of their provision and readiness for service (Johnston).

"Fresh shaved and well powdered" the men lined up, and Wayne and his field-officers walked down the long line, looking at each musket to see that it was fit for work, and into

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each haversack to see that the proper food was there, too. And it is certain that the men were commended, where possible, and made cheerful and self-confident.

At noon precisely, July 15, 1779, the inspection was finished, but when the men were listening for the order to break ranks and return to their huts for dinner they were faced south and marched down along the plateau on which they had paraded, as far as Fort Montgomery. There they turned to the west and filed into the gorge between Bear Mountain on their left and Torn Mountain on the right. A small detachment of artillery with two guns followed them, but the guns were not to take part in the assault.

The route was but a wilderness trail, and in perfect silence the men in single file marched along on the mountainside where the deer had at one time marked the trail. The primeval forest was over and around them for perhaps 5 miles from the starting-point. The route bent somewhat to the southwest after entering the mountains, and 5 miles from Fort Montgomery they reached the wilderness home of one Clement. Here, beside a brook, the command stopped to rest, for it was a hot, midsummer's day. Under

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the strictest orders from Wayne not a man had been allowed to leave the column, and now while they were at rest no man could leave it unless a commissioned officer went with him.

When refreshed, the men marched on, turning to the south and southeast a short way beyond Clement's, and passing over the southwest end of Donderberg Mountain, they descended part way into a valley, and at eight o'clock at night arrived at the farm of one David Springsteel, from whose home one could look down, by day, upon Stony Point, just a mile and a half away.

At this point the men first learned what work they were to do that night. Gathering up the long file of men, Febiger formed a column with his own regiment at the head, that of Colonel Meigs next, and a battalion under Major Hull last. Colonel Butler then formed another column with his own regiment at the head, and including all the remainder of the light infantry, except Major Murfree's battalion, which was formed in a column by itself.

Then from each of the two main columns 150 "determined and picked men" were chosen, and placed in column each about 20 paces in advance of the column from

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which it had been selected—in the post of honor. Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury commanded Febiger's advanced detachment; Major "Jack" Steward that of Colonel Butler.

The order of battle was now read to the command in a low but distinct voice. The men had come thus far with unloaded muskets and fixed bayonets. They were now, save Murfree's, commanded to keep their muskets unloaded, and the officers were instructed to kill instantly any man who should disobey this order. The work must be done with the bayonet, save only as all the officers were armed with the short-handled, keen-pointed spears for which Wayne had written.

"The General has the fullest confidence in the bravery and fortitude of the corps," said Wayne, but in order to show appreciation of the exhibition of special bravery and fortitude, the first five men to enter the enemy's works were to receive \$500, \$400, \$300, \$200, and \$100, in the order in which they entered, while the first of all was to have promotion also. On the other hand, "should there be any soldier so lost to the feeling of Honor as to attempt to retreat one single foot

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or skulk in the face of danger, the Officer next to him is immediately to put him to death—that he may no longer disgrace the name of a Soldier, or the Corps or State he belongs to.”

“The misconduct of one man is not to put the whole troops in danger or disorder, and be suffered to pass with life,” said Wayne.

It was explained meantime that Colonel Febiger’s column was to march to the southern end of the swamp that protected Stony Point, and after crossing on the sand-bar there, was to charge up the south side of the point. With Febiger’s column Wayne was to march. Colonel Butler was to pass to the northern end of the swamp, cross a sand-bar there, and charge up the north side of the point. In the meantime Major Murfree was to lead his men slowly down the causeway, with muskets loaded, and as soon as he should hear the column at the south end of the swamp under fire, he was to charge across the causeway bridge and fire as rapidly as possible in order to lead the enemy to suppose that the main attack was to be made there.

Last of all, Colonel Febiger and Colonel Butler chose each 20 men from their guards

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of honor, and these 20 slung their muskets on their backs, and with suitable tools for destroying the abatis, took places ahead of all. Each little squad of 20 was to clear the way for the column behind it, and then, if they lived, they were to join, musket in hand, in the charge on the breastworks. And as a striking proof of the spirit of the whole command, there was an instant quarrel among the junior officers for the honor of leading these little squads, and the quarrel had to be settled by casting lots. Captain Gibbons had the good luck to win command of the squad in Butler's column, and Lieutenant George Knox won command of the other.

Meantime every man had received a piece of white paper which he secured to his hat to distinguish friends from the enemy, and it was ordered that "when the works are forced, and *not before*, the victorious troops, as they enter, will give the watchword 'The fort is ours.' "

When the work had been fully explained to the command, Wayne, with a few of his officers, went down toward the point to make a final exploration of the routes over which the three divisions were to march. The exact routes to the sand-bars and the causeway

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were followed carefully and found clear. The party then returned to Springsteel's house, where Wayne put himself at the head of Febiger's column, and at 11.30 o'clock precisely gave the word:

"Forward."

Silently the columns marched down the long grade until within a mile of the swamp, when each headed alone for its post. Skirting the swamp, Wayne and his column reached the sand-bar which they were to cross, only to find that the tide had covered it waist-deep. But without a pause they waded in, and at 12.30 o'clock as the advanced squad first splashed the water, a British sentry heard the noise, saw an advancing column, and opened fire.

At that Murfree's men made a spluttering dash at the bridge on the causeway, and Wayne's column, with hastening steps, crossed the neck of water 200 yards wide. Before they were half-way over the British had manned the breastworks and began firing with great guns and small, but the Americans charged on with bayonets ready. As they attacked the abatis 17 of the little advanced squad ahead of Wayne's column were shot down and Wayne was struck in the head with



THE STORMING OF STONY POINT.

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a musket ball that knocked him to the ground. But he shouted:

“March on!” And then said to his aids: “Help me into the fort. Let me die at the head of my column.”

They marched on. The British were pitchforked from their guns in the breastworks, and with the agile Frenchman Fleury leading all, they dashed into the midst of the fortified camp, and shouted in voices heard from Dunderberg to Verplanck's Point: “The fort is ours! The fort's our own!”

To these cries Butler's men, though they had had a longer route to cover, gave quick response, for they came in over the north-side breastworks with the spirit that had been shown on the south.

And as the Americans raised their shouts of triumph the British, by the score, threw away their arms and kneeling down, cried:

“Mercy! Mercy, dear Americans! Quarter! Quarter!”

At that the slaughter stopped instantly. The British flag was hauled down (by Fleury) and the guns that would bear were turned on the British war-ship Vulture, lying at anchor in the river.

The victory was quickly won; and it was

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complete and satisfactory. Sixty-three of the enemy had been killed, 543 taken prisoners (of whom 70 were wounded), and one man escaped by swimming to the Vulture. The Americans lost 15 killed and 83 wounded, of whom nearly two-thirds belonged to the column with Wayne.

Wayne, as said, was one of the wounded, but his wound quickly healed, and he gave it no more notice than he had given to the slight touches he got (in one hand and one foot) at Germantown. The spoils at Stony Point amounted to 15 good cannon and some valuable stores.

Having made everything secure, Wayne, at two o'clock on the morning of the 16th, sent this despatch to Washington:

"The fort and garrison with Col. Johnson are ours.

"Our officers & men behaved like men who are determined to be free."

And when daylight came he wrote this general order:

"General Wayne returns his warmest thanks to the officers and soldiers for their coolness and intrepidity in the storm on the enemy's works at this place on the night of the 15th inst.

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“The perfect execution of orders and the superior gallantry exhibited on the occasion reflects the highest honor on the troops engaged.”

In its effects upon the war for independence the capture of Stony Point was a stimulant only; it carried the patient through a depressing period. The country had been discouraged because Washington had been obliged to act wholly on the defensive. The expeditions sent out by Clinton to ravage the Connecticut coast and the Chesapeake (when Norfolk was burned) had furnished the short-sighted with arguments for denouncing the army, and especially the Commander-in-Chief. But as the story of Stony Point spread over the land (though the post was soon abandoned), the populace became half wild with enthusiasm.


Moreover, Wayne had demonstrated anew that when once the patriots had been trained as soldiers they could “fight any upon the face of the earth,” as Washington had declared with unmistakable emphasis. The victory also portrayed one other characteristic of the American soldier, as shall appear, and it brought the British back hastily from their brutal raid on the Connecticut coast.

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Congress voted thanks to Wayne, Fleury, Steward, Gibbons, Knox, and a Mr. Henry W. Archer, who was present as a volunteer aid to Wayne. A gold medal was given to Wayne, and silver medals to Fleury and Steward, while Gibbons, Knox, and Archer were brevetted captains.

Congress commended (July 26, 1779) Wayne "for his brave, *prudent*, and soldierly conduct in the spirited and well-conducted attack on Stony Point." They saw, though but dimly, what we can now see most clearly—that Wayne's *preparations* for the attack were of more importance than the "spirited" dash up the slope. Anybody with physical courage and enthusiasm—a French colonel, for instance—could lead in such a dash as well as Wayne, but the real ability of the man was seen when he trained his men; appealed to their pride by making them shave and powder their hair; watched them that no traitor should sneak from the ranks; took them to the point of attack in ample time; pointed out the reward of valor, and prescribed death for the coward; made careful examination, and then, when fully prepared, took his place, spear in hand, and gave the word.

Naturally Wayne was flooded with letters



GOLD MEDAL PRESENTED TO WAYNE BY CONGRESS.

Stony Point

of congratulation, but it is better to tell here what Wayne did, rather than what people said of him.

Nevertheless there is a special reason for quoting one extract from the letter of Dr. Benjamin Rush, the Congressman already quoted in another chapter. Rush was a politician, but in spite of that, and in spite of the smoke and the glint of steel that blinded all others, as they read the story of Stony Point, he saw the one feature of that assault that is of all others most memorable. Writing on August 6th, he said:

"You have established the national character of our Country. You have taught our enemies, that bravery, humanity and magnanimity are the national virtues of the Americans."

That is the exact truth, forcefully stated, and it is the most important statement made or to be made in connection with the assault upon Stony Point. In granting mercy as soon as the enemy begged for it, Wayne did just what Rush says he did.

By the European standard of humanity in that day, and for many years afterward, it was entirely justifiable to massacre the garrison of a fort that was carried by assault. One might fill pages with the accounts of the

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merciless deeds of British soldiers in that war. But at the assault on Stony Point, Anthony Wayne—"Mad" Anthony, some called him—"established the national character of our country," and "taught our enemies that bravery, *humanity* and *magnanimity* are the *national virtues* of the Americans."

Wayne often declared that "it is in our power to produce a Conviction to the world that we deserve Success," and when his force, gathered from the length of the land, showed their humanity at Stony Point,* they did more to prove the truth of his words than was done in any battle during the whole course of the war.

* Stony Point battle-field has now become State property, having recently been purchased from private owners. The accompanying map shows in outline the State reservation. The custody of this property was at the time temporarily confided by the State to the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society, and an appropriation was made for the building by the society of a landing-pier, the construction of roads, and for making other improvements necessary in order to render the reservation accessible to visitors. The celebration of the completion of these improvements and a formal transfer of the property back to the State was made in July, 1902, on the anniversary of the battle, when the Governors of New York and Pennsylvania and several other distinguished persons were present, the attendance by people in general numbering several thousand. The Scenic Society published at the time an account of the battle and its scene, written by the secretary of the society, Mr. Edward Hagaman Hall.

REFERENCES.

Work A. "Ruins of a blockhouse erected and destroyed by the Americans." Site now occupied by the U. S. Lighthouse. Elevation 130 feet.

Work B. Earthwork near site of "a temporary magazine."

Work C. "One 24 and one 18 pr. ship guns." Elevation 130 feet.

Work D. "Ditto." Elevation 130 feet.

Work E. "One iron 12 pr." Elevation 130 feet.

Work F. "One 8 inch howitzer." Elevation 120 feet.

Work G. "One brass 12 pr." Elevation 130 feet.

Work H. "One short brass 12 pr." Elevation 101 feet.

Work I. "One long brass 12 pr." Elevation 115 feet.

Work J. Elevation 140 feet, highest on the Point.

Work O. Elevation 125 feet.

Work Q. Elevation 75 feet.

Work R. Elevation 100 feet.

Work S. Elevation 125 feet.

1. "Two companies of the 17th Regt."

2. "Do."

3. "Sixty of the Loyal Americans."

4. "The Grenadier companies of the 17th Regt."

5. "A Detachment of the Royal Artillery."

6. Approach of American right column, night of July 15-16, 1779.

7. American right column as erroneously shown on British map.

8. Major Murfree's approach to make feint in center.

9. Approach of American left column.

The fourteen works above mentioned appear on "A plan of the Surprise of Stony Point by a Detachment of the American Army commanded by Brig. Genl. Wayne, on the 15th of July, 1779." From the surveys of Wm. Simpson, Lt. 17th Regt., and D. Campbell, Lt. 42d R., by John Hills, Lt. 23d Regt., and Asst. Engr. London. Printed for Wm. Faden, Geographer to the King, March 1st, 1781. They were located for the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society by a topographical survey, made with the permission of the War Department, by direction of Col. A. L. Mills, U. S. A., Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, by a party of Engineers under Lt. James P. Jervey. They are readily recognizable on the ground, and may be identified by means of stone markers. Works A to I, inclusive, are lettered identically with those on the British map. Works J, O, Q, R and S appear on the British map without letters and have been lettered by the U. S. Engineers. References 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are taken from the British map on which they are similarly numbered. The lines of approach here numbered 7, 8 and 9, the pickets, ferry guard, abatis and quotations are from the same map. Route 7 is undoubtedly erroneous. The weight of present evidence indicates that routes 6, 8 and 9 are approximately correct.



CHAPTER XVI

THE "COW CHACE," THE TREASON OF ARNOLD, AND THE MUTINY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LINE

THE light infantry remained under Wayne until the end of the year, when the corps was disbanded. Of all that was done and recorded in connection with this corps after the assault on Stony Point, one fact only is memorable here. When, in December, the Virginians under Colonel Febiger were detached by order of Congress and sent to their own State, Wayne was obliged to write:

"Colonel Febiger will march to-morrow at 8 A.M., *but for want of shoes* he must carry a great many of his people in wagons."

Congress would provide medals, but no shoes.

The corps having been disbanded on December 31st, Wayne went home to await orders, which he received in May (dated the 18th), 1780, wherein Washington said:

"I shall be very happy to see you at camp again, and hope you will, without hesitation,

Anthony Wayne

resume your command in the Penn'a line." This summons, in spite of the fact that he was to have command of a brigade only, Wayne very gladly obeyed. The inefficient St. Clair still commanded the Pennsylvania Line.

In July a small expedition was planned, with Wayne in command. He was to go down to the peninsula between the Hudson and the Hackensack rivers, gather up the cattle and forage there, on which the British were feeding, and at the same time make such an attack on a blockhouse filled with Tories behind Bergen Heights as would be likely to draw a considerable force of the British over from New York, for whom an effective ambush was prepared.

"The lure," as Wayne wrote, "had liked to take the wished effect. Three thousand men, consisting of the flower of the British army, were embarked" after the attack was made on the blockhouse, and they "stood down the river hovering off the landing near fort Lee, where the 6th & 7th Penns'a Regiments lay concealed, with directions to let them land unmolested & then meet them in the Gorge of the Defile with the point of the bayonet." But the British failed to land, and after gathering in the cattle, Wayne marched

The "Cow Chace"

off, leaving the blockhouse in possession of the Tories.

It was an incident of no consequence in the war, although it is said to have prevented a British raiding expedition to the Connecticut coast, but there is some interest attached to it here. The British officers, to cheer up the spirits of their men who were becoming gloomy because they had been cooped up for more than a year in New York, proclaimed the skirmish as a great victory for the Tories, while Major André wrote a long string of verses about it under the title of *The Cow Chace*. The verses appeared in the *Royal Gazette*, August 16, 1780, and were afterward printed in pamphlet form for distribution among the soldiers. A copy of the pamphlet, it is said, has been sold at auction for \$750 in recent years. This alone would make the incident notable among bibliomaniacs, but the verses themselves are memorable because of the view they give of the mental attitude of the British (and all Europe for that matter) toward the American patriots.

The opening stanza read:

To drive the Kine one summer's morn,
The *tanner* took his way,
The calf shall rue that is unborn
The jumbling of that day.

Anthony Wayne

Then in Canto III André describes the return of the Americans as a retreat, and says of the junction of two detachments:

As when two kennels in the street,
Swell'd with a recent rain,
In gushing streams together meet,
And seek the neighboring drain,

So met these dung-born tribes in one,
As swift in their career,
And so to Newbridge they ran on—
But all the cows got clear.

To destroy the glory which Wayne had gained at Stony Point it was only necessary, by European standards, to mention the fact that he was a "tanner." André's contempt for the Americans emphasizes the European point of view. In Europe, birth in a caste gave eminence, and the family tree was everything. In America every capable member of one of those "dung-born tribes" could (and yet can) have his chance. And there is hope for England, and therefore for all Europe. A butcher has been knighted there, and he is in these days (1903) a close personal friend of the King: Even in England worth will yet outweigh birth.

As the summer of 1780 wore away and nothing was done, the stupor that the long in-

The "Cow Chace"

action of both armies generated in the minds of the American people seems to have affected Wayne even more seriously than the sufferings in the winter camps had done. How far his gloomy state of mind had carried him at one time we can see from a letter dated September 17, 1780, and written to President Reed, of Pennsylvania. He says:

"I have fully & deliberately considered every possible vicissitude of fortune. I know that it is not in the power of the British to subjugate a mind determined to be free. *Whilst I am master of my own sword, I am governor of my own fate.* I therefore only fear (but greatly fear) for that of my country." (Italics not in original.)

No doubt a part of this gloom—perhaps a greater part—was due to the attitude of the officers of the Pennsylvania Line under him, when one William Macpherson was commissioned as a major by Congress. It was a promotion by political influence, and for no service rendered. And the worst of it was that he was to have, by order of Congress, a position in the light-infantry corps, where only men who had proved their prowess had a right to serve, and a wholesale resignation of officers was at one time (August 10th) ex-

Anthony Wayne

pected in the Pennsylvania Line, in consequence of the act of Congress.

Wayne and William Irvine (who had been made a brigadier) united in an appeal to these officers that was characteristic. It said:

For God's sake be yourselves, and as a band of Brothers rise superior to every Injury, whether real or imaginary, at least for this campaign, which probably will produce a conviction to the World, that America owes her freedom to the temporary sacrifice you now make.

You will also reflect that this favor is solicited by men who would bleed to Death, drop by drop, to defend your honor.

They knew the sincerity of those words. The most important feature in the character of Anthony Wayne is his entire and never-failing sincerity. They knew, too, that not one of them, nor all of them together, had more than a fraction of the cause of complaint of ill treatment that Wayne had, and the appeal was effective.

Then came the treason of Arnold. It seems worth while, in a story of a life of unselfish patriotism which this biography of Anthony Wayne gives, to say a word about the treason of Arnold by way of contrast.

Arnold's Treason

The modern writers who have told the story of Arnold's heroic deeds, with a view of palliating his crime, have shown themselves utterly incapable of comprehending the events, and wholly unable to appreciate the true standard of American patriotism. Instead of Arnold's heroism serving as palliation for his treason, it does but consign him to the deeper damnation. Private soldiers by the hundred deserted to the enemy. Lieutenants and captains in a trivial host followed. Even Deane, our first envoy to France, became a traitor; but all this was so quickly forgotten that only the students of history know the facts. Nor was it for the help he gave the British that Arnold is to be condemned.

The utterly unforgivable feature of his crime is found in the fact that it was while standing before the people as a popular hero, and in a position to give inspiration to his countrymen of the most remote generation, he plunged into the depths. *He robbed us of a hero.* It is *because* of the brilliancy of his previous career that in the world's list of men who have sold themselves into hell there is no name blacker than that of Benedict Arnold.

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Consider now Arnold's crime. Recall, too, the long list of officers in the American army who, through pique or disappointment, resigned their commissions. And with this in mind, remember that Anthony Wayne, the hero of the Brandywine, and of Germantown, and of Monmouth, and of Stony Point, and of Green Spring in Virginia, and of the campaign in Georgia—Anthony Wayne, who fought from the ice-bound North to the fever-laden swamps of the far South, served through all those campaigns without promotion, paid his own expenses for months at a stretch, gave freely of his private funds to buy clothing for his men, and *never made even one complaint* about his own ill treatment.

It was on September 25th that Arnold's attempt to give West Point to the British was discovered. Wayne was at that time stationed at Tappan (some distance below the modern Nyack), with his brigade (the First Pennsylvania), and General William Irvine, with the Second Pennsylvania Brigade, was with him.

It is recorded that when Washington finally learned that Arnold was a traitor he said in a sad voice to Lafayette:

“Whom can we trust now?”

Arnold's Treason

But when he came to answer his own question he turned as if by instinct to the Pennsylvania Line.

The garrison at West Point had been scattered by Arnold, and Washington looked to see the British come up the river at any time to sweep the Americans by force from the Highlands. There was need of men who could come in haste, and who would fight at the word. A messenger was sent galloping down the trail to Tappan. He reached Wayne's tent at one o'clock in the morning, and soon the drums were beating the call to arms. The men of both brigades—Wayne's and Irvine's—sprang up, and with muskets in hand, formed in line. And when rations for the day had been secured, they marched away through the night.

Most memorable was that dash for the Highlands. For the men had learned why they had been called. They believed that the safety of the nation depended on their exertions, and "*in four hours* in a dark night, without a single halt or a man left behind," they covered 16 miles, and reached the mouth of the pass that led from the Haverstraw landing through the mountains to West Point. They stopped at "Smith's white house," that

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stood between the main branches of Haverstraw Creek.

With honest pride Wayne wrote to his friend Hugh Sheel (October 2, 1780) to say: "When our approach was announced to the General he thought it fabulous, but when convinced of the reality he received us like a God, and retiring to take a short repose, exclaimed, 'All is safe and I again am happy!'"

"The protection of that important place" [West Point], Wayne adds, "is committed to my conduct until a proper garrison arrives. I shall not throw myself into the works, but will dispute the approaches *inch by inch* and at the point of the bayonet—decide the fate of the day in the Gorge of the Defiles at every expense of blood. . . . It is not in our power to Command Success, but it is in our power to produce a Conviction to the world that we deserve it."

At the end of the year Wayne had to face an experience that was far more trying than a battle with any enemy—an experience that gave him, in fact, more anxiety than any event in his whole military career. This trouble was nothing less than the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.

Mutiny in Camp

The trouble grew out of the destitution of the men in their winter quarters as a chief cause, but it was complicated by one other reason for indignation. The men, as a body, had enlisted for "three years or during the war." As they understood the contract, it meant that they were to be discharged at the end of the war if that end came within three years. In any event, however, they were to be discharged at the end of three years. The three years for which they had enlisted expired at the end of December, 1780, but as the time drew near they learned that it was the intention of Congress to hold them "during the war."

If the men had been comfortably clothed and sheltered, and abundantly supplied with food, there would have been no mutiny under this false interpretation of the contract, but under the conditions of neglect that then prevailed, and had prevailed from the first, the able fighting men of the Pennsylvania Line refused to submit.

A brief consideration of what the conditions were, as portrayed in Wayne's letters, will be of interest. On October 17th he wrote from the winter quarters near Morristown, N. J., to President Reed, of Pennsylvania, to

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ask for "blankets and winter clothing," and said:

"We have adopted the idea of curtailing the coats to repair the elbows and other defective parts, for which we shall immediately want needle and thread."

On October 25th he writes again to say that the thread and needles had not arrived, and that "every day adds to our distress and renders an immediate supply of these articles indispensably necessary." He adds:

"When the charge of the Pennsylvania division devolved on me I thought of an expedient of reducing the heterogeneity of new, old, cocked, and slouched hats to infantry caps; in which we succeeded very well by making three decent caps out of one tolerable and two very ordinary hats. . . . We shall now try the experiment of making three short coats out of three old, tattered long ones. I must acknowledge that they would suit much better for the spring than fall, but without something done in this way we shall be naked in the course of two or three weeks; nor will even this expedient answer longer than Christmas. For God's sake use every possible means to procure clothing for both officers and men by that time at farthest."

Mutiny in Camp

Reed replied "I am much concerned," and "Turner shall have orders to send the needles and thread required."

On November 7th Wayne says emphatically, "We never stood upon such perilous ground as at present." Reed replied that "money matters lay entirely with the Assembly," and that "many new members have come into the House with expectations to lower taxes, not to increase them."

On December 16th Wayne advises Reed that "we are reduced to Dry bread and beef with cold water for sustenance," that of pay, trifling as the value of Continental currency then was, the soldiers "had not seen a single dollar for nearly twelve months." Reed replied that "in the exhausted condition of the treasury it will be difficult to keep up the supply of stores."

Even the supply of "dry bread and beef" grew scanty. The clothing went to pieces, as Wayne had predicted. Half starved and half naked, the men became desperate, and when, on January 1, 1781, they found that nothing had been done toward paying them off and discharging them from the service, they arose with arms in hand, as one man, between eight and nine o'clock at night,

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seized the camp, shot down three of the officers who strove with naked swords to force them into submission, and finally, after scouring the grand parade with round and grape shot from four field-pieces, they formed in a solid column, 1,300 strong, and marched away.

John Adams, in a burst of indignation, after St. Clair's flight from Ticonderoga had said: "We shall never be able to defend a post till we shoot a general." These mutineers might have said with greater justice: "We shall never be able to maintain the Nation till we shoot a few politicians"; and if they had said it, their sentiment would have found sympathy in many breasts even to this day.

Wayne and his officers supposed that when the men marched from the camp on the heights of Morristown (where they had been hutted at some distance from other troops) that they might march to Elizabethtown to join the British. In this the men were greatly wronged. They were headed toward Philadelphia to argue with Congress as a Cromwell might have done it. On learning their intention, Wayne, with General Richard Butler and Colonel Walter Stewart, followed the mutineers and remained with them until the

Mutiny in Camp

trouble was settled. Under the influence of these officers the men elected leaders from among their sergeants, maintained "an astonishing regularity and discipline," confined and eventually hanged two emissaries sent among them by the British to lead them to New York, and finally came to an agreement with President Reed, of Pennsylvania, by which those entitled to it were discharged, auditors were appointed to pay off all the men, some clothing was provided, and a general amnesty and oblivion proclaimed. In all the negotiations Wayne was implicitly trusted by the revolted men and the civil authorities alike.

At the beginning of the revolt the men had said to Wayne, while they held their bayonets at his breast, "We love you, we respect you." And when the wrongs of the men had been righted nearly two-thirds of them reenlisted.

Neither Congress nor the Pennsylvania Assembly had been able to find any way to relieve the men before the revolt, but when the two bodies of politicians learned that a column of determined men, 1,300 strong, was on the way to Philadelphia to ask questions at the point of the bayonet, means for sup-

Anthony Wayne

plying the unfortunate troops were quickly discovered.

It seems worth while pointing out that this revolt was an exercise of what in this day is called lynch law. It is a shocking fact, but one worth the most serious consideration of every patriot, that at intervals throughout the entire history of the nation, bodies of sober-minded men have felt obliged to openly violate statute law in order to obtain natural rights and do justice. This statement is not made to defend any form of lynch law, but to point out a fact that has not received sufficient consideration.

CHAPTER XVII

WAYNE IN VIRGINIA

IN the spring of 1780 Anthony Wayne was ordered to go South with a detachment of the Pennsylvania Line, 800 strong, and join General Nathanael Greene, who was then commanding the Southern Department and engaged in the work that eventually drove Cornwallis to Yorktown. York, Pa., was the rendezvous of the force, and when Wayne arrived he found there "scarcely a horse or a carriage fit to transport any part" of the baggage, and what was still worse, "the troops were retarded in advancing to the general rendezvous by the unaccountable delay of the auditors, appointed to settle and pay the proportion of the depreciation due the men." The quotations are from Wayne's correspondence.

At the time of the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line, as recounted in the last chapter, the frightened Legislature had promised to pay the Pennsylvania soldiers in full for all dues, and they kept their promise by running

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a printing-press and issuing paper dollars "not equal to one-seventh of " their nominal value, which they compelled the soldiers to take at par. "This was an alarming circumstance," wrote Wayne from York (May 20, 1781). "The soldiery but too sensibly felt the imposition." They also remembered their success in the previous mutiny, and on May 19th (the day before the one set for the departure), while in line on the parade, a number of ringleaders on the right of each regiment began to demand in a loud voice that they be paid "in real and not ideal money," and that they were "no longer to be trifled with."

"Upon this they were ordered to their tents, which being peremptorily refused, the principals were immediately knocked down," and confined by the officers, who had learned that trouble was coming. They were then court-martialed, the guilty were condemned, and two of them were hanged, the other guilty ones being compelled to serve as executioners.

"Thus was this hideous monster " of mutiny "crushed in its birth," says Wayne. It was a most pitiful if absolutely necessary execution, and the memory of it is the more pitiful from the fact that no way could be found

Wayne in Virginia

for hanging the members of the Legislature who were the real criminals.

Wayne left York with 800 men on May 20th, and on June 7th he joined Lafayette, who was in command of the American forces in Virginia. Cornwallis had abandoned North Carolina, and had marched into Virginia, where, at Petersburg, he was joined on May 20th by reenforcements under General Phillips, bringing his forces up to 5,000 men—all veterans and well equipped.

Lafayette, having but 3,000 men, including raw militia, was driven north, and was found at Fredericksburg on June 7th, when Wayne joined him. Other additions brought Lafayette's force up to 4,000, and Cornwallis, though still much stronger, felt obliged to march out of a hostile country and down to navigable water in order to draw supplies from the British fleet.

On June 20th he left Richmond, marching east, crossed the Chickahominy, and then on down (to the southeast) along the peninsula between the James and the York Rivers as far as Williamsburg.

In the meantime further reenforcements had raised Lafayette's force to 6,000 men, and he therefore followed the enemy closely

Anthony Wayne

into the peninsula, though he did not dare to risk an open-field engagement.

As usual under such circumstances, Wayne had command at the head of the column, while Lafayette was following the British down the peninsula, and thus found an opportunity for the display of the genius that has made him memorable. When Cornwallis had reached Williamsburg (on the north side of James River), word was brought to the American camp (July 6, 1781) that the British were crossing to the south side of the James at Green Spring, on their way to Portsmouth, Va.

At this Wayne was ordered forward with his 800 Pennsylvanians to reconnoiter, and, if possible, to attack the rear-guard of the enemy after the main body had crossed the river. On approaching Green Spring Wayne had to cross a swamp by means of a causeway (dirt and corduroy road), and he was advancing into the fields beyond the swamp, when he discovered instead of the rear-guard of the British, the whole British army there, and that they were drawn up in line of battle.

Wayne had 800 men; the British army numbered 5,000. In crossing the causeway Wayne had entered the best trap he had ever

Wayne in Virginia

seen. But with the pluck that he had displayed when with 20 men in the edge of the swamp at Three Rivers he held the army of Burgoyne at bay, he now ordered forward his riflemen—men selected for their skill as marksmen—and they opened “a galling fire,” while a messenger was sent in hot haste for the whole American army (then five miles away) to come up and join in. It was Wayne’s determination to force a general engagement then and there to end the campaign.

But while the riflemen were doing their whole duty the British recognized that the number of the men firing was small, and began to advance. Instantly Wayne ordered forward two detachments to support the riflemen, but in vain, for the British army of 5,000 veterans was coming. The utter destruction of the whole American force was at hand, when Wayne, with the spirit of the god of battles surging in his breast, formed his men with bayonets fixed, and charged the enemy.

With 800 men he charged 5,000, and Cornwallis, unable to suppose that such a dash could be made unless the whole American army was supporting it, halted his veterans and allowed Wayne to retreat in perfect order.

CHAPTER XVIII

WHEN WAYNE RECOVERED GEORGIA

THEY called Wayne "Mad Anthony." The origin of the nickname is interesting. So is the fact that it is well remembered to this day—remembered better than the deeds of the man. Among Wayne's Pennsylvanians was an Irishman who feigned insanity; who was, perhaps, somewhat out of the usual run mentally; who was most useful to Wayne as a spy; and who had, withal, the bad habit of getting drunk and making serious disturbances in camp. He was known as "Jemy the Rover," and also as "the Commodore."

One day while at work at York preceding the Virginia campaign "Jemy" was sent to the guard-house for disorderly conduct. When on the way he asked by whose orders he was to be confined. The sergeant in charge said, "By the general's." "Then forward," said Jemy, and he was put in the guard-house.

A few hours later, when released, he asked the sergeant whether the general was "mad

When Wayne Recovered Georgia

or in fun " when he issued the order. The sergeant replied :

"The general has been very much displeased with your disorderly conduct ; and a repetition of it will be followed not only by confinement, but by *twenty-nine* well laid on."

"Then," said Jemy, "Anthony is mad. Farewell to you. Clear the coast for the Commodore, mad Anthony's friend."

He left the camp, as he was allowed to do at will, and there is a letter remaining in which Wayne wrote home to say that if this "Commodore " should come that way he was to be treated with kindness and his wants supplied.

Naturally the last words of the Irishman as he left the camp amused the sergeant. "Mad Anthony's friend," indeed ! The story spread around the camp, and thence to other camps.

There were officers in the army to whom Wayne's splendid work was a constant reproach. They had neither the ability nor the courage to emulate him. But they could sneeringly use the appellation "Mad Anthony," and they did it. To the men who (like Gates and St. Clair) had been trained in a foreign service (always excepting the

Anthony Wayne

noble-hearted German Steuben) this sneer was a godsend, and to what extent it prevailed shall appear. But in the meantime the nickname had been taken up by the public, and the people applied, and still apply, it as an appellation of praise. For the American people are hero worshipers, every one, thank God! for only heroes can appreciate a hero.

Having demonstrated at Green Spring once more that the *best way to defend oneself is to attack the enemy*, Wayne remained with the army until Cornwallis was hedged in, Washington arrived, the French came also, and the whole British army was compelled to surrender (October 19, 1781). But in the final work of capturing Cornwallis Wayne had only a small part.

When it was thought that Cornwallis might try to escape to North Carolina, Wayne was sent to a post between Portsmouth and Petersburg to wait his coming and head him off. When Cornwallis was finally surrounded at Yorktown, Wayne was ordered to the American camp. On September 2d, while going to Lafayette's camp with other officers, a sentry mistook the party for the enemy and fired at them. The bullet pierced Wayne's leg. The wound laid him up for two weeks,

When Wayne Recovered Georgia

at a time when he was most anxious for active work, but his letters on the occasion show that he felt a real pity for the sentry. He was sorry that the man had suffered the pain of supposing himself attacked by a party of mounted men from the enemy.

When first ordered South Wayne had been directed to join Greene. The advance of Cornwallis into Virginia had compelled him to join Lafayette instead, and Greene was left to fight out his campaign with Lord Rawdon. There was good fighting on both sides, but at Eutaw Springs (September 8, 1781), Greene obtained a decisive strategic advantage, and "the British were cooped up in Charlestown till the end of the war."

Work remained to be done in the South, however, after the British retreated to Charleston. Georgia was yet overrun by the British, and Wayne, after going to Greene with reenforcements, was sent (January 10, 1782) with a small detachment to redeem the State.

The conditions in Georgia at this time may be inferred from Greene's letter of instructions to Wayne. "Try, by every means, to soften the malignity and deadly resentments subsisting between whigs and tories," says

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Greene, "and to put a stop, as much as possible, to the cruel custom of putting people to death after surrender."

"The British soldiers, most of whom were imported loyalists from the North, or German hirelings, ravaged the country with merciless vigor," says Stevens, while "the savages [chiefly Creeks] had laid waste nearly all the frontier settlements, and often penetrated into the older districts with the torch and the scalping-knife."

Wayne, with his command, crossed Sisters Ferry, on the Savannah River, on January 12, 1782, using canoes for the men, swimming the horses, and leaving behind his cannon for want of adequate boats to carry them across. Having then joined such forces as the patriots were able to keep in the field, Wayne found under his command (Stille, pp. 287, 288) Moylan's dragoons, 100; a detachment from Sumpter's brigade, 300 strong, under Colonel Wade Hampton; volunteers under Colonel James Jackson, 170; a total of 570, besides the artillery (less than 100 men), which he eventually brought over the river. To these were added various bodies of raw militia, amounting in all to nothing of any consequence when their help was most needed.

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To oppose him there were, throughout the State, 1,300 British regulars, 500 well-organized and well-armed Tories, with an uncounted number of Tory refugees, the whole under Sir Arnold Clarke, whose headquarters were at Savannah. In addition to these white enemies must be counted the Creek and Cherokee Indians, who could and did bring several hundred warriors into the field. On the whole, Wayne was outnumbered at all times in the proportion of at least three to one, and now and then five to one. With such a disparity of forces as this, Wayne undertook the work of driving the British from Georgia.

After entering the State Wayne established himself at Ebenezer, 25 miles up the Savannah River from Savannah, and then stretched a line of posts from that point southwesterly to the Ogeechee River, in order to cut the British line of communication with the Indians of the interior, and to stop, as well, the flow of supplies to the city. That is to say, he undertook, in spite of his inferiority in numbers, to isolate the British force in Savannah and hold the city in a state of siege.

In the meantime, after consultation with the Legislature of Georgia, then in session at

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Augusta, Wayne issued two proclamations, one of which offered pardon and protection to Tories who would join the patriots, and one that was calculated to make the Hessians desert. Both proclamations had a good effect. At the same time efforts were made to detach the Indians from the British service—a work that might well have seemed hopeless when the ability of the British to provide them with presents was considered on the one hand, and the poverty of the Americans on the other. But Wayne was the man for the occasion. While near the Ogeechee (February 19, 1782) he learned that a considerable number of Creek chiefs were coming down the river trail on their way to Savannah. Dressing a sufficient number of his men in British uniforms, Wayne sent them as if they were a guard of honor to meet the chiefs and to escort them into his own camp. By this stratagem the chiefs were captured and brought in without bloodshed. Wayne then made them a speech wherein he pointed out the failure of the British to subdue the Americans, and then sent them home with a request that all the Indians remain neutral. At the same time a party of Tory traders and Indians, who were coming in with 93 horses

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loaded with furs, were captured and the goods confiscated.

The energy and activity of Wayne in these days is apparent from a letter dated February 24th, in which he says: "It is now upward of five weeks since we entered this State, during which period not an officer or soldier with me has once undressed, excepting for the purpose of changing his linen, nor do the enemy lay on beds of down."

On May 21, 1782, Wayne learned that 1,000 British soldiers were leaving the city under Colonel Brown to meet and escort in a band of Creeks numbering several hundred. With 300 infantry under Colonel Posey, of Virginia, and 100 dragoons, Wayne started out to meet the two bodies, one at a time, before they could unite. While on the way, late in the afternoon, trustworthy information was brought that the enemy were to be found on the Ogeechee road, seven miles southwest of Savannah. Wayne was then six miles northwesterly from Savannah, and the only way to reach the enemy was to march four miles through a swamp. And he had to consider not only the danger of a night march through a tangled swamp, but the further fact that on reaching the Ogeechee road, he would find

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himself between Colonel Brown's superior force and the garrison of the city defenses.

Nevertheless, having "the conviction that the success of a nocturnal attack depended more upon prowess than numbers," and having also confidence in "the steady bravery of the troops," Wayne led the way into the swamp. At midnight, as the vanguard, with ~~Wayne~~ still in the lead, struggled from the swamp into the Ogeechee road, they saw the whole sortie force of the enemy, 1,000 strong, coming toward them "in close and good order." Their number was at that moment greater than Wayne's by more than five to one, for the main body of Wayne's force was too far away in the swamp to be of any aid. Pore

Nevertheless, Wayne instantly ordered such men as he had with him to charge, and they "obeyed with such vivacity" that they scattered the whole British force—cavalry, infantry, Hessians, and Tories—and drove them into the swamp. Colonel Brown did not escape from the swamp and arrive in Savannah until the 23d.

And on the 23d Wayne, with his little band, "advanced in view of Savannah, sending a few infantry and horse to draw the enemy out; but they declined an interview."

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As the reader has already observed, most of Wayne's fighting was done after the manner of this charge, in the night. But on June 24th, Wayne and his force had to face a night attack like that at Paoli. Wayne was then in camp at Sharon, five miles from Savannah. At one o'clock in the morning, while the greater part of the men were asleep, a large body of Indians, headed by Guristersijo and other chiefs, with a British officer to help, charged the camp. The assault was so impetuous that a company of light infantry, posted to protect two field-pieces, were swept back, and the guns were captured. But within a few minutes the whole American force was up, and with Wayne in the lead, sword in hand, they charged back at the red men. As on the field of Monmouth, Wayne now had an enemy worthy of his steel. "The bravery of the Indians fighting hand to hand gave an opening for the free use of the sword and bayonet." One of the chiefs (Guristersijo himself, very likely, for he was killed in the fight) singled out Wayne for a personal combat, and got it. Wayne cut him down, but as he lay on the ground dying he drew a pistol and fired it, killing Wayne's horse. The convulsive move-

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ment of the Indian's muscles when in the clutch of death prevented better aim.

The Indians were routed. At daylight the British garrison came out to take a hand in the battle, but they arrived too late. The Indians were so scattered that they could not be rallied, and Wayne turned on the British with such impetuosity that they were glad to find shelter behind their works.

This fight, with those that preceded it, decided the fate of Savannah. The enemy were so disheartened that they remained cooped within the city and wholly dependent on the shipping for supplies, and on July 11, 1782, they abandoned the city to Wayne.

The Legislature of Georgia, though the State was reduced to extreme poverty, voted 3,900 guineas, with which a rice plantation was purchased and presented to Wayne as a token of gratitude of the people of the State.

The end of the war was now at hand. Wayne was ordered to join Greene after Savannah fell. He had contracted a malarious fever while fighting in the swamps of Georgia, but he was able to ride into Charleston at the head of the column on December 14, 1782, when the Americans took possession.

During the winter of 1782-'83 Wayne ne-

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gotiated treaties of peace with the Creeks and Cherokees, and thus completed the work that he had begun with the sword.

In June, 1783, all of the soldiers of the American army received six months furlough, and in December they were finally discharged. They were paid off with bills of the nominal value of 20 shillings each, and the soldiers were compelled to take them at par, although worth but one-tenth of their face value. The American people in those days trembled with fear whenever they thought of a government strong enough to support itself, but there was no quiver among any of them (save among the victims) when the government, through weakness, broke faith with the men who had made and saved the nation.

On October 10, 1783, when the war was ended, Congress gave Wayne the rank of major-general by brevet "on the recommendation of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania." In the annals of the United States there is no other case to match that of the failure to promote Anthony Wayne to the full rank of a major-general during the course of the war. The explanation of the failure, however, is simple enough. "To avoid exciting jealousy on the part of the States which fur-

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nished most men " for the Continental army, Congress had early adopted the rule by which each State was to have generals in proportion to the number of men it sent into the field. Pennsylvania really had in the field enough men to entitle her to three major-generals, but a part of them were so dispersed in frontier garrisons that they could not be organized into brigades, and so her right to more than two was ignored. One of the two commissions to which her title was recognized was given to Mifflin, a man of political influence. The other was given to St. Clair, whose claim rested on his previous experience in the king's service and his political influence. Had a third commission been allowed to Pennsylvania Wayne would have received it, but in order to prevent sectional jealousy he was ignored. If he felt the slight he never, either directly or indirectly, said so. And because he gave his very best services to his country throughout the war without complaining, it is but fair to say that he did his work not from a hope of any kind of reward or praise, *but solely because of his love of country and his sense of duty.*

CHAPTER XIX

BETWEEN TWO WARS

OF Wayne's doings in civil life in the years following the War of the Revolution few words will suffice. When able to attend to his private affairs he turned his attention to the estate that Georgia had given him. It contained 830 acres, and its former owner had obtained from 800 to 1,000 barrels of rice, worth from 2,400 to 3,000 guineas a year, from it. The estate, however, was wholly without stock, and it could be worked only with the aid of slaves. Wayne did not have the cash capital needed, and the American people were so poor that he could not borrow it at home, even by pledging his Chester County estate as well as the other one for security.

While casting about for money Wayne was told that he could get it in Holland, and the information was given in such definite form that he drew on Holland capitalists for 4,000 guineas. The bills were discounted

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and cashed in Philadelphia, and with the money Wayne went to work on the estate. But when the bills reached Holland the capitalists refused to accept them, and they came back protested.

"It is physically impossible for a well-educated, intellectual, or *brave* man to make money the chief object of his thoughts," said one great writer whom some critics do not admire. Wayne, with his frank, open-hearted ways, could not compete with the money-makers in a period of our commercial history when it was possible for a successful scoundrel to openly boast of thievish cunning without losing caste among business men. But Wayne could be and was honest. He sacrificed his Georgia estate, took up the protested bills, and saved his Chester County property.

In the meantime he had given his time to his State. In the constitution of Pennsylvania, adopted in 1776—the constitution that had given the stay-at-home patriots more concern than the sufferings of the American army had done—it was provided that a body of men should be elected once in seven years to review the work of the various branches of the State government during the seven-year period, to determine whether the government

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had been well conducted or not, and make report of their findings to the people. Wayne was chosen a member of this board of censors late in 1783. In this work Wayne is memorable because he showed he was anxious that "measures of conciliation should be adopted now that peace was restored."

In 1784, as a member of the Assembly, Wayne also worked actively to get repealed certain war measures that had been aimed at people who neglected or refused to take certain prescribed test oaths. The war measures bore heavily on the Quakers (the most praiseworthy class of people in the State, all things considered), but he worked in vain. The contest was continued, however, and in 1789 good sense triumphed over the hatreds engendered by war.

In 1787 Wayne was a member of the Pennsylvania convention that ratified the Constitution of the United States.

In 1790, although it was then plain that he would have to sacrifice his Georgia estate, and give up all hope of spending a part of his time in that State, as he had intended to do, a large number of his friends there determined that "he was, in his legal relation, a citizen," and that he should represent them in Con-

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gress. Accordingly, he was returned as elected on January 3, 1791, but when his opponent in the election contested the result, the House investigated the matter, and on March 16, 1792, "Resolved, That Anthony Wayne was not duly elected a Member of this House."

Wayne was unseated, but it was admitted and declared on all sides that Wayne himself had had neither part in nor knowledge of any of the irregularities that had led to his return, and that his character "stood pure and unsullied as a soldier's ought to be."

It appears now that when Wayne learned that he was not entitled to a seat in Congress, he was somewhat—perhaps not a little—chagrined. If this be so, his experience was, in a way, but a repetition of that which gave him chagrin when General St. Clair relieved him as the commander of the Pennsylvania Line. He was deprived of work which he hoped to do, but because he was thus deprived, a new way was opened for him to add to his renown. By losing the command of the Pennsylvania Line he had obtained command of the light infantry, and had captured Stony Point. And through losing the seat in Congress to which he had supposed himself entitled, he was

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
placed in command of the American regular army and sent to the West. The campaign in Ohio—the crowning work of his life—the work that was to give peace to the frontier and loosen the British grip upon the Northwest, was at hand.

CHAPTER XX

THE WAR ON THE FRONTIER

STRICTLY speaking, the war that called Anthony Wayne to the frontier was a prolongation of the War of the Revolution. Though the treaty of peace made with England had been written in a kindly spirit, it had not been carried out in kindly fashion. Urged on by the Canadian fur buyers chiefly, who saw an immense trade slipping from their grasp, the British officials had refused to evacuate Detroit and the other posts in the American territory northwest of the Ohio. The British could no longer claim territory to the south of the Great Lakes, but they persuaded the Indians to claim and to fight for these broad lands, and there is no doubt that the British hoped to acquire the territory in due time.

Immediately after the close of the Revolution the frontiersmen began to seek home sites in this Northwest territory, and by the ordinance of Congress, dated July 13, 1787 (a



ARTHUR ST. CLAIR.

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famous document in the history of the American people), the territory was organized with General Arthur St. Clair as Governor.

St. Clair reached Marietta, Ohio, the first town laid out in the territory, on July 9, 1788, and on the 20th "the machinery of government" was set in motion.

As a first duty St. Clair endeavored to buy the Indian title to all the land of the territory south of the forty-first parallel of latitude. For, while the United States claimed the fee of and the sovereignty over the land, the Indian right of occupancy was recognized, and it was this right that St. Clair tried to buy.

In January, 1789, St. Clair made two different treaties with small bands of Indians, but the red signers of the treaties had no authority to bind their tribes, and the treaties served merely to strengthen the British position. For the British, who urgently opposed any cession of land to the Americans, were able to point to the treaties as proofs that the Americans purposed evicting all the red men from the region northwest of the Ohio.

As a matter of fact, there were Indians on the war-path while these Indians who negotiated the treaty were accepting presents from St. Clair. In every month since the Revolu-

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tion Indian raiders in greater or less numbers had prowled around the white settlements or haunted the banks of the Ohio to attack home seekers floating down in flatboats to the promised land.

The settlements that were guarded by Fort Harmer, at Marietta, and by Fort Washington, at Cincinnati, escaped assault, but the smaller and unguarded settlements were raided whenever the weather permitted the Indians to go from their villages comfortably. It is said that in the seven years between 1783 and 1790 no less than 1,500 home makers were killed in Kentucky alone, not to mention the devastation in Virginia and western Pennsylvania.

Eventually the outcries and protests of the frontiersmen compelled the National Government (Washington had been inaugurated President on March 4, 1789), to send an expedition into the Indian country to compel them to keep the peace. General Josiah Harmer was placed in command of a body of men that included 320 Federal troops and 1,453 militia, with three brass field-pieces.

Harmer's expedition marched to the Indian villages that stood where Fort Wayne, Ind., now stands, and burned them (October

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17, 1790). But in such fighting as was done the white men were beaten, with a loss of 103 killed and 111 wounded.

Naturally the Indians were incited to further aggressions rather than subdued by such work, and another expedition to chastise them was necessarily organized. General St. Clair himself took command. But St. Clair was sick during nearly all the time he was in command. His army was made up of raw recruits of a worthless character chiefly, and they were enlisted for six months only, for Congress was in deadly fear lest a standing army of American citizens overthrow the republic.

On November 3, 1791, St. Clair, with an army that numbered 1,400 men under arms, encamped where Recovery, Mercer County, Ohio, now stands, and at daylight the next morning a red host swept the camp as a tornado sweeps away an unsheltered village of the plains.

The fight began at sunrise. At 9.30 o'clock the remains of the panic-stricken army fled, and the red warriors, greedy for the spoils of the camp, let them go. But they left behind 630 men killed, and of the 1,400 who had been under arms, "scarce half a hundred were un-

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hurt" (Winsor). General Richard Butler, Wayne's old comrade, was second in command, and was among the slain.

That was the most disastrous defeat that the white men had sustained at the hands of the red since the day of Braddock, and it came at a time when the nation was in dire distress because of the aggressions of the British. The British were as exultant as the red men. Since the War of the Revolution no event had depressed the people of the United States as the defeat of St. Clair did, and none had placed the republic in greater danger.

It was in this time of wide-spread consternation and deadly peril that "Mad Anthony" Wayne was called on to save the nation. And he did it.

CHAPTER XXI

AT THE BATTLE OF THE FALLEN TIMBERS

By an act approved March 5, 1792, the President was authorized to fill up the two regiments of infantry of which (with a battalion of artillery) the regular army was then composed, until each should contain 960 enlisted men and non-commissioned officers. In addition, because of the exigencies due to the defeat of St. Clair, he was to raise three more regiments of the same size. The army for the defense of the nation was to be increased to 5,000 men, that is to say, and over it a major-general was to be appointed. By another act approved May 2, means were provided for supporting the Legion of the United States, as this army was called.

In looking about for a man to command this Legion, Washington's first choice was "Light-Horse Harry" Lee, and Lee wanted the appointment. But Lee had held a lower rank than some of the men whom Washington wished to appoint in the grade of brigadiers, and it was therefore necessary to pass

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him. Anthony Wayne was the next choice in Washington's opinion. Yet it is plain that Washington did not then have full confidence in "Mad Anthony." When Wayne was considered in a Cabinet meeting Washington said that he was "brave and nothing else." What Winsor calls Washington's "studied and written estimate of Wayne" (*The Westward Movement*) is equally severe. In it he says Wayne was "more active and enterprising than judicious and cautious. No economist, it is feared. Open to flattery, vain; easily imposed upon and liable to be drawn into scrapes." Winsor asserts that such was a "prevalent opinion" of "Mad Anthony" in the spring of 1792.

The officers who had found the work of Anthony Wayne during the Revolution a constant reproach to themselves had been able to bring even Washington to the belief that Wayne was "brave and nothing else." Wayne's ill success in business matters had created an additional evil impression which his strict integrity had not counterbalanced. This, with his love of fine clothing, and a tendency toward ostentatious display, no doubt gave the idea that he was "no economist."

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Nevertheless Washington appointed him to the command in April, 1792, and then wrote to Lee (who, it will be remembered, was the son of Washington's earliest sweetheart), and apologized for making the appointment by saying that "Wayne has many good points as an officer, and it is to be hoped that time, reflection, good advice, and above all, a due sense of the importance of the trust, will correct his foibles, or cast a shade over them." Wayne's nomination was accepted by the Senate, though Madison records that the confirmation went through "rather against the bristles."

Hammond, who was then British minister to the United States, wrote home that Wayne was "the most active, vigilant, and enterprising officer in the American army, but his talents are purely military." Hammond thought Wayne would be apt to attack the posts which the British were holding in American territory.

But while the Administration prepared for a frontier war by appointing "the most active, vigilant, and enterprising officer in the American army" to command, Washington was obliged to give heed to the peace-at-any-price men of the nation. Two peace envoys,

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Colonel John Hardin and Major Alexander Truman, were sent, in the spring of 1792, with a flag of truce to the hostile tribes to arrange for a council. They were received by the Indians with an appearance of good-will, and then, when their apprehensions of possible danger were allayed, they were foully murdered.

Nevertheless, the efforts to obtain peace by negotiation were continued, and in May, 1793, three commissioners were appointed (Benjamin Lincoln, Beverley Randolph, and Timothy Pickering) to meet the Indians at Detroit, under the protection of the British garrison in that American fortress, and endeavor to make a new treaty.

What Wayne thought of this humiliating movement is nowhere recorded, but what he did meantime we know. He went to Pittsburg in June, 1792, to organize the troops who had been, and were to be, enlisted in the Legion. These recruits were gathered by sweeping the streets and prisons of the Eastern cities of their beggars, tramps, and criminals. And let it be remembered that they were a second sweeping of such refuse, the first having gone to St. Clair. As these recruits learned that they were destined to fight

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Indians their hearts melted, and they deserted in squads, but by slow degrees the number corralled at Pittsburg grew until there were enough to organize a first sub-legion.

Meantime the contractors who were to supply Wayne's expedition proved to be men who gloried in the "smartness" by which they sold worthless supplies at the prices of the best—men utterly devoid of any sense of honor.

For a time Wayne worked as best he could at Pittsburg, but finding that the whisky and the tales of Indian atrocities which this frontier city afforded were demoralizing the recruits faster than he could train them, he shipped them all to a camp 27 miles down the Ohio, named the post Legionville, and settled down for a winter's work as drill-sergeant. For so many of the experienced officers of the army had been killed at St. Clair's defeat that Wayne found himself surrounded by officers that needed training as much as the privates did.

In May, 1793, the command was transferred to a camp in the vicinity of Fort Washington (Cincinnati). In the meantime Knox, Secretary of War (he who, by his stupidity,

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saved the British from utter defeat at Germantown), had not been sparing in giving the "advice" to Wayne which Washington supposed was needed. Extracts from Knox's letters are interesting. Thus:

"The sentiments of the citizens of the United States are adverse in the extreme to an Indian war."

"It is still more necessary than heretofore that no offensive operations should be undertaken against the Indians."

The last extract is from a letter sent to Wayne at Fort Washington at the time the three American commissioners were on their way to negotiate for peace under the protection of the British—at a time when the British, with what Roosevelt calls "smooth duplicity" (Winning of the West), were making open pretense of friendship for the United States, and in every underhanded way were strengthening the Indian determination to continue the war.

The work that Wayne did at Legionville and Fort Washington gives us a view of his character that has been almost, but not quite, overlooked by historians—the thoroughness of the man. Day by day he brought that mob of weaklings and degenerates upon the parade-

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ground. Day by day, and all day long, he made them march to and fro and go through the manual of arms until a time came when their watery eyes cleared, their backbones stiffened, and their slouching gait became an elastic tread. He taught them to wheel into line, to lower their muskets and with the bayonet charge an enemy they had to imagine was before them. And he taught them to yell at the top of their voices when they did so.

He did more. In the annals of the West there is one story which the writers tell almost with awe. Louis Wetzell, they say, could run "with almost the speed of a deer through the woods, and while doing so could load his rifle." The annalist writes that with wide-eyed wonder, but Wayne took his mob of weaklings and trained them until he had nearly 1,000 men who could do as Wetzell did—who could load their rifles as they charged the enemy at the top of their speed.

Anthony Wayne—"Mad Anthony"—was not only an ideal leader of men in time of battle, but *he was the most capable drill-master the American army has ever had.*

One reads that in one of the drill charges a squad of mounted men were led into the river until some were thought to be in danger

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of drowning, and on another occasion they were sent charging across a brigadier-general's private garden in order to accustom them to obeying orders that seemed without reason. But only one writer (Winsor) has recorded the ability of Wayne's men to load and fire and load again as they charged the enemy. That they were also taught to shoot with accuracy scarcely need be said. Their skill "as marksmen astonished the savages on St. Patrick's day," 1793, when the camp at Legionville received a visit, and it was the marvel of the frontiersmen.

Inevitably the story of Wayne's thorough work reached the hostile camps by the lakes, and the British who attended the American peace commissioners protested. At that these commissioners wrote to the Secretary of War a strong remonstrance against Wayne's vigorous work on the drill-ground, and said that their reason for remonstrating was that Wayne's work angered the Indians and the *British* considered it "unfair and unwarrantable."

Fortunately, Wayne was not ordered to stop drilling his men. More fortunately still, when the peace commissioners reached the Detroit River the Indians sent them a mes-



SITE OF THE BATTLE OF THE FALLEN TIMBERS.

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sage from a "general council, at the foot of Miami (Maumee) Rapids, the 13th day of August, 1793," which said:

Brothers: We shall be persuaded that you mean to do us justice, if you agree that the Ohio shall remain the boundary line between us. If you will not consent thereto, our meeting will be altogether unnecessary.

A battle was inevitable, though not immediately at hand. For the news of the failure of the peace negotiations traveled so slowly in those days, when lakes and rivers were the only comfortable highways of the region, that it was not possible for Wayne to receive orders to advance until it was too late to do effective work in that season (1793).

On the whole, however, the delay was advantageous to the ultimate result, because it gave Wayne additional time for drilling his men, and it gave the British time in which to prepare the Indians for the conflict. It was necessary that both sides be well prepared, if a decisive victory was to be obtained.

What the British now did to prepare the Indians is a most important feature of this war. "The attitude of the British gradually changed from passive to active hostility,"

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says Roosevelt. "The advisers of the King, relying on the weakness of the young Federal Republic, had begun to adopt that tone of brutal insolence which reflected well the general attitude of the British people toward the Americans, and which finally brought on the second war between the two nations."

In the winter (1793-'94), Little Turtle, who had led the red hosts when St. Clair was defeated, went to Canada to secure help, and on February 10th, with some other chiefs, met Lord Dorchester (the Guy Carleton who had, with 1,800 men, held Quebec in spite of the assaults of 500 American boasters), who was now Governor of Canada, for a formal conference. Dorchester had just returned from a visit to England, and reflecting the spirit of the British Government, he said:

From the manner in which the people of the United States push on, and act, and talk, on this side; and from what I learn of their conduct toward the sea, I shall not be surprised if we are at war with them in the course of the present year; and if so, a line must be drawn by the Warriors. . . . I have told you that there is no line between them and us. I shall acknowledge no lands to be theirs which have been encroached on by them since the year 1783. . . . All approaches towards

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us since that time, and *all the purchases* [of land from the Indians] *made by them I consider as an infringement on the King's rights.* And when a line is drawn between us, they must lose all their improvements and houses on our side of it. Those people must all be gone who do not obtain leave to become the King's subjects.

Lord Dorchester wished the Indians to believe that the British were going to declare war against the United States, and they did believe so. The speech was made deliberately for the purpose of encouraging the Indians to fight, and the purpose was accomplished. But Dorchester did not stop with giving the Indians an encouraging speech. To emphasize his words and add to the hostile spirit of the Indians, he sent Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe, in April, 1794, with three companies of British regulars and an unstated number of Canadians, to invade the United States and built a fort (Fort Miami) at the foot of the Maumee Rapids (just above the modern city of Toledo, Ohio). This fort was constructed in such fashion that it could not be carried without cannon, or it carried without cannon, then at an enormous loss of life in the assaulting party. To the Indians it seemed impregnable. Sim-

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coe, who had been the colonel of a Tory regiment during the Revolution, as previously noted, heartily hated the Americans, and was careful to do the work well. Of the speeches that Simcoe made to the Indians meantime, there is no official record, but a Pottawattami brave, captured by the Americans before the final battle, boasted that the British had promised to reenforce the Indians with 1,500 men; and a Shawnee, at about the same time, said that Captain Elliott, the Tory partizan, had gone to Detroit, and had promised to bring back 1,000 white men to aid the Indians.

While making these promises, the British officials gave the Indians abundant supplies of arms and ammunition, and Alexander McKee, the British Indian agent, was careful to see that the Indians received guns of the best quality, instead of the trade guns usually given them in exchange for furs.

The British fort, built on American soil, and where it might serve well to protect the Indian villages along the Maumee, was to the red men a sufficient earnest that the promises of reenforcements would be kept. The supplies of ammunition gave additional assurance, and 2,000 warriors, well armed and

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eager for the conflict, gathered on the Maumee in the spring of 1794.

And while they rested there, looking forward eagerly for the day of battle, they were visited by emissaries of the Spanish Governor at New Orleans, who came to promise them aid and to urge them on to fight. For the Spanish were then holding, and hoping to keep, a great breadth of the United States territory in the Southwest.

In the meantime (October 7, 1793), Wayne had left his camp at Fort Washington. The faint-hearted Knox had written in September to say: "Let it therefore again, and for the last time, be impressed deeply upon your mind, that as little as possible is to be hazarded . . . that a defeat at the present time and under the present circumstances, would be pernicious in the highest degree to the interests of our country." To this Wayne replied: "I pray you not to permit present appearances to cause too much anxiety either in the mind of the President or yourself on account of this army."

Wayne knew his men at last, and they knew him. On October 13th the command encamped where Greenville, Ohio, now stands. It was then a spot in the midst of the wilder-

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ness. Wayne built winter quarters and a base of supplies there, and named the post for his old friend, Major-General Greene, under whom he had fought when in Georgia. The post stood 6 miles north of Fort Jefferson and 80 from Cincinnati.

From this post a detachment was sent forward, and a fort was erected on the site of St. Clair's defeat. It was named Fort Recovery, and a village in Mercer County, Ohio, perpetuates the name. The Indians, in large bands, haunted the trail over which supplies were brought from Cincinnati. Several convoys were attacked, with some loss of men, and especially of officers, for although some of the recruits were yet "bashful," as a contemporary writes, the young officers had caught the spirit of the general, and they fought like tigers. But instead of injuring the Legion by these attacks, the Indians only gave it needed experience.

In the garrisons the winter wore away with unending drills. In the spring came rains that flooded the forest, and Wayne was obliged to wait for the dry season. While he waited the impatient Indians swarmed down to Fort Recovery in a band that numbered, at the lowest estimate, 1,500—the most power-

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ful war party that had ever faced the white men—even more powerful than that which the intrepid Cornstalk had taken to Point Pleasant in 1774. A number of British soldiers and Canadians were in the band, and they were accompanied by several British officers who intended to aid the Indians with advice—particularly in the matter of handling some cannon that had been abandoned by St. Clair, and had been hidden by the Indians under some logs in the woods. The cannon were not found, however, because the Americans had recovered them; but the officers remained to encourage the red warriors.

The Indians reached the neighborhood of Fort Recovery on the night of June 29, 1794. A party of 140 Americans that had brought supplies to the fort was encamped without the walls that night, and on the morning of the 30th the Indians charged them and soon drove them within the fort, with no small loss. Then the exultant red men, with their white allies, dashed up to the fort in an effort to enter in with the flying Americans, or at worst, to swarm over the walls and massacre the garrison.

But Captain Alexander Gibson, who commanded the fort, though he had less than one-

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fifth as many men as were in the attacking force, closed the gate in time, manned the walls, and with a fire that was made deadly by the unceasing practise the men had had, drove the enemy back.

One repulse, however, could not defeat these red men; for they were confident of ultimate success because of their superior numbers, and because the British officers were behind them to urge them on. Throughout the whole day the fort was closely besieged; but when night came they gathered up their dead by the light of torches, and the next morning, after the failure of a feeble assault, they fled away through the forest, beaten.

Three weeks later General Charles Scott, with more than 1,000 mounted militiamen from Kentucky, joined Wayne, and on July 27th the army began once more its northward march. Scouts were kept out in all directions, and they were so active and vigilant that the Indian scouts were baffled. The Indians came to believe that Wayne was marching toward the head of the Maumee (Fort Wayne, Ind.), when in fact he was headed for the junction of the Maumee and Auglaise Rivers.

On the banks of the St. Mary's River, in

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Mercer County, Wayne paused long enough to erect a stockade for the protection of convoys with supplies. He named it Fort Adams, and then continued cutting his way through the solid green timber in Van Wert and Paulding Counties (I saw the old trail through the woods often forty years ago), and he reached the junction of the Maumee and Auglaise Rivers on August 8th.

The French had named this big tributary of the Maumee Au Glaise because of the rich loam of the plains found there. When Wayne arrived the fields of corn stretched away for miles along both rivers, and the corn was in the black silk, but the Indians were to have no green-corn dance that year. A deserter named Newman had given the Indians the alarm, so that they fled just in time to escape, but their homes and fields were desolated, and a fort was built in the forks of the rivers that, with his mind on the British invaders, Wayne named Fort Defiance. And the town of Defiance, Ohio, perpetuates its name.

On August 15th Wayne crossed to and marched down the left bank of the Maumee. He marched slowly, because he was still willing to give the tribes peace, but fortunately

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for the ultimate result, the Indians had full confidence that the British in the fort at the foot of the rapids would give them aid in battle, and succor in case of need, as they had promised to do. So Wayne's offers were rejected. But to gain time for bringing on reinforcements Chief Little Turtle asked for a cessation of hostilities for ten days, promising to treat at the end of that time—a request that Wayne refused of course.

On August 18, 1794, Wayne and his army arrived at a spot called Roche de Bout, at the head of the rapids, where he camped. The modern village of Waterville marks the site of the camping-ground. Here the army lay on the 19th while numerous scouts examined the enemy's ground and a small fortification called Fort Deposit was thrown up to protect the baggage.

Most interesting were the facts that the scouts learned. There were from 1,500 to 2,000 Indians and 70 white Canadians waiting to meet the American army. The ground where they were lying was known as the Fallen Timbers. A tornado had swept across the country and had piled up the huge trees of the primitive forest in confused masses and heaps that gave ideal cover for such fighters



THE BATTLE OF THE FALLEN TIMBERS.

The Battle of the Fallen Timbers

as the red men. The British fort was but two miles below the advance edge of this entanglement, and the Indians were confident that its garrison would come to their aid as soon as the battle was begun.

Having studied the ground well on the 19th, Wayne gave his men their breakfast the next morning, and then at eight o'clock, with a battalion of mounted Kentuckians, under Major Price as an advance-guard, he marched down the river in column. Wayne was suffering from gout so severely that morning that he could not mount unaided, and four men lifted him into the saddle. The pain brought tears to his eyes, but he held his place.

When between five and six miles below the camp, Major Price, with his advance-guard, saw the Indians in their hiding-place, and charged them. But the enemy was in full force among those tangled masses of tree trunks, and they opened a fire that literally hurled the Kentuckians back on Wayne's main army.

The supreme moment of the day and of the long war on the frontier had come. With instant decision Wayne ordered the militia under General Scott away to turn the enemy's

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right, and the dragoons of the Legion to cut in between the river and the enemy's left. At the same time a line of infantry 900 strong, with bayonets fixed, was stretched before the enemy, while a second line was placed as a reserve in the rear, and then he gave the word to charge.

And as the long roll of the drums began, that battle line leaped forward, yelling with the joy of the conflict. They pitchforked the red men and their allies from behind the logs, shot them down as they fled, and dashing on in relentless pursuit, loaded and fired, again and again, till they had driven the panic-stricken hosts past the tight-closed British fort, and scattered them far and away in the wilderness beyond.

CHAPTER XXII

WHEN HIS WORK WAS DONE

THAT bayonet charge of 900 infantrymen decided the Battle of the Fallen Timbers, for the dragoons and the mounted militiamen were able to join in only after the bayonet had forked the enemy into a run. It also practically ended the long war on the frontier. There were a few small raids by small bodies of red men thereafter, but the hope of the tribes was gone. The Americans lost 33 killed and 100 wounded. The Indians lost two or three times as many. Several of the British rangers were killed also.

With promises which he never intended to fulfil the British Governor had urged on the Indians to fight. He did this solely to promote the British fur trade and other British interests. But when the battle came the gates of the fort that had been so ostentatiously erected on the banks of the Maumee for the aid and protection of the Indians were kept closed. Not one red man found protection there from the bayonets of Wayne's fierce in-

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fantry. The Indians were deliberately abandoned to their fate then, as they had been in 1783, and they well understood that they had been. Said Joseph Brant, the great Mohawk chief, who had been most active in keeping alive the frontier war (who had striven for years to form a war league among the Western tribes to force back the American home builders), in a letter to Sir John Johnson:

"The Indians were engaged in a war to assist the English," but were "left in the lurch at the peace, to fight alone until they could make peace for themselves. After repeatedly defeating the armies of the United States so that they *sent* Commissioners to endeavor to get peace, the Indians were so advised as prevented them from listening to any terms and hopes were given them of assistance. A fort was even built in their country, under pretence of giving refuge in case of necessity; but when that time came the gates were shut against them as enemies. . . . They relied upon it for support and were deceived."

The events immediately following the battle also impressed the Indians deeply. The British fort was commanded by Major William Campbell. On August 21st the major wrote to Wayne to ask "in what light I am to

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view your making such near approaches to this garrison?" Wayne replied that "were you entitled to an answer, the most full and satisfactory one was announced to you from muzzles of my small arms yesterday morning."

On the 22d Campbell wrote saying: "Should you, after this, continue to approach my post in the threatening manner you are at this moment doing, my indispensable duty . . . will oblige me to" fire on you.

By the latest instructions he had received Wayne was permitted to attack this fort if, in his judgment, it was to the interest of the nation to do so; for Washington's doubt as to Wayne's ability and good judgment had vanished. When Wayne was clearing the eyes and stiffening the backbones of the slouching mob that had been given to him as an army, he was clearing other eyes than those of his recruits. But Wayne thought it was not yet necessary to attack the fort; instead of doing so he replied to Major Campbell's letter by sweeping from the ground every building (including the trading store of Alexander McKee, the British Indian agent), and every other improvement, up to, and "even under the muzzles of the guns" in the fort.

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It is certain that this destruction of British property under the guns of a fort manned by British soldiers finally and fully convinced the Indian sachems that their hope of help from the British was gone forever.

After clearing the ground about Fort Miami, Wayne went down the river and built a wooden fort, called Fort Industry, on land that now forms the "easterly corner of Summit and Monroe Streets," Toledo, Ohio (Gunckel's "Maumee Valley"). When this was finished and garrisoned the army moved slowly up the Maumee Valley. The Indian settlements had looked like a continuous village, and the valley was one vast cornfield. But in the interests of peace all the villages and the corn had to be destroyed; and the work was done thoroughly.

At the junction of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph's Rivers—the head of the Maumee—where the army arrived on September 17th, a large fort was built, and placed under the command of Colonel John F. Hamtramck, who, on October 20, 1794, "after a discharge of 15 guns, and naming the fort by a garrison order 'Fort Wayne,' marched his command into it." (Captain John Cooke's Journal.)

Wayne left Fort Wayne on October 27th

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(after having, in the meantime, built boats for the navigation of the Maumee, and otherwise provided for holding the country), and reached Greenville on Sunday, November 2, 1794. Here he settled down for the winter. And here, on August 3, 1795, he concluded a treaty with 15 tribes and divisions of tribes, "to put an end to a destructive war, to settle all controversies, and to restore harmony and friendly intercourse" between the Indians and the United States; also to establish a boundary between the red men and the white. And this the treaty did. For the first time in twenty years there was peace on the frontier, and the peace lasted nearly fifteen years.

It is pleasing to remember that in negotiating this treaty Wayne frankly and fully explained its meaning again and again to the Indians. They learned exactly what land they were selling and exactly what was expected of them. In return for the cession they received \$20,000 worth of goods, which were distributed to the 1,130 Indians present, while annuities amounting in all to \$9,500 were granted to the tribes represented. Then "as a last word," Wayne told the Indians they were "children and no longer brothers."

But more than peace with the red man was obtained by this work of Anthony Wayne. A

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war with Great Britain was averted by the victory at the Fallen Timbers. John Jay had been sent to London to negotiate a treaty, a chief object of which was to secure to the United States the territory defined by the treaty of 1783 and the evacuation of the American frontier posts that the British had been holding in defiance of that treaty, and had, indeed, strengthened, as if intending to hold them forever. When Jay arrived and opened negotiations, the British commissioner (Grenville), who had heard of the skill of Wayne's Legion, stipulated first of all that there should be no overt act of war between the two nations during the negotiations. And when he heard how the bayonet had done the work at Fallen Timbers, he promptly agreed that the British would abandon the forts they had held so long.

It was Anthony Wayne who first spread the Gridiron Flag over all the broad domain between the Ohio River, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi River. It was he that opened the way for the home builders, who soon came in throngs over all the routes to the new land.

Praise had not been lacking during the career of Anthony Wayne, even though the envy of lesser minds had given Washington an incorrect view of the man. But after his work

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at Greenville had been completed he was to have one day of glory. For three years he had lived in the wilderness, where at times weeks passed without news from the civilized part of the nation. But after the treaty was concluded, and everything was made secure, Wayne returned to Pennsylvania. How he was applauded along the route by the hero-worshipping populace one "can better imagine than express," to quote words he often used in his letters. On Saturday, February 6, 1796, he reached Philadelphia. Four miles from the city three troops of light horse from the city met him, to serve him as a guard of honor. A salute of 15 guns was fired as he crossed the ferry, and "he was ushered into the city by the ringing of bells, and other demonstrations of joy, and thousands of citizens crowded to see and welcome the return of their brave general, whom they attended to the city tavern, where he alighted. In the evening a display of fireworks was exhibited" (Pennsylvania Gazette, February 10, 1796).

And Congress had resolved (December 4, 1794) "That the thanks of this House be given to Major-General Wayne for the good conduct and bravery displayed by him in the action of the twentieth of August last, with the Indians."

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But when Wayne's greatest hour of glory and joy came to him—when all men acknowledged the worth of his work—the sun was low down in the afternoon of his day.

On April 30, 1796, the House decided to vote appropriations to carry into effect Jay's treaty with England, and orders were sent by the British authorities to commanders of the posts on the American territory to deliver them up to the Americans. Fort Miami, on the Maumee, had been abandoned by the British on July 11, 1795, and now that the others were to be evacuated, Wayne was appointed to receive them.

"He knew the English on the border, with their allies the Indians, and they knew him," says one writer. Moreover, the man who had won the territory was the one to whom the honor of receiving it was due.

Wayne left home on this mission in July, 1796. It is worth noting that one Moses Cleaveland, with a party of 50 pioneers, had left Connecticut the preceding month on his way to settle where Cleveland, Ohio, now stands—the first of the great hosts of home makers who thronged to the region to which Wayne had confirmed the American title.

Of Wayne's meeting with the British officials and with the Indians, and of the transfer

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of the posts, one fact only is memorable: Wayne was treated with the distinguished consideration that soldiers and warriors—men trained to fight—always give to one who has met them man-fashion. The Miami Indians had named him Black Snake because of the relentless manner in which his army had penetrated the wilderness thickets in search of the enemy. The Pottawattamies called him the Tornado because of the impetuosity of his men when they charged at the Fallen Timbers.

In November, when this work was finally done, Wayne sailed from Detroit in the sloop Detroit, for Presque Isle (Erie, Pa.). On November 17th, the day before he landed, he was seized with an attack of his old enemy, the gout. He was taken ashore on the 18th, and at the American fortress overlooking the bay he was cared for as tenderly as possible.

But care was unavailing. "How long he can continue to suffer such torture is hard to say," wrote one of the garrison on December 14th, "but it appears to me that nature must soon sink under such acute affliction." In his life he had faced every vicissitude of a soldier's career with clear eyes, and now, with unbroken fortitude, he died.

The end came at ten minutes after two

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o'clock on the morning of December 15, 1796. At his request they buried him at the foot of the flagstaff of the fortress. He wished to lie under the shadow of the flag for which he had fought faithfully and well.

Here his body remained until 1809, when, at the request of his son, Colonel Isaac Wayne, his bones were taken up and carried to St. David's churchyard, at Radnor, near Philadelphia. There a modest monument was erected by the Society of the Cincinnati, on which these words were inscribed:

(North Front)

Major General
Anthony Wayne
was born at Waynesborough
In Chester County
State of Pennsylvania
A. D. 1745.
After a life of Honor & Usefulness
He died in December 1796,
At a military post
On the shores of Lake Erie
Commander-in-chief of the Army of
The United States.
His military achievements
Are consecrated
In the history of his country
And in
The hearts of his countrymen.
His Remains
Are here Deposited.

When His Work was Done

(South Front)

In honor of the distinguished
Military Services of
MAJOR GENERAL ANTHONY WAYNE
And as an affectionate tribute
of respect to his Memory
This Stone was erected by his Companions
In Arms
The Pennsylvania State Society of
The Cincinnati,
July 4th A. D. 1809,
Thirty fourth anniversary of
The Independence of the United States,
An event which constitutes the most
Appropriate Eulogium
Of an American Soldier and
Patriot.

In 1876 the original grave at Erie was discovered, and in 1879 an appropriation of \$1,000 was obtained from the State Legislature by patriotic citizens of the city. To this the citizens added \$500, and with the total sum a stone was placed on the grave where the dust of his body reposed. Over this stone a model of a blockhouse of squared oak logs was erected, 16 feet square and 10 feet high. Above that a second story, octagonal in shape, was built, and from the center of the roof—directly above the grave—was erected a flagstaff, from which the Gridiron Flag is flung to the breeze.

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With the monument at Radnor and the flagstaff at Erie in mind, one might believe that "the paths of glory lead but to the grave." Yet it is not so. For while the memory of his work remains, who can estimate the influence of a hero upon his countrymen?

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